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Abstract 
The purpose of the thesis is to identify why Tibet has been unable to achieve the 
independence or self-determination it seeks while, at the same time, more than fifty 
years after the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Tibet Question remains unresolved. In 
conducting an examination of the legal theory of self-determination and its 
limitations, in an analysis incorporating legal norms of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and also human rights, further objectives are to find out how the international 
legal system and the legal theory on which it is premised have impacted on the 
relationship between China and Tibet. The thesis in addition considers the 
implications for international law of the failure of the international community to 
resolve the Tibet issue in a rapidly changing world where the principle of external 
self-determination is seen to be extending its reach and what has been perceived as a 
bar on unilateral secession is called into question. Current theories and developments 
with respect to self-determination are considered, against a subtext of political 
realism, as is the extent of human rights abuses in Tibet. I conclude the thesis with an 
assessment that Tibet needs to refocus its claims with reference to self-determination 
to take advantage of potential reconfiguration of the law resulting from developments 
in the proposed Kosovo Status Settlement, together also with an assessment of the 
pressures on international law arising not only from the long-standing and presently 
unresolved Tibet Question but also from the dynamism evinced in the theory of self- 
determination particularly with reference to the ongoing situation in Kosovo. 
ii 
Summary Contents 
List ofAbbreviations ix 
Acknowledgments xii 
1 Introduction 1 
2 The Evolving Boundaries of the Legal Theory of Self-Determination 22 
3 The Changing Identity of Tibet 62 
4 Issues Pertaining to Sovereignty and Tibet 99 
5 Human Rights in the Sino-Tibetan Context 143 
6 Self-Determination and Beyond 181 
7 Conclusions 221 
Appendix of Primary Sources 243 
Bibliography 253 
iii 
Contents 
List ofAbbreviations ix 
Acknowledgments xii 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Background and the Issues 1 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 4 
1.3 Theory, Methodology and Literature 7 
1.3.1 Theory 7 
1.3.2 Methodology: A Library-Based Research Study 12 
1.3.3 Literature Review 14 
1.3.3.1 Primary Sources 14 
1.3.3.2 Secondary Sources 16 
1.4 Summary of the Structure of the Thesis 18 
2 The Evolving Boundaries of the Legal Theory of 
Self-Determination 
2.1 Introduction 22 
2.2 History 22 
2.3 Issues Inherent in the Theory 27 
2.3.1 Who Are Peoples'? 27 
2.3.2 The Conflict With Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity 31 
2.3.3 Links Between Self-Determination and Human Rights 35 
iv 
2.4 Analysis of the Theory 40 
2.4.1 Rule or Principle 40 
2.4.2 Dynamism of the Theory 44 
2.4.2.1 The Soviet Union 44 
2.4.2.2 Eastern Europe 47 
2.4.2.3 An Ongoing Process 51 
2.4.2.4 The Move Towards Internal Self-Determination 53 
2.4.3 Choice Theorists and Remedial Right Theorists 57 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 59 
3 The Changing Identity of Tibet 
3.1 Introduction 62 
3.2 Tibet at the Time Prior to the Chinese Insurgence 63 
3.2.1 Turmoil in China and Repercussions in Tibet 64 
3.2.2 Governance, Religion and Culture in Tibet 1911-1950 67 
3.2.3 Buddhism in Tibet and Confucianism in China 69 
3.3 An Invasion or Liberation? 71 
3.3.1 A Synopsis 71 
3.3.2 The Agreement on Measuresfor the Peaceful Liberation of 72 
Tibet 
3.3.3 The Chinese Perspective 73 
3.3.4 The Tibetan Perspective 77 
3.4 The Aftermath and Impacts of the Seventeen-Point Agreement 80 
3.4.1 The Collapse of Tibet as a State 83 
V 
3.4.2 The Flight of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Response 84 
3.4.3 Severe Measures in Tibet and the International Response 86 
3.5 Issues 91 
3.5.1 Fluidity ofPolitical and Legal Identity 91 
3.5.2 Autonomy 93 
3.5.3 The Relevance of the Remedial Right Theory to Chinese 95 
Tibet 
3.5.4 Physical Movement ofPeoples 97 
3.5.5 Final Words 98 
4 Issues Pertaining to Sovereignty and Tibet 
4.1 Introduction 99 
4.2 Sovereignty 99 
4.2.1 As Criteriafor Statehood 99 
4.2.1.1 A Permanent Population 101 
4.2.1.2 A Defined Territory 102 
4.2.1.3 Government 103 
4.2.1.4 Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States 104 
4.2.2 Recognition of Statehood 105 
4.2.3 China and International Law 108 
4.3 Changing Concepts of Sovereignty 112 
4.4 Tibetan Sovereignty 117 
4.4.1 Introductory Words 117 
4.4.2 Tibet at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century 119 
vi 
4.4.2.1 A Tibetan Population? 120 
4.4.2.2 Tibetan Territory 122 
4.4.2.3 Effective Tibetan Government 125 
4.4.2.4 Tibet's Capacity to Enter into International 129 
Relations 
4.4.3 Recognition of Tibet 133 
4.5 Application of Sovereignty at the Present Time 135 
4.5.1 Summation 135 
4.5.2 Potentialfor Recognition of Tibet 138 
5 Human Rights in the Sino-Tibetan Context 
5.1 Introduction 143 
5.2 Priorities under the Human Rights Regime 145 
5.2.1 Universalism and Relativism 145 
5.2.2 The Bangkok Declaration 149 
5.3 The Chinese Constitution and Human Rights 151 
5.3.1 The 1982 Constitution 151 
5.3.2 Legislation and White Papers 155 
5.3.3 China and the International Human Rights Regime 159 
5.4 Oppression in Tibet 163 
5.4.1 Civil and Political Rights 164 
5.4.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 170 
5.5 Human Rights as a Challenge to Sovereignty 175 
vii 
6 Self-Determination and Beyond 
6.1 The Twenty-First Century Context 181 
6.2 A Tempered Idealism 181 
62.1 Choice Theorists 182 
6.2.2 Remedial Right Theorists 186 
6.3 The Dynamic Theory of Self-Determination: A New Progression 189 
6.3.1 Secession 190 
6.3.2 Kosovo and Intervention by the International Community 193 
63.3 The Future Status of Kosovo 197 
6.4 Enhanced Autonomy and Autonomy Light 204 
6.4.1 Elements q Autonomy 205 
6.4.2 The Meaning ofAutonomy in Tibet 209 
6.5 The Tibet Question and Supervised Statehood 214 
7 Conclusions 
7.1 Opening Remarks 221 
7.2 The Kosovo Status Settlement: A New Development 222 
7.3 A Kosovan Focus for Tibet 226 
7.4 Implications for Public International Law 236 
Appendix of Primary Sources 243 
Bibliography 253 
viii 
List of Abbreviations 
Badinter Commission Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace 
in Yugoslavia 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CFI Court of First Instance 
CHR Commission on Human Rights 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (of the United Nations) 
EJIL European Journal of International Law 
EU European Union 
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
lCCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
lCJ International Court of Justice 
ICLT International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 
IFDA International Foundation for Development 
Alternatives, Nyon, Switzerland 
ILO International Labour Organization 
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO-led) 
LNTS League of Nations Treaty Series 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
ix 
NGOs Non-govemmental organisations 
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
PCART Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of 
Tibet 
PLA People's Liberation Army 
PRC People's Republic of China 
Seventeen-Point Agreement Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of 
Tibet 1951 
TAR Tibet Autonomous Region 
TCHRD Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo 
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
UNOSEK United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for 
Kosovo 
UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
x 
1991 Charter 1991 Charter of the Tibetans in-Exile 
xi 
Acknowledgements 
My particular thanks are due to Professor Ian Ward, my principal supervisor, who has 
actively supported me in the preparation of this thesis. I am grateful for the time he 
has spent considering its content throughout the three years it has been in course of 
preparation, as well as for the invaluable advice and guidance he has provided. 
My thanks are also due to Dr James Sweeney, for steering me towards Newcastle Law 
School at the outset of the project and for his input during the first two years of work 
when he acted as my second supervisor before his transfer to pastures new at Durham 
University. Dr Elena Katselli then stepped into his shoes, and I am grateful for the 
detailed consideration she has given to the text and for her willingly transmitted 
knowledge of international law. 
I am indebted to the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Newcastle 
University for the grant of a postgraduate studentship and to Ashley Wilton, Head of 
Newcastle Law School, for the grant of bursary funding. Without these awards the 
thesis would not have come to fruition. 
On a rather more personal note, I should thank my parents, Rachel and the late Walter 
Dickinson, whose commitment to education I am sure has rubbed off on me. Lastly, I 
wish to record my gratitude to my wife, Marion. Throughout my period of study she 
has provided cheerful and unfailing support to ensure its completion, and it is to her 
that I now dedicate this work. 
xii 
I Introduction 
1.1 The Background and the Issues 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century the people of the world are on the 
move as never before. The age of mass travel has dawned, as ease of communication 
expands amid a burgeoning global infrastructure. All this facilitated by an ever- 
increasing speed of technological advance, leading to a world that would have been 
unrecognisable a century ago, even fifty years ago. A world, though, that has as a 
result a new range of problems, difficulties which themselves can be exacerbated by 
the very speed of change. 
Road and rail construction projects enable people to travel more freely and 
extensively on land, and the construction of new airports together with expansion of 
existing airports broadens the accessibility of many parts of the world to the business 
traveller and to the tourist. The advent of the Internet means that information becomes 
accessible on an exponential basis. As greater numbers go 'on-line' and have wider 
access to all sorts of information, that which was unknown or secret becomes 
available to increasing numbers of people. 
Politically and economically the world shrinks and becomes more integrated. The 
interests of the United Nations extend around the globe, and offshoots of that 
organisation, economic, humanitarian and otherwise, operate in ever more countries, a 
constraint on the power of the state. Similarly, supranational organisations such as the 
European Union impinge on established power of states; bodies such as the World 
Trade Organization exist to regulate trade among nations throughout the world; and 
I 
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement regulate not only trade, as evident 
from its title, but also seek to raise living standards within its area and to regulate, for 
instance, environmental conditions. The link between politics and economics is 
woven and evident, and globalisation continues apace. ' 
Parallel to this increased integration there is a concurrent fragmentation of states. This 
is incipient in, for example, Canada and Australia, where indigenous peoples seek 
greater powers, and has become transparent in the unified Soviet Union, and also 
Yugoslavia, now both largely broken up into their constituent parts. 2 Territorial 
integrity is a political imperative of states, and this type of political development is 
anathema to the nation state, be it an ethnically homogeneous nation state or a 
multinational or multicultural state. 
Those seeking to break up the state may attempt to do so by peaceful or violent 
means, the latter exemplified by terrorism, itself more easily achieved as a result of 
improved communication, both in transport and by reason of technological advances. 3 
Similarly, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants are more easily able to move from 
the country they seek to escape: physically due to an improving infrastructure, but 
1 'Man is no longer indigenous, native to one place; he is global': Finkielkraut A, In the Name of 
Humanity Reflections on the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 2001) 105. By virtue of this 
integration the world becomes more interdependent: see Twining W, Globalisation and Legal Theory 
(London: Butterworths, 2000) 5. Boaventura de Sousa Santos emphasises the pace of globalisation, 
when writing 'One of the transformations most commonly associated with globalization is time-space 
compression, that is, the social process by which phenomena speed up and spread out across the globe': 
Santos B de S, Toward A New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, And Emancipation, Second 
Edition (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) 179. 
2A 'tribalism' emanating, for instance, from the former Yugoslavia in contrast to a homogeneous state 
or region: see, for example, Finkielkraut, ibid, 97. Thus Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri contend that 
the legacy of modernity is one of violence: Hardt M and Negri A, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 46. 
3 Technological advances, for instance, of media communication and the communications industry are 
relevant not only in this respect, but are of significance generally with regard to globalisation: 
'Communication not only expresses but also organizes the movement of globalization' (Hardt and 
Negri, ibid, 32). John Gray argues that the worldwide spread of new technologies, creating a global 
economy, results in 'an anarchy of sovereign states, rival capitalisms and stateless zones': Gray J, 
False Dawiv The Delusions of Global Capitalism (London: Granta Books, 1998) 194. 
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also others are more aware of their plight through increased knowledge available to 
them by means of the media or by the Internet. In consequence of this increased 
knowledge, greater assistance is available to those seeking a new state. This assistance 
may be voluntary or on a commercial basis, and the latter may lead the immigrant, the 
refugee, into a fresh set of problems. 
As lawyers, we may ask whether 'the law', either the law of a state or intemational 
law, has adapted to a changing world order and whether it meets the demands now 
placed upon it. This was brought home to me in November 2003, when travelling in 
the Himalayas and encountering a group of Tibetan refugees who, with their Han 
Chinese guides, had crossed the border into Nepal. Illicit migration from Tibet still 
continues more than fifty years after the Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet and 
more than forty years after the flight of the present Dalai Lama to India. While the 
phenomenon is fixed in the context of the historical relationship between Tibet and 
China and of issues relating to human rights, in and of itself it raises issues of wider 
significance: those relating to the physical movement of peoples and the fluidity of 
political and legal identity. It also has particular relevance to the modem doctrine of 
external self-determination, set in the context of the concept of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and raises questions of autonomy. 4 
In this background the thesis has its genesis and the aims and objectives of the 
research become visible. 
4 The modem doctrine of self-determination is in contrast to the principle of sovereignty, which aims to 
protect the status quo. Self-determination is a right held by 'peoples' as opposed to states, and has the 
potential in its external form to change the status quo. See Seidel G, 'A New Dimension of the Right of 
Self-Determination in Kosovo? ' in C Tomuschat (ed. ), Kosovo and the International Community: A 
Legal Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 203-215,203; also Chapters 2 and 6 
below generally re self-determination; section 2.3.1 re peoples; and Chapter 4 generally re sovereignty. 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
Two issues are paramount in the thesis: the first, the particular, relates to Tibet, and 
the second, on a general level, to self-detennination. Thus the principal objective of 
the thesis is to find out and understand why, in a rapidly changing world, Tibet has 
been unable to achieve the statehood and self-determination it seeks, while, at the 
same time, so many years after the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Tibet Question 
remains unresolved. To this end, the main aim of the thesis is to conduct an 
examination of the legal theory of self-determination and its limitations, and in doing 
so against the backdrop of Tibet further objectives are to ascertain how the 
international legal system and the legal theory on which it is premised have impacted 
on the relationship between China and Tibet. In contextualising the aims and 
objectives relating to the particular issue, it is first necessary to consider the nature of 
what may be termed 'the Tibet Question'. 
The Tibet Question is one that centres on territory and control. It has various facets: it 
is about what is or should be the political status of Tibet - whether it is a part of China 
or historically an independent state; 5 whether it should be an independent state, and if 
so what is the extent of that state? If not an independent state, issues of its status 
within China arise. For Barry Sautman, the Tibet Question is 'one of the world's most 
5 An 'inalienable' part of China, as claimed by the Chinese authorities, or 'a fully-fledged independent 
country, as the Tibetan government-in-exile claims': Tibet Information Network, Unity and discord 
Music and politics in contemporary Tibet (London: Tibet Information Network, 2004) 8. See also 
Sautman B and Dreyer JT, 'Introduction: The Tibet Question in Contemporary Perspective' in B 
Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet. - Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed 
Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 3-22,5. 
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intractable conflicts ... [inter alia] a 
long-running ethnic dispute that has persisted 
into the post-Cold War era of rising nationalism ... 
[and] a sovereignty dispute 5-6 
Consequently it is a question at the nub of which is independence. However, 
commentators also focus on human rights issues, and hence the issue can become one 
of nationalism or ethno-nationalist struggle for self-determination. Melvyn Goldstein 
specifically refers to it as 'a conflict about nationalism - an emotion-laden debate 
over whether political units should directly parallel ethnic units'. 7 There are various 
ways of looking at the Tibet Question, 8 some of which are more esoteric than others. 
The legal questions spill over into the political and into the religious, even into 
idealist Western concepts of Shangri-La, 9 and thus the debate and the participants in 
the debate take on an elusive quality, the shape of the debate yielding to a variety of 
pressures. For China the practical question, however, is one of territorial integrity, 
historical continuity as opposed to invasion, and one relating to interference by other 
states, and also human rights proponents, in the internal affairs of the People's 
Republic. 10 
These issues surrounding the Tibet Question will become apparent in the course of 
this thesis, and, in examining the substantive issues of the question, it will seek to 
analyse a potential way forward. As the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader 
6 Sautman B, 'The Tibet Issue in Post-Summit Sino-American Relations' (1999) 72(l) Pacific Affairs 
7-21,11-12; also Sautman and Dreyer, note 5 above, 3. 
7 Goldstein MC, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997) ix. 
8 Klieger PC, 'Riding High on the Manchurian Dream: Three Paradigms in the Construction of the 
Tibetan Question' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and 
Societ 
,y 
in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 214-229,227. 
9 lbid 224-227. 
10 See, for instance, Mountcastle A, 'The Question of Tibet and the Politics of the "Real"' in B 
Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed 
Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 85-106,86; also see Goldstein, note 7 above, for 
instance at 130 with regard to 'China's extreme sensitivity to outside intervention in its internal 
affairs'; and section 3.2 below. 
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of the Tibetans, enters his later years, ' 1a window of opportunity to achieve some 
form of reconciliation may become apparent to both China and Tibet. This may be 
given impetus by the People's Republic's desire to bring Taiwan back to the 
motherland; any burgeoning dispute with Tibet is likely to be counter-productive in 
this regard. Conversely, the Dalai Lama's death potentially gives impetus to the 
Tibetan independence movement, if the Dalai Lama is seen as a moderate brake on 
that movement. Increasing global terrorism in a fragile political international 
environment may impact on this independence movement. 
There are therefore reasons to suppose the time is ripe for a full consideration of the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship, 12 and in so doing international law comes to the fore in the 
contexts of sovereignty, human rights and also the principal theory around which this 
thesis is constructed: self-determination. Self-determination as a principle has evolved 
during the last century, and particularly interesting developments have emerged in 
recent years culminating in the proposals of 2007 relating to the Kosovo Status 
Settlement, which have important potential implications for Tibet. Such an appraisal 
of the relationship between China and Tibet enables us to see the Tibet Question 
contextually as one concerned with sovereignty and territorial integrity over Tibet, 13 
self-determination of the Tibetan people, and also human rights with reference to that 
people. It also enables us to consider the implications for international law of the 
failure to resolve the issues surrounding the Tibet Question, in a scenario where the 
dynamic principle of external self-determination is on the cusp of extending its reach, 
exerting pressures on the norm of sovereignty, and what has seemed to be a bar on 
11 The present Dalai Lama was born on 6 July 193 5. 
12 A consideration that falls properly not only to the most affected political leaders, but also to scholars 
and to proponents of both the Chinese and Tibetan views, as well as leaders of international 
organisations: the United Nations and its derivative bodies. 
13 Whether over the Tibet Autonomous Region or ethnographic Tibet; see section 3.5.2 below. 
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unilateral secession is called into question. Consequently, the analysis of self- 
determination becomes the general focus of the thesis. 
1.3 Theory, Methodology and Literature 
There is a great volume of literature on the subject of public international law, 
including sovereignty and self-determination, and also human rights. These works 
tend to consider Tibet, if at all, in passing. Conversely, much of the literature on 
Tibet, in the legal and political context, focuses on the Tibet Question, or the Tibetan 
problem, and tries to fit this into international law perspectives of sovereignty or self- 
determination, or indeed to focus on human rights abuses. 
This thesis, targeting a gap in the literature, approaches the subject in a different 
fashion. It analyses in depth the law relating to self-determination, taking that as the 
basis. The Tibetan situation is then examined, issues relating to sovereignty and 
human rights are considered, before conclusions are reached with regard to self- 
determination itself and also with regard to its impacts on the Tibet Question. In 
addition, the thesis seeks to clarify the appropriate focus for the question in the 
current climate. 
1.3.1 Theory 
The theory underpinning this thesis is that of self-determination. The thesis will 
undertake a detailed study and analysis of the theory, 14 a theory that is potentially in 
conflict with dominant norms in international law of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and when considering the theory it has to be borne in mind that a right to 
14 The theory of self-determination and its history is considered more fully throughout the thesis, 
especially in Chapters 2 and 6. 
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unilateral secession has not been recognised in international law; consequently 
secession is not a right of self-determination. At its most basic level, self- 
determination is 'a principle concerned with the right to be a State', 15 but the journey 
undertaken by the principle has brought about a situation where examination is 
required both of 'external' and 'internal' self-determination, as well as analysis as to 
identification of the units of self-determination. This main theory and its evolution do 
not, however, stand alone in the thesis. Just as there is an interrelationship between 
self-determination and other international legal norms, self-determination must 
operate in a political environment. As Tibet is essentially a political question as much 
as a legal one, and as both international law and politics are in issue, it is appropriate 
to complement the legal theory of self-determination with a theory apposite to 
politics. 
Various political subtexts have been considered, and ultimately rejected in favour of a 
subtext of political realism. The People's Republic of China, of which Tibet currently 
forms a part, is a powerful nation, a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council, and a major actor on the world stage. Power is a concept of vital 
importance in political realist theory and, according to Stephen Krasner, 'for a very 
large class of global issues, indeed the classic agenda of the study of international 
politics - security, autonomy, and the distribution of valued resources - power needs 
to be given pride of place'. 16 In such issues it is necessary, therefore, to consider 
15 Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006) 107. 
16 Krasner SD, 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier' in DA 
Baldwin (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism. - The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993) 234-249,246. See also Baldwin DA, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World 
Politics' in DA Baldwin (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism. - The Contemporary Debate (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993) 3-25,15. Power is indeed a central dimension of globalisation, and 
thus remains significant in an increasingly interdependent world where 'politics' is global in nature: see 
Ward 1, .4 Critical 
Introduction to European Law (London: LexisNexis, 2003) 212; Giddens A and 
8 
relative power capabilities, as these 'draw attention to how the payoff matrix was 
structured in the first place, how the available options are constrained, who can play 
the game, and, ultimately, who wins and loses'. 17 One factor to be considered in the 
thesis then is the nature of the Tibet issue, whether it is global or international in 
nature, or one that is internal to China, for, if an internal issue, support for Tibet will 
particularly be determined by whether state actors are prepared to intervene in the 
affairs of another country. However, it may be that there is a lessening of a fine 
distinction between international and internal matters, and that states are now more 
inclined to intervene against the territorial integrity of other nations than previously 
even in instances where their own security, or expansion, is not in direct issue. 18 
It has been said that realism encompasses five propositions. 19 The first is that states 
are the major actors in world affairs: 'States are the units whose interactions form the 
structure of international-political systems. ' 20 This is not to say, however, that they 
are the only actors, or indeed that their actions are unconstrained. Secondly, states 
behave rationally as they are penalised in the international sphere 'if they fail to 
protect their vital interests, or if they pursue objectives beyond their means'. 21 
Thirdly, 'international anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions 
of states -) . 
22 This in turn links with the fourth proposition: the concept that 'states in 
anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are disposed toward conflict and 
Hutton W, 'In Conversation' in W Hutton and A Giddens (eds), On the Edge: Living with Global 
Capitalism (London: Vintage, 2001) 1-51,41. 
17 Krasner, ibid, 246-247. 
18 See sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 below, and also Chapter 7. 
19 Grieco JM, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism' in DA Baldwin (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 116-140,118. 
20 Waltz KN, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979) 95; Grieco, note 
19 above, 1] 8. 
Grieco, ibid; see also Waltz, note 20 above, 79-128. 
22 Grieco, ibid. Here anarchy may be interpreted as referring 'to a lack of common government in 
world politics': Axelrod R and Keohane RO, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions' in DA Baldwin (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 85-115,85. 
9 
23 
competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests'. This 
is a proposition that premises conflict; it is a proposition in tune with remarks of 
Raymond Aron to the effect that 'Politics, insofar as it concerns relations among 
states, seems to signify - in both ideal and objective terms - simply the survival of 
states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states', and 
further that 'If a province, an integrated portion of the state's territory or a fraction of 
the population, refuses to submit to the centralized power and undertake [sic] an 
armed struggle, the conflict, though civil war with regard to international law, will be 
considered a foreign war by those who see the rebels as the expression of an existing 
or nascent nation ). 
24 
The aforementioned propositions are of considerable import in analysing not only the 
stance taken by the People's Republic with respect to Tibet, but also the reaction of 
the international community, individually and collectively, to the Chinese occupation 
of Tibet, initially and subsequently, and also in light of an evolving principle of self- 
determination. Finally, by the fifth proposition inherent in realism, international 
institutions only have marginal effect on the prospects for co-operation among 
nations. 25 Thus the fifth proposition returns to the first proposition, that states are the 
major actors in world affairs. 
Political realism, then, accounts for the way in which states seek to protect their own 
security and interests, for their behaviour and the outcomes of that behaviour. In turn 
it has been identified with a character of politics termed realpolitik. The elements of 
realpolitik were listed by Kenneth Waltz as follows: 'The ruler's, and later the state's, 
23Grieco, ibid, 119. 
24 Aron R, Peace and War. - A Theory of International Relations, translated from the French by R 
Howard and AB Fox (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967) 6 and 7 respectively. In this regard the 
distinction between international and internal matters becomes blurred. 
25 Grieco, note 19 above, 119. 
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interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the 
unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover 
the policies that will best serve a state's interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, 
and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state. ' 26 
It is only by recognising China's position as a dominant world power that an 
evaluation of the Tibet Question and its outcomes can be attempted. It is for this 
reason that an alternative theory of idealism, neoliberalism, must be rejected. Such 
theoretical basis would find emphasis in espousal of ideas of a world civilisation and 
world citizenship, 27 in the promotion of the idea that domestic affairs have primacy 
over foreign affairs, a denunciation of military alliances and in challenging the idea 
that peace could be ensured through the balance of power; proponents of such theory 
have 'emphasized the mutual interests of states and advocated free trade, which they 
[have] argued would help prevent war'. 28 The conjoining of the idea of free trade 
promoting peace with the idea of an international organisation, universal in nature, 
promoting the same goal was the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson, 29 and 
idealism came to the forefront subsequent to the First World War in notions of self- 
determination. 30 Yet this early variant of the theory of self-determination has not 
proved to be lasting, and in its idealism its effects were limited .31 Further, when 
considering Tibet it is important not to fall into the trap of conceiving of the entity as 
26 Waltz, note 20 above, 117. 
27 The association of ideals with humanitarian aspirations: see Mountcastle, note 10 above, 97. 'The 
vision of a world polity that would end international anarchy and war is a recurring theme in political 
thought': Held D and Koenig-Archibugi M, 'Introduction: Whither American Power? ' in D Held and 
M Koenig-Archibugi (eds), American Power in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2004)1-20,14. 
28 Baldwin, note 16 above, 12. 29 ibid. 
30 Section 2.2 below. 
31 As evidenced, for example, by the failure of the Kurds to achieve self-determination, although this 
was on the agenda at the time and supported by Woodrow Wilson: see section 2.4.2.3 below. 
a Shangri-La - an imaginary paradise, an ideal in itself . 
32 Tibet is an entity in the real 
33 
world and sharp focus on the Tibet Question is required . 
The connotation of realism 'is one of looking at the world as it really is% 34 as an 
objective reality, and a recognition of the importance of the nation state and of 
sovereignty. 35 As a subtext, a secondary theory, political realism and realpolitik 
provide an appropriate and recurrent theme throughout the thesis, giving visibility to 
the aims and objectives outlined in section 1.2 above and giving strong support to and 
validating the principal theory elaborated in the thesis, that of self-determination. 
1.3.2 Methodology: A Library-Based Research Study 
The thesis requires a methodology that is complementary to both its aims and 
objectives and also to the theory applied. The nature of the aims and objectives are 
investigative and interpretive; an examination of the reality of the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship and the external forces that have shaped it, together with an analysis of 
32 Also the name of a hidden Tibetan valley in J Hilton's 1930s novel, Lost Horizon: see The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Ninth Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
33 For this reason, too, a postmodem approach has been rejected. This approach has its attractions, as 
'One of the central themes of post-modernism ... is its insistence on the value of looking at things from multiple points of view' (Twining, note I above, 212), and I have noted that full consideration of 
the Sino-Tibetan relationship falls properly to a plurality of voices (note 12 above). Further, 
postmodernism is related to 'the need to respond contextually and strategically to shifting frameworks 
of power and resistance, and to articulate a fuller recognition of multiplicity and difference': Squires J, 
'Introduction' in J Squires (ed. ), Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993) 1-2. Such an approach is evinced by Hardt and Negri, note 2 
above, in their treatise on empire and the counter-power of the multitude, but despite its capacity for 
development it is suggested that it is the power of elites, be they the elites of the nation state or indeed 
within the 'constituted power of empire' (Hardt and Negri, ibid, 361) that remain apt at the present 
j uncture. 
34 Baldwin, note 16 above, 9. In this context, it has been said that 'Scholars belonging to the "realist" 
school of international studies dismiss the idea of global democracy as inappropriate to the 
international realm, which is necessarily governed by the rules of power politics': Held and Koenig- 
Archlbugi, note 27 above, 15. 
35 As William Twining points out, even such postmodem theorists as Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
concede that in the medium and short term 'the nation state is likely to remain by far the most 
significant actor at nearly all levels': Twining, note I above, 223; 'The nation-state and the interstate 
system are the central political forms of the capitalist world system, and they will probably remain so 
for the foreseeable future', and further that they 'will remain, in the foreseeable future, a major focus of 
human rights struggles': Santos, note I above, 94 and 283 respectively. Z: ý 
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the causes and effects interlinking that relationship with international legal nonns and 
realpolitik. The thesis conducts an examination of these legal norms and their 
evolution. 
At its core the thesis represents a case study. Its focus indeed determines that. In 
examining concepts of human rights incorporating self-determination, minority rights 
and oppression, contextually allied to issues of sovereignty, a Chinese Tibetan 
perspective is brought to the forefront. The issue is then one of how the case study 
should be resolved. Various options were considered and rejected. These included a 
process that would incorporate a number of interviews and questionnaires. It was 
decided, however, not to utilise an empirical study due to difficulties in language and 
in finding a sufficiently representative body, which would need to involve both Han 
Chinese and Tibetan participants. For similar reasons an ethnographic approach was 
also rejected. 
Fieldwork, indeed, is not the raison d'etre of this research,, although issues of 
nationalism and ethnicity are a part of the Tibet Question. 36 Independence and self- 
determination are at the heart of the question, and an appraisal of relevant legal theory 
and norms is the structure on which the thesis is founded. Thus, rather than just the 
narrow focus of the Tibet Question, larger theoretical questions relating to the 
principle of self-determination are significant to the thesis. The two aspects of the 
research issues, both the particular and the general, require a more conceptual, library- 
based research study, analysing content in an approach which is both critical and 
constructive as the thesis conducts an examination of international law as it is and 
how, in an objective manner, it may be interpreted, while at the same time it points to 
36 See section 1.2 above. 
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the potential of an effective alternative strategy for Tibet. 37 This then is the 
appropriate methodology to pursue. The nature of this library base is the focus of the 
next section. 
1.3.3 Literature Review 
Both primary sources and secondary sources feature widely throughout this thesis, the 
former comprising both formal instruments and case law. The thesis includes an 
Appendix of Primary Sources, and also a full Bibliography detailing the secondary 
sources. 
1.3.3.1 PrimaLy Sources 
These include reference to and interpretation of international treaties such as the 
United Nations Charter, 38 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 39 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 40 In addition 
the 1982 Chinese Constitution is analysed, as are certain internal Chinese laws and 
also White Papers, such as those of 1991 on 'Human Rights in China' and 1992 on 
41 'Tibet - Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation'. Provisions of the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States are considered, 42 and reference is made to 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 43 
37 cf Hardt and Negri, note 2 above, 47-48. 
38 The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion 
of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 
1945. 
39 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976,999 UNTS 171. 
40 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976,999 UNTS 3. 
" See sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 below. 
42 165 LNTS 19. The Convention was signed at Montevideo on 26 December 1933 and entered into 
force on 26 December 1934. See section 4.2.1 in particular. 
43 Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980,1155 UNTS 33 1. 
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A number of additional treaties and conventions are mentioned in the course of the 
thesis, among others those concerning Tibet are referred to, including the Simla 
Convention of 1914 involving Britain and China, 44 and in the context of the Tibetan 
government in exile reference is made to the 1991 Charter of the Tibetans in-Exile. 45 
There is, in addition, particular consideration of the 1951 Agreement on Measures for 
the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. 46 The thesis also makes mention of numerous 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and also the United Nations 
Security Council; such resolutions are not confined to Tibet but also include 
resolutions relating to, for example, Kosovo. In that context there is also mention of 
various constitutions of the Balkans, including the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. 47 
Primary sources in the thesis also take the form of case material. Important cases with 
regard to self-determination are referred to and analysed as appropriate. These include 
the Western Sahara Case, 
48 East Timor (Portugal v Australia) '49 and Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 50 
The important European case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities is also referred to, 51 as is the 
relevant Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) with reference to norms of 
44 See section 4.4.2.4 below; also section 3.2.1 below. 
4' The Charter is available at <http: //www. tibet. com/Govt? charter. html>. See section 4.4.2.3 below. 
46 The translated text of the agreement can be found in various places including, for example, van Walt 
van Praag MC, The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law (London: 
Wisdom Publications, 1987) 337-340; also <http: //www. freetibet. org/info/file/file2. html>, accessed 3 
August 2005. 
47 The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, promulgated on 21 February 1974, 
and reprinted in part in Trifunovska S, Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its 
dissolution (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) 224-233. 
48 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12. 
49 ICJ Reports 1995,90. 
50 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 9 July 2004; (2004) 43 International Legal Materials 1009. 
51 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005. 
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customary international law. 52 In addition to international cases of consequence, 
Canadian and Australian cases are considered in the context of moves towards 
internal self-determination, 53 as is the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, adopted in 1994.54 
1.3.3.2 SecondaLy Sources 
A range of secondary sources has been examined and analysed, sources in respect of 
public international law generally, and on Tibet in particular. So far as the fon-ner are 
concerned, major works by authors such as James Crawford and Ian Brownlie feature, 
as well as Cases and Materials on International Law by DJ Harris, and Steiner and 
Alston's International Human Rights in Context. 55 There is reference to volumes by 
Hurst Hannum, Neil MacCormick, Neil Walker and Christian Tomuschat, and in 
respect of self-determination works by Antonio Cassese and Margaret Moore have 
been particularly useful, 56 as have works by William Twining, Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, and by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in the context of globalisation. 57 
52 lCJ Reports 1986,14. Also in this context the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
of 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons lCJ Reports 1996,226, accessible at 
<http: //www. icj-cij. org/docket/files/95/7495. pdf>. 
5' Section 2.4.2.4 below. 
54 (1995) 34 International Legal Materials 546. 
55 Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law, note 15 above, and see also his edited 
volume The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Brownlie 1, Principles of Public 
International Law, Sixth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), and see also, for example, 
Treaties and Indigenous Peoples: The Robb Lectures 1991 (ed. FM Brookfield) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992); Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004); 
Steiner HJ and Alston P, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and 
Materials, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
56 Hannurn H, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. - The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); MacCormick N, 
Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Walker N (ed. ), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); 
Tomuschat C, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Cassese A (ed. ), UN LawlFundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 
- The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979); Cassese A, Self-Determination of Peoples: .4 Legal 
Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Moore M (ed. ), National Self- 
Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
57 Twining W, Globalisation and Legal Theory, note I above; Santos B de S, Toward A New Legal 
Common Sense, note I above, Hardt M and Negri A, Empire, note 2 above. 
16 
Works most concerned with specific areas of international law are considered 
throughout the thesis where relevant. 
With specific reference to Tibet, The Status of Tibet by Michael van Walt van Praag is 
a defining text on Tibet's status. 58 Although this volume was published twenty years 
ago and the author is closely linked with the Tibetan independence movement, he 
writes directly on the issue of the status of Tibet in international law. Significant 
works by Melvyn Goldstein, Tom Grunfeld, Tsering Shakya and John Avedon have 
been consulted, as have volumes by Jane Ardley and Dawa Norbu, and edited 
volumes by Cao Changching and James Seymour and by Barry Sautman and June 
Dreyer, among others. 59 
In the wider contexts of public international law, self-determination, human rights and 
sovereignty, and in the narrower field of Tibet, journal articles have been researched 
and a number of Internet sources consulted. In the Sino-Tibetan area, where facts and 
perspectives are strongly divergent, a balance has been attempted between the points 
of view, and thus, for instance, on the one hand, websites of the China Internet 
Information Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China, and People's Daily Online have been accessed, as have, on the other hand, 
websites of the Government of Tibet in Exile, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 
58 Van Walt van Praag MC, The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law, 
note 46 above. 
59 Goldstein MC, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1989) and The Snow Lion and the Dragon: 
China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, note 7 above; Grunfeld AT, The Making of Modern Tibet, Revised 
Edition (Armonk, New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1996); Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the 
Land of the Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (London: Pimlico, 1999); Avedon JF, In 
Exile ftom the Land of Snows: The Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest (New York: 
HarperPerennial, 1994, reissued 1997); Ardley J, The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, 
religious and Gandhian perspectives (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Dawa Norbu, 
China's Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001); Cao Changching and Seymour JD (eds), 
Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eýves: Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and 
London: ME Sharpe, 1998); Sautman B and Dreyer JT (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, 
Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006). 
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and Democracy, and the International Campaign for Tibet. 60 More generally, 
productive Internet sources, such as various United Nations websites and Keesing's 
Record of World Events, have been referred to. 
The texts consulted both with regard to public international law and with respect to 
Tibet provide a sound basis for the thesis and are supplemented by the journal articles 
and Internet sources which supply up-to-date material. All such secondary sources are 
fully referenced in the Bibliography and are detailed and commented upon throughout 
the text as appropriate, each chapter reviewing and analysing literature pertinent to its 
content. 
1.4 Summary of the Structure of the Thesis 
Turning to the substance of the thesis, Chapter 2 begins the exploration of the theory 
of self-detennination with an examination of the historical background, then 
proceeding to look at issues inherent in the theory. The definition of 'peoples' entitled 
to self-determination is considered, as is the relationship of the theory with norms of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and also human rights. An analysis of the theory 
as rule or principle then takes place, and the thesis goes on to look at the dynamism of 
the theory before finally touching on the philosophical debate between choice 
theorists and remedial right theorists. 
Having explored central issues and conflicts attributable to the legal theory of self- 
determination and noted that, for Tibetans, self-determination has to date failed to 
bring about the freedom they seek, Chapter 3 delves more deeply into the relationship 
that has subsisted between China and Tibet. A brief examination of Tibet prior to the 
60 Respectively, websites <http: //www. china. org. cn/english/index. htm>, <http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn>, 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn>, <http: //www. tibet. com>, <http: //www. tchrd. org>, and 
<http: //www. savetibet. org>. 
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Chinese insurgence of 1950 is conducted, before that insurgence and its aftermath is 
focused upon. The 1951 Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 
is considered from both the Chinese and Tibetan perspectives, and the impacts of that 
Agreement are discussed, including matters such as the collapse of Tibet as a state 
and the international response to the measures imposed on Tibet. Four key issues are 
identified, fluidity of political and legal identity, autonomy, the relevance of the 
remedial right theory to Chinese Tibet, and physical movement of peoples. 
The issues identified all bear not only on self-determination but also on sovereignty, 
and thus Chapter 4 proceeds to look at that topic. The criteria for statehood are 
considered and elements identified prior to a discussion of recognition of statehood. 
China's relationship with international law and the wider international community is 
discussed before changing concepts of sovereignty are focused upon. The second part 
of the chapter deals with issues of Tibetan sovereignty and analyses the elements of 
statehood in this context, proceeding to examine issues relating to recognition of Tibet 
as an independent state. Finally, conclusions are reached regarding Tibet and 
independent statehood in a discussion bearing on the current pressures on sovereignty 
and the integrity of the state. Despite such pressures an independent Tibet has not 
been recognised by any state, and thus the thesis returns to the theory of self- 
determination. 
Due to the nexus between self-determination and human rights, Chapter 5 examines 
human rights in the Sino-Tibetan context. A note of the momentum of the 
international human rights movement begins the chapter, which then considers 
priorities under the human rights regime, examining universalism and relativism and 
the Bangkok Declaration. The Chinese Constitution of 1982 is reviewed in the context 
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of human rights, as are Chinese legislation and White Papers and also China's role in 
the international human rights regime. The chapter then moves on to examine 
oppression of the Tibetan minority in some detail, exploring oppression in respect of 
civil and political rights and also economic, social and cultural rights. The chapter 
ends with a section on human rights as a challenge to sovereignty, concluding that it is 
relevant to assess whether an expansion of the collective right of self-determination 
may lead to a reconsideration of the status of Tibet. 
Chapter 6 therefore comes back to the main theory running through the thesis, that of 
self-determination, and looks at the recent momentum attained by self-determination. 
The ongoing debate between choice theorists and remedial right theorists is focused 
on, as are developments with regard to secession as a concept. The new progression in 
the theory is analysed with particular reference to Kosovo, leading up to and including 
the Final Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement of 14 March 2007. 
The ongoing momentum to intervention by the international community is discussed 
before the chapter considers issues of autonomy, which are analysed in the Tibetan 
context. The chapter draws to an end with an analysis of the Tibet Question, bearing 
in mind, first, the concept of supervised statehood emanating from the Kosovo Status 
Settlement and, secondly, the potential relevance of the remedial right theory of self- 
determination. 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, proceeds with specific analysis both in respect of 
the development comprising the Kosovo Status Settlement and of applying a Kosovan 
perspective to Tibet, this perspective prospectively giving a fresh and sharp focus to 
the Tibet Question. Finally, the chapter considers the implications for public 
international law and its norms, resulting from the long-standing failure to bring about 
20 
a resolution of the issues surrounding Tibet. The subtext of realism permeates the 
thesis, as does the principal theory of self-determination, to which I now turn. 
21 
2 The Evolving Boundaries of the Legal Theory 
of Self-Determination 
2.1 Introduction 
Self-determination is a concept that connotes images of freedom, yet for many across 
the globe it represents nothing but fractured hopes. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore issues and conflicts inherent in the theory in an analysis preliminary to 
examination of the failure to date of norms of public international law to resolve the 
Tibet Question. The theory has proved dynamic in its evolution, but has not 
succeeded in stemming the physical movement of peoples and indeed has contributed 
to the fluidity of political and legal identity. At the same time, it has proved limited as 
it comes up against other established norms of international law. Before critically 
evaluating the theory it is necessary to establish its current parameters. 
2.2 History 
While relatively modem in acceptance as a legal theory, the political origins of the 
concept of self-determination go back to the eighteenth century and the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789.1 The legal 
theory traces forward to the twentieth century and has had different meanings in 
different contexts. 2 In the aftermath of the First World War the League of Nations was 
established by the victorious Allied Powers and the League's Covenant, its charter, 
1 Cassese A, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) 11. 
2 Foster CE, 'Articulating Self-Determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples' (2001) 12(1) European Journal of International Law 141-157,143. 
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was approved at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as part of the Treaty of Versailles. 3 
The theory of self-determination was 'politically popular at the time of the Peace 
Settlement of 1919-20 in Europe', and the effect was that minorities who found 
themselves on 'the wrong side of boundaries of new States' had the option to change 
their nationality or on occasion were 'the subject of large-scale population transfer 
and exchange'. 4 There was not, however, acceptance of self-determination as a 
general principle at this time, 5 and it had different connotations for major actors: it 
was the essence of a lasting peace in Europe for US President Woodrow Wilson, yet 
for Vladimir Lenin it was 'a means of realizing a dream of world-wide socialism'. 6 
The political implications of self-determination are thus evident at this early stage. 
Essentially, specific provisions defining obligations were incorporated in the Treaty 
of Versailles, but these were limited in extent and, despite the influential authority of 
Woodrow Wilson, the principle of self-determination 'was not specifically included in 
the Covenant of the League of Nations'. 7 It was only those states signing the League's 
minority treaties that came under any obligation to the League for the protection of 
minorities within their borders and the League in their approach sought to 'suppress in 
the future those special conditions which give rise to minority grievances and can 
arguably legitimate a claim to self-determination ... the League [rejected] self- 
determination and particularly secessionist self-determination as a further remedy for 
3 The Covenant of the League of Nations is to be found in the Peace Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 
1919. The Treaty may be accessed through the website of The World War I Document Archive at 
<http: //net. lib. byu. edu/-rdh7/wwi>. 
4 Brownlie 1, Treaties and Indigenous Peoples. - The Robb Lectures 1991 (ed. FM Brookfield) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992) 4. 
5 Brownlie I, 'The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law' in J Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of 
Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 1-16,5. 
6 In Cassese, note I above, 13. 
7 Buchheit LC, Secession. - The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978) 64. 
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minority groups'. 8 This line was subsequently confirmed by a Commission of 
Rapporteurs to the Council of the League of Nations on the Aaland Islands question, 
for to allow minorities to withdraw from the state to which they belong 'would be to 
destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in the international 
life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a 
territorial and political entity'. 9 
It was after 1945 that the principle of self-determination was affirmed, but its 
application following the Second World War took a different approach, and the theory 
was applied to 'peoples under colonial domination', ' 0 initially almost exclusively so. 11 
The principle became enshrined in international law, in particular through Article 1(2) 
of the United Nations Charter 12 and subsequently through Article I of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ' 3 Colonial domination, however, 
' Ibid 70. The minority treaties imposed 'no general principles of good government upon the signatory 
States ... They merely [registered] certain conditions which had to be accepted by a limited number of European States who, as a result of the War, were receiving political recognition, or great increases in 
territory, at the hands of the principal Allied and Associated Powers': Dugdale BEC and Bewes WA, 
'The Working of the Minority Treaties' (1926) 5(2) Journal of the British Institute of International 
Affairs 79-95,79. The policy was to secure equality of citizenship among the inhabitants of the 
signatory states, who were to have equal freedom 'to practise their own religion, and speak their own 
language' (ibid), and in that way to counteract separatism, yet the minorities themselves were not 
parties to the treaties (ibid 79-80). Particular clauses in the Treaty of Versailles specified the 
obligations towards minorities, see for example Articles 86 and 93 regarding the 'Czecho-Slovak State' 
and Poland respectively. As to the separate peace treaties concluded, see Buchheit, note 7 above, 67-70 
and the sources of the various treaties cited thereat. 
9 Buchheit, ibid, 7 1; quoting from The Aaland Islands Question; Report Submitted to the Council of the 
League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League Doc B. 7.21/68/106 (1921). 
10 Crawford J, 'Some Conclusions' in J Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988) 159-175,161. 
11 Emerson R, 'Self-Determination' (1971) 65(3) American Journal of International Law 459-475,462. 
12 Article ](2) of the Charter provides that a purpose of the United Nations is: 'To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace'. Self-determination 
reappears in Article 55 of the Charter, which commences: 'With a view to the creation of conditions of 
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. Both articles represent self- 
determination as an aim, an aspiration, rather than a right or an obligation necessarily creating a legal 
effect, although under Article 56 'All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. ' 
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976,999 UNTS 17 1. Also Article I of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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was only applied to Western imperialism and not to Communist imperialism, although 
in the Western Sahara Case 'the Court accepted ... that the principle of self- 
determination is a part of customary international law', 14 the emergent norm being 
applicable to the decolonisation of those non-self-governing territories under the aegis 
of the United Nations. 15 
The post-Cold War era has seen a further shift in direction for the principle of self- 
determination, and it is the classification of self-determination as a general principle 
rather than a rule, albeit with a number of customary rules, 16 which opens up the 
space for ideas and evolution. States are no longer the sole parties involved and 
interpretation of self-determination by the International Court of Justice in cases such 
as East Timor (Portugal v Australia) 17 'has served as a point of entry into 
international law for newcomers, the newly returned and even the absent, and for their 
18 
challenges to international law's marginalization of them'. This interpretation, 
which may be connected with the decline of the nation state, has opened up the door 
for minorities to argue their case for self-determination. Thus 'external' self- 
determination, which was applied to the colonial situation, is now less commonly the 
issue, and the focus has turned towards the right of self-determination to guarantee 
'internal' self-determination -a protection of the right 'of national or ethnic groups 
within the state to assert some degree of "autonomy" over their affairs, without giving 
Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976,999 UNTS 3. See 
section 2.3.1 below. 
14 Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) 116; see 
11"estern Sahara Case Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12, para. 56. See also section 2.3.1 below. 
The UN General Assembly took note 'with appreciation' of the Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case: UNGA Resolution 3458 (XXX) of 10 December 1975, 
Question of Spanish Sahara. 
15 Harris, ibid, 115 -, Western Sahara Case, ibid, para. 54. 
16 Cassese, note I above, 126-133. See also the analysis in section 2.4.1 below. 
17 lCJ Reports 1995,90. 
18 Knop K, Diversiýv and Seýf-Determination in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 110; and see also 206. 
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them the right to secede'. 19 The emphasis on 'internal' self-determination is linked 
with the democratic decision-making proceSS20 and is less in conflict with the integrity 
of the state than is 'external' self-determination, although issues surrounding 
intenneddling in the internal affairs of a state arise in each. It is also the case that few 
Western colonies now exist, and for the concept of self-determination to continue to 
be of significance beyond the context of decolonisation it has to evolve. 
In any event, self-determination is now accepted as a legal principle, 21 a customary 
legal right, and thus has both legal and political implications. As is evident from the 
above, though, the principle has proved contentious: not only in its content but also in 
its application. A particularly pertinent issue in many cases is the definition of 
4 peoples' entitled to the protection of the principle; for this definition is open to 
interpretation. 22 In other words, while the principle of self-determination 'has become 
an accepted norm of international law', there is a lack of clear-cut boundaries to the 
principle. 23 This raises the question as to who is the holder of a right and, indeed, 
Tibet has not been treated as a right-holder. To enable consideration to be given as to 
why this should be, it is appropriate to consider issues and conflicts inherent in the 
principle. This in turn will shed light on the limitations of the principle. 
19 Groarke P, Dividing the State. - Legitimacy, Secession and the Doctrine of Oppression (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004) 84; see Cassese, note I above, 350-351. Internal self-determination 
can be understood as 'forms of self-government and separateness within a state rather than separation 
(so-called "external" self-determination) from the state': Steiner HJ and Alston P, International Human 
Rights in Context. - Law, Politics, Morals. - Text and Materials, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 1249. 
20 Cassese, note I above, 64-65. 
21 Brownlie 1, Principles of Public International Law, Sixth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003)555. 
22 Knop, note 18 above, 34. 
23 Bhalla RS, 'The Right of Self- Determination in International Law' in W Twining (ed. ), Issues of 
Self- Determination (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) 91-101,93-94. 
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2.3 Issues Inherent in the Theory 
2.3.1 Who Are Peoples'? 
Reference to self-determination of 'peoples' appears in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the 
United Nations Charter, 24 while Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 25 and similarly Article I of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 26 provides that '[a]ll peoples have the right of self- 
determination'. Nevertheless, as the theory has evolved, it is manifest that it has not 
been applied to all peoples or in all circumstances. A prerequisite to an analysis of the 
theory, therefore, is to consider who are 'peoples' intended to benefit from the right of 
self-determination. 
Despite the articles mentioned above, 'peoples' remains undefined in the international 
instruments and uncertainty continues as to who may comprise 'peoples' intended to 
benefit: 'it is far from clear that peoples or nations rather than tribes, ethnic groups, 
linguistic, religious, or geographical groups are the relevant reference group 5.27 
Subsequent to 1945 it was colonial peoples who benefited from the theory, and here it 
was national colonial boundaries that prevailed; states were not broken up to reflect 
ethnic groups and homogeneity was not the watchword behind the emergence of the 
new independent states, which followed 'generally artificial colonial borders'. 28 
24 See note 12 above. 
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 13 above. 
26 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, note 13 above. 
2' Margalit A and Raz J, 'National Self-Determination' (1990) 87(9) Journal of Philosophy 439-461, 
443. In his 'Law of Peoples', John Rawls uses the term 'peoples' to emphasise the 'singular features of 
peoples as distinct from states, as traditionally conceived': Rawls J, The Law of Peoples: with 'The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited' (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001) 27, 
such features including, for example, the lack of traditional sovereignty. 
28 Knop, note 18 above, 55. See also Thornberry P, International Law and the Rights of Minorities 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 13-14. The principle behind the emergence of these newly 
independent states was uti possidetis - an extension of the principle that you keep what you now 
possess, in this context that these states retain their old colonial boundaries: as to the principle of uti 
27 
Further, it was very much Western imperialism in focus; and the principle of self- 
determination was not applied in practice to imperialism either of the Soviet Union or 
China due to the fact that such 'colonies' as they had were not geographically separate 
from but were contiguous with the administering state. It is the application to 
4overseas' colonies that ensured socialist imperialism was exempt from the effects of 
the theory, and consensus had been drawn around the theory of 'salt-water 
colonialism' - colonial territories geographically separate from the administering 
country. 29 Self-determination as a concept from the standpoint of socialist 
governments is viewed as 'the right that foreign States shall not interfere in the life of 
the community against the will of the government 9.30 This is one fundamental reason 
behind the position taken by China in respect of Tibet: it regards Tibet as an integral 
part of China, and therefore not subject to foreign interference. The right of the state 
to its own self-determination is accordingly a defence to interference in the state. 31 
possidetis, see Malanczuk P, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised 
Edition (London: Routledge, 1997) 162-163. It is noteworthy that by UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) of 
14 December 1960, the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 
while 'The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial 
of fundamental rights' and 'All peoples have the right to self-determination', the resolution went on to 
declare that such dependent peoples should be enabled 'to exercise peacefully and freely their right to 
complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected'. Self- 
determination was thus seen as a one-off right, exercisable to enable a colony to become an 
independent state. The resolution concluded by emphasising 'non- interference in the internal affairs of 
all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity'. 
29 Thomberry, note 28 above, 17; see also UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960, 
Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit 
the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter (Article 73 forms part of Chapter XI of the 
UN Charter, which constitutes the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories), Principle 
IV referring to 'territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally 
from the country administering it', and UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960, note 28 above. 
30 Cassese A, 'Political Se I f-Determi nation - Old Concepts and New Developments' in A Cassese 
(ed. ), UN Lawl/Fundamental Rights. - Two Topics in International Law (Alphen aan den Rijn - The 
Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979) 137-165,140, emphasis in original. See also Kamenka E, 
'Human Rights: Peoples' Rights' in J Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988) 127-139,136. Self-determination can thus be seen as a political construct, changing its cloak 
only at the whim of the nation state, currently the nation states that are members of the United Nations. 
31 See Emerson, note II above, 466. 
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In more recent years, in the post-Cold War era, ethnicity has come more to the fore. 
This emerges in the break-up of the Soviet Uniong 32 for example, and ethnic 
nationalism can be seen to prevail in the states emanating from the former Yugoslavia 
33 and the partition of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Thus 
self-determination has moved into the socialist realm and away from the specific 
context of colonialism. 
This though is not the full picture. Margalit and Raz argue that the encompassing 
group forming a substantial majority in a territory shall have the right to decide if that 
territory 'shall form an independent state in order to protect the culture and self- 
respect of the group'. 34 This argument has been made not just with reference to 
entities which can be separated, such as the Baltic States, leading to disintegration of 
multinational states along national lines, 35 but also with respect to indigenous groups. 
Indigenous peoples have been perceived as victims, and thus as actors 'deprived of 
sovereign rights, without participation in prevailing political arrangements'. 36 Chinese 
officials, though, imply that no indigenous peoples live in China, only minorities. 37 
32 See section 2.4.2.1 below. 33 See section 2.4.2.2 below. 
34 Margalit and Raz, note 27 above, 457. This argument is congruent with that of the choice theorists in 
respect of self-determination, see sections 2.4.3 and 6.2.1 below for analysis, and is problematic in that 
multiple fragmentation of states is the potential result of that strand of philosophical thought. 
35 See Moore M, 'Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession' in M 
Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 1-13, 
1. 
36 Falk R, 'The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)' in J Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of 
Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 17-37,18. 'Indigenous peoples may be defined as the original 
inhabitants of a territory who, because of historical circumstances (generally conquest and/or 
colonization by another people), have lost their sovereignty and have become subordinated to the wider 
society and the state over which they do not exercise any control': Stavenhagen R, 'The Indigenous 
Probl&matique' (1985) 50 IFDA Dossier 4,4, quoted in Falk, ibid. 
37 Pitty R, 'Indigenous Peoples, Self-Determination and International Law' (2001) 5(4) International 
Journal of Human Rights 44-71,47. This is buttressed by the 1982 Chinese Constitution, the current 
version, which for instance in Article 4 refers to minority nationalities. Note though that references do 
exist to ethnic groups, if not indigenous peoples, within the Chinese state: see, for example, 
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 'Tibet: China's Policy 
Paper on Tibet' (2004), Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation Home Page 
<http: //www. unpo. org/article. php? id=655>, accessed 4 November 2004, and section 3.3.3 below, and 
see also Sautman B, 'Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints' (1999) 21(3) 
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Nevertheless, issues of cultural identity and the value of cultural groups come to the 
fore, as exemplified by a series of cases in Australia and Canada and by the 
38 proceedings of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva. While the 
argument has not led to independence for any such group, it raises in particular 
questions o internal self-detennination, and these will be alluded to in greater detail 
below. 39 
The nature of a 'substantial majority' may itself be ambiguous, and occupying powers 
have manipulated units of self-determination by altering the balance of the population. 
Instances include population transfers from Turkey into Cyprus from 1976, from 
Indonesia into East Timor from 1975 and, pertinently, from China into Tibet from 
195 1.40 Moreover, if Tibet can be viewed as a state independent of China, any attempt 
to alter the democratic population of Tibet by China would be illegal under 
international law. 41 It is also the case that people may move from one state to another 
as a result of, rather than prior to, self-determination, for instance ethnic flows within 
Law and Policy 283-314. In making the distinction between minorities and indigenous peoples, 
'Chinese officials have ... adopted the semantic practice of other states by refusing to acknowledge indigenous peoples elsewhere as distinct entities': Pitty, ibid. Robert Barnett comments that officials in 
China are now required to use the word 'ethnicity' rather than 'nationality' when referring to the 
peoples recognised as minority nationalities - thus nationality policy becomes ethnicity policy: Barnett 
R, 'Beyond the Collaborator - Martyr Model: Strategies of Compliance, Opportunism, and Opposition 
Within Tibet' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and 
Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 25-66,56 note 33. 
38 Nettheim G, "'Peoples" and "Populations": Indigenous Peoples and Rights of Peoples' in J Crawford 
(ed. ), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 107-126. 39 See section 2.4.2.4 below. 
40 See Bowring B, 'Whose Rights, What People, Which Community? The Rule of Law as an 
Instrument of Oppression in the New Latvia' in P Fitzpatrick (ed. ), Nationalism, Racism and the Rule 
of Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1995) 117-134,13 1. 
" Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950 (accessible at 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/law/civilianpersons. htm>), states inter alia: 'The occupying power shall 
not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies'. Further, Article 
85(4) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted 8 June 1977, entered into 
force 7 December 1979 (accessible at <http: //www. ohchr. org/english/law/protocoll. htm>), states, inter 
alia: 'the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully and 
in violation of the Conventions of the Protocol; (a) the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its 
own civilian population into the territory it occupies ... in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth 
Convention'. 
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the former Yugoslavia. 42 So all in all self-determination can be seen to highlight 
ethnic nationalism and is illuminated by 'the clamor of peoples trapped in pluralistic 
states in which they have no dominant share to take charge of their own destinies'. 43 
The nature of 'peoples' thus remains in a state of flux, more so as a variety of 
groupings seek to attain the benefits of self-determination at the same time as states 
claim for themselves what they would deny others. 44 It is nevertheless true to say that 
the status of the collective right to self-determination 'depends on the recognition of 
the collective in question', 45 and it is the case that any 'claims to self-determination 
by minorities in established countries are typically ignored by other established 
powers, as internal issues to be settled by those within the country'. 46 This latter point 
brings self-determination directly into conflict with the norms of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, yet the ability of self-determination to contribute to the fluidity of 
political and legal identity is certain as it expands its reach within a flexible definition 
of 'peoples'. 
2.3.2 The Conflict With Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity 
The principle of self-determination does not exist in a vacuum. While it is endorsed 
by the United Nations, it has to operate alongside and in competition with other norms 
of international law. Claims to rights may conflict with each other, and similarly 
42 See Horowitz DL, 'Se I f- Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law' in M Moore (ed. ), National 
Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 181-214. 
43 Emerson, note II above, 475. 
44 Bowring, note 40 above, 123. 
45 De George RT, 'The Myth of the Right of Collective Sel f-Determi nation' in W Twining (ed. ), Issues 
of Self-Determination (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) 1-7,7. For Crawford, the notion of 
a 'people' may be context-dependent and, indeed, what constitutes a people 'may be different for the 
purposes of different rights': see Crawford, note 10 above, 168-170, especially 170. 
46 De George, note 45 above, 6. See though particularly the situation regarding Kosovo: sections 6.3.2 
and 6.3.3 below. 
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norms and institutions may also reflect an internal plurality of interests . In thi s 
section consideration is given to the relationship of self-determination to long- 
standing norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, for these norms do by their 
very existence and interpretation qualify and determine the extent of emerging norms 
of intemational law. 
Sovereignty is inextricably linked to notions of statehood and territorial integrity, and 
the principle of external self-determination has the ability to compromise the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation. Sovereignty itself is a guarantee of the 
stability of the legal order and has been seen as the 'supreme legitimate authority 
within a territory'. 48 At the same time, the content of the term 'sovereignty' is not 
subject to universal agreement, although the term is frequently associated with 
independence. 49 Indeed, 'sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic 
constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting 
primarily of states having a uniform legal personality'. 50 It is clear therefore that there 
is an element of primacy to the principle of sovereignty as an international norm. 
The roots of sovereignty are deep, and for more than 400 years 'it has been impossible 
to talk about sovereignty without also discussing territory', 51 and one point of 
concurrence is that it is only states that can be sovereign, the state being defined in 
47 See Kamenka, note 30 above, 127. 
48 See Groarke, note 19 above, 49, emphasis in original. Sovereignty has been viewed, like law itself, 
as a presupposition and not as a legal conception. See Twining W, Globalisation and Legal Theory 
(London: Butterworths, 2000) 32, referring to Buckland WW, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945) 68. 
49 Hannum H, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Seýf-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 14-15. 
50 Brownlie, note 21 above, 287. 
51 Buchanan A and Moore M, 'Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries' in A Buchanan 
and M Moore (eds), States, Nations, and Borders. - The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 1-15,6. 
Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 52 
Accordingly, there is an inherent relationship between sovereignty and the integrity of 
the state. It is this integrity that self-determination comes up against, for self- 
determination at its deducible extreme of secession violates the boundaries of the 
state. 53 Te ct that actors other than states may be parties involved in issues of self- 
determination 54 is a further factor emphasising the tensions between norms of self- 
determination and sovereignty. States though are always minded to preserve their 
supremacy, and a recent instance involving China, outlined below, is instructive. 
China has shown itself in recent decades to be intent on preserving its territorial 
boundaries, and indeed on expanding them to incorporate territories previously 
removed from China, such as Hong Kong and Macao. In March 2005 China went 
further, and a draft Anti-Secession Law was prepared and, on 14 March, ratified. The 
Law is aimed specifically at Taiwan and the intention is to 'provide the legal 
framework to support Beijing's opposition to moves by Taiwan to make its de facto 
52 Signed 26 December 1933,165 LNTS 19. See section 4.2.1 below, and also Hannum, note 49 
above, 15-16. By Article Ia state has to show that it is territorially defined, contains people and 
governs them, and is able to enter into relations with other states: see James A, Sovereign Statehood. - 
The Basis ofInternational Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986) 4 1. 
5' In this sense self-determination and secession are interlinked: Galbreath DJ, 'Dealing with Diversity 
in International Law: Sel f-Determi nation and Statehood' (2005) 9(4) International Journal of Human 
Rights 539-550,539-540. However, it is clear that the United Nations does not accept the principle of 
unilateral secession, and that it respects the territorial integrity of the nation state - see UNGA 
Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, note 28 above. Yet a colonial territory does have the right 
to secede, as is evident from UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which resolution itself also emphasises that 'The 
territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable'. The resolution provides, 
inter alia, that 'The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Goveming Territory has, under the Charter, 
a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and 
distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing 
Territory have exercised their right of self-determination'. There are indeed three possible ways in 
which a non-self-governing territory 'can be said to have reached a full measure of government'. These 
are specified in Principle VI of UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960, note 29 above. 
The three possible ways referred to are: '(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free 
association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State. ' A fourth 
possibility, the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people, is specified 
additionally by Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
54 See East Timor (Portugal v Australia), note 17 above, and related text. 
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55 -chairman of the independence permanent' . According to 
Wang Zhaoguo, vice 
Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, the intent is that, in 
the event of possibilities for peaceful reunion of China and Taiwan being exhausted, 
'the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect 
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity'. 56 Wang Zhaoguo stresses the fact that 
resolution of the Taiwan question and accomplishing national reunification 'is an 
internal affair of China bearing on the fundamental interests of all Chinese people, the 
Taiwan compatriots included'. 57 In addition, he makes specific reference to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity brooking no division. This attitude towards 
Taiwan is indicative of the dichotomy between self-determination, on the one hand, 
and sovereignty and territorial integrity, on the other, and also of the position China 
takes with regard to Tibet, which, unlike Taiwan at the present juncture, is embedded 
within the Chinese state. 
Secession, however, is not the only potential outcome of a successful claim to self- 
determination, and not all potential outcomes are in direct conflict with the norms of 
55 Coonan C, 'China fights Taiwan independence with arms and a new law', 5 March 2005 The Times 
50. 
56 See People's Daily Online, 'China clarifies conditions for non-peaceful means to stop secession' 
(2005) 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200503/08/eng2OO5O3O8 - 
17601 I. html>, accessed 8 March 2005. It 
is worth noting, though, the general comment of Qian Qichen, former Vice Premier of China, at the 
Kyoto Conference that 'History shows that force would not lead to peace, and war could not win 
popular support': Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Stepping up 
International and Regional Cooperation to Put an End to Armed Conflicts and Remove their Sources' 
(2004) 
<http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/tl42395. htm>, accessed 29 March 2006. This remark also 
resonates in the Tibetan context. 
57 People's Daily Online, 'Resolving Taiwan question "entirely" internal affair of China: legislator' 
(2005) 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200503/08/eng2OO5O3O8 - 
176010. html>, accessed 8 March 2005. 
Similarly Li Peng, 'Accomplishing the Great Task of the Reunification of the Motherland Is the 
Common Wish of All Chinese People (January 30,1996)' (2002) 35(5) Chinese Law and Government 
18-24,2 1. See also Keyuan Zou, 'Governing the Taiwan Issue in Accordance with Law: An Essay on 
China's Anti-Secession Law' (2005) 4(2) Chinese Journal of International Law 455-463: particularly 
the Law is to oppose and prevent Taiwan's secession with a view to preserving the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of China (at 457). 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity. 58 The right of self determination inheres to all 
peoples, but, while there is 'clear preference for independence as the normal result of 
exercise of the right to self-determination', 59 a result of minority autonomy should be 
less conflictual with the retention of sovereignty and territorial integrity in situations 
where secession is impractical . 
60 In this respect the issue of 'internal' self 
determination becomes relevant, raised particularly in the context of indigenous 
populations and minorities. 
Nor is it the case that self-determination conflicts with all other norms or institutions 
of international law. The principle is in harmony with the burgeoning human rights 
doctrines, and indeed it is through deviations in the respect for human rights that 
peoples may find their route to pursue claims for self-determination. 
2.3.3 Links Between Seýf-Determination and Human Rights 
Similar to the theory of self-determination, international protection of human rights is 
a doctrine that has been formulated in relatively recent years, and previously, for 
centuries, 'any ruler would take care in the most appropriate fashion of the fate of his 
subj ects'. 61 Any interventions on the international level were random - for instance in 
respect of the protection of Christian communities in parts of the Ottoman Empire. 62 
" Secession, unless consensual, may be defined as 'the creation of a new independent entity through 
the separation of part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent of the 
latter': Kohen MG, 'Introduction' in MG Kohen (ed. ), Secession: International Law Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1-20,3. No such right to secede is accepted by the 
United Nations: see note 53 above. 
59 Hannum, note 49 above, 40. See also Brownlie 1, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: 
International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1998) 46. 
60 Norman W, 'The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics' in M Moore (ed. ), 
National Seýf-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 34-61,55. 
61 Tomuschat C, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003)7. 
62 Such concerns were 'generated far more by the tangible threat of intervention on behalf of ... 
[religious, national or linguistic] minorities by outside States sharing the same religious, national, or 
linguistic traits than by a felt need to minimize the theoretical justifications for possible secession by 
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In any event, it was not until the twentieth century that international institutions with 
the ability to exercise a monitoring function came into existence, initially with the 
inception of the International Labour organization in 1919 but principally with the 
63 
advent of the United Nations Charter in 1945. 
While self-determination is applicable to peoples rather than individuals, and is 
subject to interpretation, human rights 'are rights of individuals in society which are 
regarded as universal and inalienable'. 64 Universality, though, is a concept in this 
context that merits discussion, and finds its focus in the different categories of human 
rights. Human rights in the first category may be termed civil liberties, or 'negative' 
human rights, which limit the power of the state: for example, freedom and security of 
the individual or freedom of speech. Human rights comprised by the second category 
are in the nature of economic and social rights - such as the right to work or the right 
to social security; these are positive demands on an ever-increasing state. A third 
such groups. Nevertheless, such early attempts at securing fundamental rights for minorities are 
significant in that they provided precedents for the much more intensive effort at international 
protection undertaken during the League of Nations era': Buchheit, note 7 above, 60. 
63 See generally Tomuschat, note 61 above, 6-23. However, solicitude for the welfare of individuals 
pen-neated the international system as early as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in certain 
specific respects. The abolition of the slave trade is evidence of this (exemplified by the Slavery 
Abolition Act 1833), and following the First World War 'concern for individual human beings was 
reflected in several League of Nations programmes. Building on earlier precedents in the nineteenth 
century, the dominant States pressed selected other States to adhere to "minorities treaties" guaranteed 
by the League ... The years following the First World War also saw a major 
development in 
international concern for individual welfare ... the International Labour Office 
(now the International 
Labour Organisation (110)) was established and it launched ... a series of conventions setting 
minimum standards for working conditions and related matters': Henkin L, 'International Law: 
Politics, Values and Functions' (1989) 216 (IV) Collected Courses of Hague Academy of International 
Law 13,210, quoted in Steiner and Alston, note 19 above, 127-130,128. After the end of the First 
World War, provisions for minority protection were included in the peace treaties of some states, such 
as Austria and Hungary, and other states such as Poland 'signed minority protection treaties with the 
allied and associated powers': Steiner and Alston, ibid, 95. See too section 2.2 above. The work of the 
ILO continues, and, for example, on 27 June 1989 the General Conference of the ILO at its 76th 
session adopted the Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, which entered into force on 5 September 1991, and which provided for instance in Article 3: 
'I. Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. The provisions of the Convention shall be applied 
without discrimination to male and female members of these peoples. 2. No form of force or coercion 
shall be used in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples concerned, 
including the rights contained in this Convention. ' 
64 Kent A, Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 6. See though notes 73 and 76 below and section 5.2.1 below. 
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category of human rights comprises composite rights, such as the rights to peace, to a 
clean environment, or the right to development. 65 
Christian Tomuschat makes the point that 'international human rights must be 
considered an offspring of the human rights that were originally codified at national 
level' 
. 
66 This then explains the fact that different states approach the principle of 
human rights from different angles and give different emphasis to particular human 
rights over others. In the West, in the history of classical liberalism, it has been the 
view that human rights should serve the ends of the individual. This is reflected in the 
philosophical works of such as John Locke (1632-1704) and is made clear by 
Emmerich de Vattel who, when premising a right of resistance for citizens, wrote: 
When a prince, without any apparent reason, attempts to deprive us of life, or 
of those things, the loss of which would render life irksome, who can dispute 
our right to resist him? Self-preservation is not only a natural right, but an 
obligation imposed by nature, and no man can entirely and absolutely renounce 
it. 67 
The case is somewhat different, though, in socialist states, and human rights in such 
systems 'are seen as determined by the state and as having no autonomous 
existence'. 68 In China, human rights are viewed as subordinate to state sovereignty 
65 See Tomuschat, note 61 above, 24; Kent, note 64 above, 7. 
66 Tomuschat, note 61 above, 25. Further, it must be remembered that 'International law rules framed in 
terms of the protection of human rights against state interference are very largely a post-1945 
phenomenon. Before then ... the treatment of nationals was regarded as 
being within the domestic 
jurisdiction of sovereign states': Harris, note 14 above, 654; similarly Tomuschat, ibid, 8, with regard 
to the lack of international institutions capable of exercising monitoring functions prior to the twentieth 
century; and Douzinas C, The End of Human Rights. - Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 115: 'Human rights entered the world scene after the Second World 
War'. See also section 5.1 below. 
67 De Vattel E, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and 
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (ed. J Chitty) (London: Sweet, Stevens & Sons, and Maxwell, 1834) 
Book 1, Chapter IV, §54. See, also, Tomuschat, note 61 above, 11. 
68 Kent, note 64 above, 13. 
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and as collectively based: the legal system intervenes 'on behalf of the collective 
interest of all individuals, vested in the sovereignty of the state'. 69 Collective interests 
of the state, not interests of the individual, are stressed. This reflects Marxist 
convictions that it is only within the collective interest that individual rights can be 
fully realised. Further, in China, the understanding of rights is a part of thought that 
dates back to the late Qing (mid-to-late nineteenth century) and Republican periods of 
Chinese history and indeed ultimately to Confucianism. 70 The end purpose is the 
strengthening of the state, 71 and thus, for China, economic and social human rights 
take precedence, whereas civil and political human rights are subordinated to state 
interests. The Chinese perception of the individual is of someone who owes duties to 
society and the nation: any rights he or she may have are essentially the offspring of 
those duties. 
72 
It is therefore evident that while the subject of 'human rights' is perceived as a 
universal and rapidly growing doctrine, in fact 'universality' is a misnomer, by reason 
73 
of the fact that fault lines occur within the panoply encompassing human rights. This 
is important when moving on to consider the theory of self-determination, as self- 
determination has linkages with human rights issues. It is also important specifically 
69 Ibid 30. 
70 Weatherley RD, The Discourse of Human Rights in China. - Historical and Ideological Perspectives 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997) 211-212,242. 
71 Kent, note 64 above, 38. 
72 Weatherley, note 70 above, 107. 
73 In contrast to the universality of human rights is the relativist challenge to human rights, based on 
cultural relativism. See, in this regard, section 5.2.1 below. Nevertheless, cultural relativism may prove 
to be the means whereby a state maintains its power: see Chapter 5, note 30 below, and also Rosalyn 
Higgins, who argues that relativism is a state-centred view which 'loses sight of the fact that human 
rights are human rights and not dependent on the fact that states, or groupings of states, may behave 
differently from each other so far as their politics, economic policy, and culture are concerned': 
Higgins R, Problems and Process. - International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994) 96-97, quoted in Harris, note 14 above, 656-657 (emphasis in original). 
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when examining China's view that only states, not individuals, can be subjects of 
intemational law. 74 
Just as there is divergence between Western and socialist doctrines of human rights, 
there is also divergence in respect to self-determination. This has centred around the 
anti-colonialist force of the principle, where the socialist doctrine became 
predominant: 'Socialist countries understand self-determination essentially as the 
liberation of non-self-governing peoples from colonial domination. -)75 The socialist 
view has been that self-determination means 'external' self-determination, and not for 
peoples other than those who are subject to colonial or racist rule or who are under 
foreign domination. There is emphasis on the idea that only in socialist states can self- 
determination be completely realised, and in the end 'for sovereign and independent 
States self-determination becomes tantamount to the right to non-intervention': 76 i. e. 
emphasis is placed on territorial integrity. Western states have viewed this perspective 
as too narrow - and emphasise close links between individual human rights and self- 
determination, as well as the universality of self-determination. Although socialist 
doctrine came to the fore in the post-Second World War era, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and its satellite empire in 1991 has inevitably provoked a re-evaluation of 
concepts of self-determination. 
It is clear then that a strained relationship may exist, not only between individual 
states, but also between international law so far as human rights are concerned and 
national laws based on the perceptions of individual states. Nevertheless, states may 
74 Kent, note 64 above, 48. 
75 Cassese, note 30 above, 140. 
76 Ibid. The right to non- intervention is buttressed by East Asian states' stance in the relativist 
challenge to human rights and the community/culture-based view that it incorporates. See section 5.2.1 
below regarding the 'Asian values' debate and section 5.2.2 regarding the Bangkok Governmental 
Declaration of 1993. 
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not derogate from mandatory provisions of international law with reference to the 
universal protection of human rights, and peremptory norms of international law 
4exist to protect the values and interests that are fundamentally important to the 
international community as a whole'. 
77 
It is plain, however, that tensions have permeated the principle of self-determination, 
as well as subsisting between the principle and other international legal norms. 
Accordingly, I shall now turn to an analysis of the theory, in a critical evaluation that 
examines the theory in light of present-day realpolitik. 
2.4 Analysis of the Theory 
2.4.1 Rule or Principle 
It has been a point of disagreement as to whether self-determination is characterised 
as a principle of international law, or as a rule, or indeed both. 78 Although the theory 
has proved to be dynamic in its evolution, as would be expected of a principle, this 
has not been the product of a flowing momentum, but rather of development by fits 
and starts, and there have been formulations of the theory as a clear-cut rule. That this 
is so is evidenced by the history of the theory during the twentieth century, and in 
particular following affirmation of self-determination as a theory subsequent to the 
Second World War, when the application of the right of self-determination to 
77 Orakhelashvili A, 'The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions' (2005) 16(l) European Journal of International Law 59-88,62. 
See also Case T-315/01 Yassin . 4bdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, para. 23 1, 
referring in turn to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 1996,226, para. 79, accessible at 
<http: //www. icj-cij. org/docket/files/95 /7495. pdf>. 
78 Knop, note 18 above, 29. 
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overseas colonies came to be seen as the formulation of a sharply defined rule. 79 A 
narrow definition of self-determination precludes in turn 'any definition of "peoples" 
broader than colonies'. 
80 
Nevertheless, a positivist rule-based theory leaves little room for the dynamism 
manifest in respect of self-determination in the post-colonial era. Antonio Cassese 
refers to the drive to transform self-determination from an idea to a legally binding 
principle and evidences the expansion of the principle as an instrument that in the 
post-Cold War era has been turned on its creators. 81 The International Court of Justice 
has clarified the issue and stated in East Timor (Portugal v Australia 
In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self- 
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations 
practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The principle of self- 
determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter 
and in the jurisprudence of the Court (see Legal Consequencesfor States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 1971, pp. 31-32, paras 52-53; Western Sahara, Advisory 
Opinion, I CJ Reports 1975, pp. 31-33, paras 54-59); it is one of the essential P 
principles of contemporary international law. 82 
79 Ibid 30. 
'0 Ibid 54. 
" In the post-Cold War period, self-determination 'has come to be seen increasingly as fuelling the 
currency of ethno-national intolerance, rivalry, tribalism, xenophobia, and worse: a Golem turned on its 
creators': Cassese, note I above, 4. Thus latterly self-determination has operated against socialist 
imperialist states: see section 2.4.2 below. 
82 ICJ Reports 1995,90, para. 29, Judgment of 30 June. See too Harris, note 14 above, 116-117. 
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Affirmation of this is found in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 83 and obligations are placed on all states. In that 
case, the Court recalled its previous case law emphasising that 'developments in 
"international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to 
all [such territories]" ... [and] that the right of peoples to self-determination is a 
right erga omnes'. 
84 
The International Court has been wary of using the terminology of 'peremptory norm 
of international law' Yus cogens) and has instead employed 'virtual synonyms (such 
85 
as the concept of obligations erga omnes)' . Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms 
and are non-derogable, whereas erga omnes rules 'are rules which, if violated, give 
rise to a general right of standing - amongst all States subject to those rules - to make 
claims'. 86 Thus 'jus cogens rules are necessarily erga omnes rules, but ... erga omnes 
rules could exist which were not of ajus cogens character'. 87 Not all writers view the 
principle of self-determination as being of a jus cogens nature, but such rejection is 
not universally held. 
88 
Jus cogens rules derive 'from the "process of customary intemational law", which is 
itself part of an international constitutional order', 89 and the International Court has in 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) confin-ned the principle of self-determination as 
83 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 9 July 2004; (2004) 43 International Legal Materials 1009. 
84 Advisory Opinion, ibid, para. 88. Also, UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, note 53 
above, affirmed that 'Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples referred to ... of their right to self-determination'. ! Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006) 101. 
86 Byers M, 'Conceptual ising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules' (1997) 66 
Nordic Journal of International Lcm, 211-239,211. 
87 lbid 212. 
88 See Harris, note 14 above, 117. 
89Byers, note 86 above, 212. 
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cone of the essential principles of contemporary international law'-90 Thus, even 
though the Court has been wary to use the term jus cogens, writers such as Alexander 
Orakhelashvili are able to state: 'The right of peoples to self-determination is 
undoubtedly a part of jus cogens'. 91 This conclusion is logical and the view of the 
Court in East Timor (Portugal v Australia) therefore supports a proposition that self- 
determination has achieved the status of jus cogens, derogation from which is 
prohibited. 
The classification of the theory as a general principle rather than a rule is of 
importance due to the 'great normative potential and dynamic force' of principles. 92 
However, it is larger, external events that have brought about evolution of this 
principle, rather than a momentum of its own. It was the shock of the First World War 
that led to its popularity at the time of the 1919-1920 Peace Settlement; the events of 
the Second World War that led to the inclusion of the principle in the United Nations 
Charter and its subsequent use in the colonial context; and the collapse of the Soviet 
empire, leading to the post-Cold War era, that resulted in its further evolution, and it 
is that evolution that is the subject of the following section. 
90 lCJ Reports 1995,90, para. 29, Judgment of 30 June. 
91 Orakhelashvili, note 77 above, 64; referring, for example, to Gros Espiell H, 'Self-Determination and 
Jus Cogens' in A Cassese (ed. ), UN LawlFundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law 
(Alphen aan den Rijn - The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979) 167-173,170. Orakhelashvili 
further makes the point that human rights that are non-derogable under treaties such as the 1CCPR are 
peremptory and thereforejus cogens: ibid, 64-65. See also Cassese, note I above, 140, referring to his 
arguments at 133-140: 'the conclusion is justified that self-determination constitutes a peremptory 
norm of international law ... the whole cluster of 
legal standards (the general principle and the 
customary rules) on self-determination should be regarded as belonging to the body of peremptory 
norms'. James Crawford also indicates that self-determination is a peremptory norm: Crawford, note 85 
above, 10 1 (despite Harris, note 14 above, indicating at 117 that Crawford rejects se I f-deten-ni nation as 
jus cogens). 
92 Cassese, note I above, 129. See also sections 2.4.2 and 6.3 below regarding the dynamic force of the 
theory of self-determination. 
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2.4.2 Dynamism of the Theory 
2.4.2.1 The Soviet Union 
Although the idea of sovereignty is still a central part of much thinking in the arena of 
international relations and international law and plays a part in defining both the 
status and rights of nation states, 93 its primacy has been challenged, particularly in the 
wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, and it is in the last two decades that the 
dynamism inherent within the competing principle of self-determination has become 
most obvious. Even so, there remains a basic problem within the concept of self- 
determination, and this attaches to the question of what kind of community it should 
apply to, 94 and this in a situation where national self-determination may be perceived 
as a 4rather unclear mixture of ideas about cultural identity and individual liberty'. 95 
In analysing the theory of self-determination, therefore, it is pertinent to ask whether 
the events of recent years shed light on the theory itself, its content and extent. 
As the era of clecolonisation has drawn to an end, self-determination has sought to 
find outlets in a variety of ways, to greater or lesser success. The 1991 collapse of the 
Soviet Union is one example. From the mid-1980s onwards, the peoples of socialist 
Eastern Europe were seen to reject 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' 96 as the 
democratic process gained ground, and it is the seed of self-determination that 
spawned the resultant entitlement to democracy. 97 It has been acknowledged that the 
93 Jackson JH, 'Sovereignty- Modem: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept' (2000) 97(4) 
American Journal of International Law 782-802,782. 
94 Sluga G, 'What is national self-determination? Nationality and psychology during the apogee of 
nationalism' (2005) 11 (1) Nations and Nationalism 1-20,1-2. 
95 Breuilly J, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982) 373. 
96 Franck TM, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86(l) American Journal of 
International Law 46-91,49. 
97 lbid 52. The rejection was of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
of 14 May 1955 (commonly known as the Warsaw Pact) -a defence pact instigated by the Soviet 
Union following World War 11 - and of Soviet dominance, both by states peripheral to the Soviet 
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principle of self-detennination 'contributed to the decision by the leaders of the Soviet 
Union, beginning in 1989, to withdraw their military forces and political suzerainty 
from Eastem Europe and ... 
from the Baltic States'. 98 This effectively was the 
commencement of a belated Soviet decolonisation, 99 and a rebuttal of the subsisting 
doctrine of self-determination whereby, to benefit from the theory, colonial territories 
had to be geographically separate from the metropolitan state. ' 00 
It was not just states within the Soviet ambit that were able to separate themselves 
from the so-called Eastern Bloc, but also states integral to the Soviet Union itself, 
such as the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia and the Baltic States. The Soviet 
Government tried to stave off the assertion of nationality rights, and bring about a 
greater democracy to the Soviet system, by several amendments to the constitution in 
1988.101 However, territories such as the Baltic States severed direct connections with 
Moscow, and altered their relationship with what had been the parent state. The 
situation is ongoing, from the insurgents of Chechnya to the revolutionary upheavals 
in the Ukraine and Moldova in 2004 and 2005.102 Self-determination extended its 
reach into the USSR, but in so doing there has been increased instability in the area, 
Union but within the Warsaw Pact and by states within the Soviet Union itself The Warsaw Pact 
eventually terminated on I July 1991. 
98 Ibid 55, the Baltic States comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The withdrawal of the Soviet 
Union from Eastern Europe followed demands for democratic reforms and revolt in 1989 in states such 
as East Germany, where the Communist Party collapsed leading ultimately to unification with West 
Germany in 1990, Bulgaria, where a multi-party system replaced the Communist authoritarian rule of 
Todor Zhivkov at the end of 1989, Romania, where the Communist Government of Nicolae Ceaucescu 
was overthrown, and Ceaucescu executed, in December 1989, and Czechoslovakia where, in the same 
month, the democratic government of Vaclav Havel was elected following public demonstrations and 
the resignation of the Communist leaders. 
99 Reisman WM, 'International Law after the Cold War' (1990) 84(4) American Journal of 
International Law 859-866,864. 
100 It is, though, the case that the Soviet Union consented to its own break-up, and a right to self- 
determination for its constituent republics was enshrined in the Soviet Constitution: see the 
Constitution of the Soviet Union, adopted on 7 October 1977, Article 72. 
101 Hannum, note 49 above, 365-366,1988 constitutional amendments, for example, altering the 
electoral and political systems in place. 
102 It is noteworthy that Chechnya has not been able to achieve self-determination. Article 72 of the 
Soviet Constitution, note 100 above, referred to the right of each union republic to secede from the 
USSR, and Chechnya was not such a republic, being a constituent part of Russia. 
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and sphere of influence, of the fonner Soviet Union, emphasising the fluidity of 
political and legal identity and the potentially destructive impact of self-determination 
on territorial integrity and the inviolability of state boundaries. 
Self-determination in the form of consensual secession has determined the outcome of 
the collapse of the Soviet power. However, in a sense the secession is incomplete, 
although highlighting ethnic nationalism and conflicting with notions of statehood and 
territorial integrity. There is ever-increasing interdependence of states, and the states 
that have seceded from the Soviet Union are still linked, in particular economically, 
with the Russia of the present. 103 This can be seen, for instance, with regard to 
arguments raging at the end of 2004 and early in 2005 in the Ukraine with reference 
to the benefits or otherwise of retaining close links with Russia - or indeed pursuing 
closer ties with the European Union - and is indicative of an age of 'porous borders 
and intertwined economies and cultures'. 104 The Soviet example of self-determination 
through secession of constituent republics, though, evidences the consensual 
separation of states from an imperial bloc and should not be taken further as evidence 
leading to the disintegration of multinational states along national or ethnic lines. 105 
103 This point was given particular emphasis in December 2005 and January 2006, when Gazprom, the 
Russian state-controlled natural gas monopoly, halted gas deliveries to the Ukraine after the Ukraine 
Government refused to pay quadruple the price it had previously paid for Russian gas, Russian gas 
accounting for approximately a third of Ukraine's gas consumption. Ukraine accused Russia of trying 
to undermine its economy. The dispute was compounded by the fact that Ukraine acted as a transit 
country for much of the Russian gas flow to Europe. See generally, for example, Associated Press 
(The), 'Europe feels effect of Russia-Ukraine gas fight: Austria, Hungary say supply cut after Kiev 
refuses Moscow's price rise' (2006) 
<http: //www. msnbc. msn. com/id/10673855>, accessed 13 September 2006. Similarly regarding 
Ukrainian accusations in May 2005 of Russian oil companies trying to 'bully' the Ukraine by causing 
fuel shortages: BBC News, 'Ukraine raps Russia oil "bullies"' (2005) 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/I /hi/business/4552349. stm>, accessed 13 September 2006. 
104 Talbott S, 'Se I f- Determination in an Interdependent World' (2000) Foreign Policy 152-163,156. 
105 See Brownlie, note 59 above, 44-47. Further, Chechnya, a federal unit within Russia, has been 
unable to secede from the Russian Federation following the break-up of the Soviet Union, and has been 
unsuccessful in obtaining support for secession from nation states; see note 102 above. 
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2.4.2.2 Eastern Europe 
The break-up of the Soviet Union shows the truth of the comment that self- 
determination is likely to be a harbinger of 'discontent, disorder and rebellion', 106 and 
this is again highlighted in the context of the former Yugoslavia. While such 
dissolution of the Soviet Union as has taken place was based on agreement of the 
constituent parts of the state, this was not the case in Yugoslavia. Declarations of 
independence came from Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, and ultimately the state 
broke up into constituent parts in a surge of violence and what came to be known as 
'ethnic cleansing'. 107 The trauma was such that the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), set up in 1993, still sits some fourteen years later, 
establishing facts and bringing to accountability those involved in war crimes within 
the scope of its remit. ' 08 
Despite the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, issues of territorial integrity were not 
without relevance. The artificiality of post-colonial boundaries has previously been 
106 See Talbott, note 104 above, 153; quoting Robert Lansing, Secretary of State to Woodrow Wilson. 
107 See Hannum, note 49 above, 497-498, and De Lange R, 'Paradoxes of European Citizenship' in P 
Fitzpatrick (ed. ), Nationalism, Racism and the Rule of Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Limited, 1995) 97-115,10 1. 
108 Charges brought in front of the ICTY include those in respect of ethnic cleansing. See, for example, 
the Indictment brought on 4 March 2004 by the Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Jadranko Prlic, 
Bruno Stojic, Slobodan PraIjak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Covic, and Berislav Pusic (IT-04-74-PT), 
which at paragraph 15 outlined the joint criminal enterprise, inter alia: 'to politically and militarily 
subjugate, permanently remove and ethnically cleanse Bosnian Muslims and other non-Croats who 
lived in areas on the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... and to join these areas as 
part of a "Greater Croatia, " ... by 
force, fear or threat of force, persecution, imprisonment and 
detention, forcible transfer and deportation, appropriation and destruction of property and other means . 
.. It was part of the 
joint criminal enterprise to engineer the political and ethnic map of these areas so 
that they would be Croat-dominated, both politically and demographically' (unaffected by the 
Amended Indictment of 16 November 2005). See the website of the ICTY: for the Indictment 
specifically, see <http: //www. un. org/icty/indictment/english/prl-ii04O3O4e. htm>. Ethnic cleansing 
leads to displacement of population by measures such as those alleged in the Indictment mentioned: see 
Kaldor M, 'Transnational civil society' in T Dunne and NJ Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 195-213,204-206; Balkan, 'View from The 
Hague: They Allegedly Carried Out the Ethnic Cleansing Plan' (2004) 
<http: //www. un. org/icty/bhs/outreach/articles/eng/article-040407e. htm>. The existence itself of the 
Tribunal, which 'has expanded the boundaries of international humanitarian and international criminal 
law' (website of the ICTY - 'The ICTY at a Glance, point 4. <http: //www. un. org/icty/glance- 
e/index. htm>), is a challenge to the idea of state sovereignty. 
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referred to: where decolonisation applied, national colonial boundaries prevailed. 109 
This thinking persisted in Yugoslavia, 'where all of the Western states decided from 
1991 that the former internal borders of constituent republics would remain 
sacrosanct'. ' 10 This has been emphasised by the ICTY, and referred to on the basis 
that 'a liberal rule legitimating secession of constituent federal units is matched by a 
strict prohibition on any ftirther territorial change', "' i. e. the right to secede, based on 
self-determination, is applied only to those inhabiting a federal unit whose territorial 
limits had previously been defined by an autonomous government and 
administration. 112 The effect of this exacerbates ethnic cleansing, and brings to the 
fore new ethnic minorities within newly created states as ethnic nationalism increases 
in visibility. A potential outcome of self-determination is thus to create new demands 
for self-determination from new minorities, new problems, 113 but there has been 
'09 See note 28 above. The artificiality of post-colonial boundaries has been particularly acute in Africa, 
and the different ethnic groups within the distinct countries on the African continent, and has sown 
seeds of division, exemplifying the conflict between self-determination and the principle of uti 
possidetis. See, for example, the genocidal conflict in Rwanda and Burundi in 1993-1994 and also 
Sudan: Hannum, note 49 above, 493-494. See in this context also the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights, which in Article 20 sets out a right to self-determination of all 'peoples', and provides, 
in paragraph 2 thereof, that 'Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves 
from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community': 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted 27 June 198 1, entered into force 21 October 
1986, OAU doc CAB/LEG/67/3. Also see Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 UNTS 39, 
entered into force 13 September 1963, Article III of which refers to the sovereign equality of the 
member states, the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and 'for its inalienable right to independent existence', 
affirming the concept of uti possidetis 'as a basis for determining boundaries': Brown-John C Lloyd, 
'Self-Determination and Separation', September 1997 Options Politique 40-43,42. Continuing internal 
conflict within states has implications so far as economic progress is concerned, leading to stalled 
economic initiatives, low gross domestic product, and poor, even decreasing, life expectancy: see in 
this respect Denham ME and Lombardi MO, 'Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty: Problems 
with(out) Borders' in ME Denham and MO Lombardi (eds), Perspectives on Third- World Sovereignty 
The Postmodern Paradox (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 1-12,6-7 - the acceptance of 
colonial borders that has promoted conflict. 
110 Hurrell A, 'International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries' in A Buchanan and M 
Moore (eds), States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 275-297,293. 
111 Horowitz, note 42 above, 193. 
112 This emphasises what was previously thought to be good international law - exemplified by Weller 
M, 'The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' 
(1992) 86(3) American Journal of International Law 569-607,606. See now though the question of 
supervised statehood with respect to Kosovo: section 6.3.3 below. 
113 See Margalit and Raz, note 27 above, 458. 
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consensus that such minorities should have no right to external self-determination. 
This in turn reflects 'the powerful impulse towards stable frontiers and the finality of 
borders' and the primacy of the territoriality of states. 114 Yet it is arguable that the 
support at the outset from international states and international organisations for 
retaining the original territorial integrity of the Yugoslav federation in 1991 
strengthened the inflexibility of Slobodan Milosevic, the late Serbian President of 
Yugoslavia, and directly contributed to the violent and bloody aftermath of the Balkan 
war. 
115 
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were 
emphasised as late as 1999 by the UN Security Council. ' 16 However, there is further 
validation of the contention for secession in the instance of Kosovo, a province of the 
former Yugoslavia. By Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 117 the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was forced to withdraw its military, police and paramilitary 
forces from Kosovo" 8 in the face of violence against and repression of the Kosovan 
population. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
and the NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo Force) assumed responsibility for the 
administration of Kosovo to the exclusion of the Yugoslav authorities, 119 while 
114 Hurre I I, note 110 above, 293, and also 283. 115 See Weller, note 1] 2 above, 570. 
116 See UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) on the situation relating to Kosovo, adopted by the Security 
Council at its 4011 th meeting on 10 June 1999, and see also the statement by the Chairman on the 
conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999, 
incorporated therein as Annex 1. Similarly, UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999) emphasised the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Indonesia in establishing a United Nations Transitional Administration for 
East Timor: Yannis A, 'The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and Its 
Implications in International Politics' (2002) 13(5) European Journal of International Law 1037-1052, 
1048. 
117 This is a Chapter VII resolution and therefore mandatory. 
118 Point 3 of Resolution 1244. 
119 Point II of Resolution 1244, and see Yannis, note 116 above, 1047-1048. By point 10 of Resolution 
1244, an international civil presence was established 'in order to provide an interim administration for 
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, and , vhich will provide a transitional administration while establishing and overseeing 
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
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stipulating that the international civil presence would promote 'the establishment, 
pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in 
Kosovo'. 120 Self-determination, without being mentioned, 'penneates the entire 
texture of the resolution ... [which] can be deemed to constitute the first formalized 
decision of the international community recognizing that a human community within 
a sovereign State may under specific circumstances enjoy a right of self- 
determination'. 121 
While the Yugoslav situation is indicative of the disintegrative potential of the theory 
of self-determination, not all recent instances of partition of states have been so 
violent and disruptive. Czechoslovakia is a case in point, the state dividing along 
consensually ethnic lines into the Czech and the Slovak Republics. 122 Following July 
1992 elections in Czechoslovakia, the likelihood of dissolution increased and came to 
the fore as disagreement intensified between the two constituent republics. The 
political leaders negotiated details for disbanding the federation and parliament voted 
to dissolve the country on 31 December 1992. By the end of 1992, definitive 
constitutions had been approved for both the individual Czech and Slovak 
Republics, 123 and on I January 1993 each state became peacefully independent of the 
other in what was known as the 'Velvet Divorce'. 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo'. See Chapter 6, note 87, on the question of 
democratic institutions. 
120 Point II of Resolution 1244. 
12 1 Tomuschat C, 'Secession and self-determination' in MG Kohen (ed. ), Secession. - International Lmi, 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 23-45,34. Recent developments in 
respect of Kosovo are considered and analysed in detail in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 below. 122 Hannum, note 49 above, 495 and 497. 
123 Stein E, 'International LaNv in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern 
European Constitutions? ' (1994) 88(3) American Journal ofInternational Law 427-450,440-443. 
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2.4.2.3 An Onaoint! Process 
The illustrations referred to above all emanate from Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, 
around the remainder of the world the principle of self-determination has not been 
quiescent. It has arisen in various countries, but largely to limited effect. However, the 
number of instances in which the principle is pleaded leads to the conclusion that it is 
gaining in force. 
One case where self-determination has been achieved is East Timor, which, as long 
ago as 1960, had been placed on the international agenda by the UN General 
Assembly when it was published on the list of Non-Self-Goveming Territories. East 
Timor was at that time a Portuguese colony. 124 In 1974,, there was civil war over the 
question of whether there should be independence for East Timor or integration into 
Indonesia. Portugal was unable to control developments, withdrew, and in 1975 
Indonesia invaded and subsequently annexed the territory. ' 25 The occupation was 
illegal, but it was not until 1999 that the UN Security Council took decisive action in 
Resolution 1272 (1999)126 - establishing the United Nations Transitional 
Administration for East Timor, 'with a mandate to prepare East Timor for 
independence'. 127 This followed violence subsequent to an East Timorese referendum 
that rejected autonomy within Indonesia. The UN peacekeeping operation took effect, 
and, following a further referendum in August 2001, East Timor finally achieved 
12' See UNGA Resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, Transmission of information under Article 
73 e of the Charter: paragraph I (i) referring to 'Timor and dependencies'. Tibet has not been placed on 
the international agenda by the UN General Assembly in the same fashion: see section 3.4.3 below. 
125 See Ball D, 'Silent witness: Australian intelligence and East Timor' (2001) 14(l) Pacific Review 35- 
62; Leaver R, 'Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia' (2001) 14(l) Pacific Review 1-14; 
and UNMISET [United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor], 'Background' (2005) 
<http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/'background. html>, accessed 15 March 2005. 
126 Resolution dated 25 October 1999 on the situation in East Timor; see (2000) 39 International Legal 
Materials 240-2422. 
127 Brownlie, note 21 above, 60. 
51 
independencein 2002.128 Self-determination was attained, therefore, for East Timor, 
but the process was long drawn-out, epitomised by violent struggle and militia 
attacks, 129 and, notably, it was in respect of what could be defined as a recognised 
territory. 1 30 
A different scenario persists in respect of the Kurds residing in the mountains 
connecting Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, a region where Kurdish culture has remained 
dominant despite severe repression. The area 'has been referred to as Kurdistan since 
the early thirteenth century' 131 and is a distinct entity. The idea of self-determination 
for the Kurds is not new, and was promoted by President Woodrow Wilson at the end 
of the First World War. Subsequently, however, this did not materialise: Turkish 
policy, for example, was to assimilate Kurds into Turkish society, and in Iraq 
chemical weapons were deployed against Kurds. 1 32 The Kurdish issue is complex. 
The Kurds inhabit three states in which there are pro-Kurd movements and are said to 
be perhaps 'the largest geographically separate community in the world not to have 
achieved either statehood or some form of territorial autonomy'. 133 However, they 
lack unity in that, for example, they are not one ethnic group, do not speak one 
128 See UNMISET, note 125 above. 
129 See Candio P and Bleiker R, 'Peacebuilding in East Timor' (2001) 14(l) Pacific Review 63-84. 
130 See also note 112 above and related text. 13 1 Hannum, note 49 above, 178. 
132 See Plunk RL, Seýf-Determination of Peoples: Tibet and Kurdistan (Unpublished LLM Thesis: 
George Washington University, 1993) 47-60. In August 2006, Saddam Hussein went on trial in 
Baghdad in connection with an anti-Kurdish offensive in 1987-1988, charged with genocide and crimes 
against humanity. As many as 180,000 people are said to have been killed in 'Operation Anfal', an 
offensive during which chemical weapons were used. See, for example, Associated Press (The), 
'Saddam Hussein's Genocide Trial Resumes' (2006) 
<http: //www. abc news. go. co m/I ntemational/print? i d=241 8325>, accessed 13 September 2006; and 
BBC News, 'No Saddam plea at genocide trial' (2006) 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/ I /h i/world/middl e- east/5268900. stm>, accessed 13 September 2006. The trial 
was not concluded due to the execution of Saddam Hussein on 30 December 2006 following conviction 
on earlier charges relating to mass executions at Dujail 'in the aftermath of an attempt on his life' in 
July 1982: Keesing's Record of World Events, 'Imposition of death sentence on Saddam Hussein' 
(2006) 
Accessible at <http: //keesings. com>. 
133 Hannum, note 49 above, 199. 
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language, and are riven by internal argument. ' 34 Yet had the major powers taken a 
stronger line pursuant to the aftermath of the First World War it would have been 
possible to create a viable Kurdistan-' 35 This is strong evidence of the fact that self- 
determination, while treated as a legal theory and evolving principle, is subject to the 
vagaries of the political world. The Kurdish situation itself resonates in discussion of 
and in comparison with the Tibetan situation, and also in the context of the debate 
between choice theorists and remedial right theorists, which is referred to below. ' 36 it 
emphasises the importance that commitment of major powers to a cause may have, 
and brings into the equation the extent to which a state's policy may or may not be 
interventionist. 
2.4.2.4 The Move Towards Internal Self-Determination 
A further scenario to be considered in the context of the gathering momentum of the 
principle of self-determination relates to indigenous peoples. While external self- 
determination was the original focus of the principle, there has been a movement in 
recent years towards an emphasis on internal self-determination. 
It has been seen that there are restrictions on external self-determination, particularly 
in the fact that international law has not recognised any formal right to secede - to do 
so would conflict with established legal norms of statehood and territorial integrity - 
and also in the limited scenarios in which self-determination has had application. This 
has led to a distinction that seeks to guarantee internal rather than external self- 
determination. 
Ibid. 
Ibid 200. 
136 See sections 2.4.3 and 6.2. 
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The impetus for internal self-determination reflects the unwillingness of a state to 
divest itself of sovereignty of a part of its territory, and a desire to give a minority in a 
state some authority or autonomy over its own affairs. ' 37 Thus internal self- 
determination comprises an ongoing, not a once-and-for-all, right. 138 Commentators 
such as Antonio Cassese have seen the internal dimension of self-determination as 
neglected, and believe it may provide the means for a meaningful autonomy, enabling 
a minority group to obtain the protection it seeks. 139 
There is a further potential benefit in respect of internal self-determination, when 
considering the nature of the peoples who are to benefit. So far as external self- 
determination is concerned, this is perceived in any event to be limited to recognised 
administrative territories, 140 whereas this is not so with internal self-determination. 
This is clear from the cases that have been brought by indigenous groups, or members 
of indigenous groups, and is indicative of the expanding subjects of international law. 
There are, though, limitations even in this context, as it is a right of peoples not of 
individuals. 141 
Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 
19949 142 provides that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, 
137 See Groarke, note 19 above, 84; see also Cassese, note I above, 350. 138 Cassese, note I above, 101. 
139 Ibid 63; 350-352. 
140 See note 112 above and related text, subject to recent potential developments in Kosovo. 
... See Brownlie, note 59 above, 43; and see Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (1994) 
96 International Law Reports 667. 
142 (1995) 34 International Legal Materials 546. The Draft Declaration remains pending, although on 
29 June 2006, by Resolution 2006/2, the Human Rights Council adopted the text of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and recommended that the Declaration be adopted by 
the UN General Assembly. China voted in favour of the adoption in the Human Rights Council. While 
the Declaration is not yet legally binding, even so it reveals the will of states to incorporate such 
principles in normative terms and as a result may have persuasive value. 
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although this right is couched in vague terms-' 43 This follows attempts since the early 
1970s in a number of states to deal with claims of indigenous peoples, and some 
national legal systems, such as those of Canada and Australia, 'have begun to come to 
terms with the notion that a "people" may have rights as distinct from the rights of 
individuals and the rights of the total community'. 144 A point of significance in 
respect of the Draft Declaration is that indigenous peoples took part in the Working 
Group formulating the Draft. These participants were outsiders not only to normative 
international law but also to the institutional system of states. 145 This then leads to a 
role for indigenous groups in the principle of self-detennination and links to the 
judgment in East Timor (Portugal v Australia) 146 in respect of the extension of 
participants in the field of international law beyond states, that extension acting as a 
potential brake on the power of states. 
Although for indigenous peoples secession from the state has proved elusive, and 
indigenous rights fall short of sovereign rights, 147 internal self-determination through 
autonomy is proving a more realistic goal. In Canada there has been recognition of 
indigenous peoples as 'legitimate constitutional actors' and 'aboriginal rights' have 
been recognised in Canadian courts. 148 In Australia indigenous inhabitants have 
successfully brought court action, for instance claiming land under a pre-colonial title 
143 See Brownlie, note 59 above, 48; also Tomuschat, note 121 above, 37. Article 3 states: 'Indigenous 
peoples have the right of self-deten-nination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. ' 144 Nettheim, note 38 above, 126. 145 Knop, note 18 above, 213-214. 146 See note 17 above and related text. 
147 See Curry S, Indigenous Sovereignty and the Democratic Project (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2004) 82. 
148 Ibid 160; see also St Catherine's Milling Co vR (1888) 14 App Cas 46; Calder v Attorney-General 
of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145; Rv Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075; and Delgamuukw v 
British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010. Also, the Nisga'a treaty process and rights of self-government 
granted to the Inuit over the new territory of Nunavut: see <http: //www. nisgaalisims. ca> and 
<http: //www. inac.,, c. ca/nunavut/index. html> respectively. 
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and invalidating Crown Title. 149Nevertheless the approach differs in Canada and 
Australia: in the former indigenous peoples are considered self-governing for certain 
purposes, and in the latter 'certain special services or programs [are provided] for 
indigenous groups within an overall context of legal equality'. 150 Even so, by attaining 
land rights Australian aboriginals can be seen to make progress in the sphere of self- 
determination, by enabling themselves to have full control over the use of that land in 
pursuit of economic, social and cultural development and continuation. Self- 
determination is not therefore equated solely with demand for independence and 
secession and this may in turn lead to greater potential for resolution of claims by 
minorities. For indigenous groups, internal self-determination may be more 
significant than external self-determination. 151 
A prime example of self-determination through internal autonomy is in respect of the 
indigenous Saami population of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Indigenous Saami 
parliaments now exist in all three countries, and these are essentially indigenously 
elected departments of the respective state governments. In Norway, the constitution 
has been amended to provide that the Norwegian state has the responsibility 'to create 
conditions enabling the Saami to preserve and develop its language, culture and way 
of life'. 152 While the powers of the Saami participants are limited, the indigenous 
communities concerned regard the very creation of the parliaments as a significant 
development. 153 
There is thus evidence indicative of evolving boundaries to the international legal 
theory of self-determination; the concept developing from one relating to external 
149 See Mabo and others v Queensland (2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, and Curry, note 147 above, 58. 
"0 Hannum, note 49 above, 80. 
151 Ibid 96-97. 
152 Ibid 489. 
153 Ibid 247-262,489-490. 
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self-determination to one incorporating doctrines of internal autonomy, as well as 
expanding out of the context of decolonisation. Around these developments two 
distinct schools permeate the current discourse on self-determination. 
2.4.3 Choice Theorists and Remedial Right Theorists 
These two schools of thought are prevalent in the modem philosophical debate on 
self-determination, and can be exemplified by Daniel Philpott, on the part of choice 
theorists, and by Allen Buchanen and Christian Tomuschat, on the part of remedial 
right theorists. 
The contention of choice theorists is that, if a majority in a territory express their will 
to secede by referendum or plebiscite, then secession will be legitimate. There is no 
requirement for the group seceding to show that they are culturally distinct, that they 
have been subject to injustices, or indeed that they have any particular claim to the 
territory to which they lay claim. A close relation between democracy and the right to 
secede exists here, and this explains the view evidenced by Philpott of self- 
determination as 'a legal arrangement that gives a group independent statehood or 
expanded powers within a federal state'. 154 The simple choice 'by a majority within a 
seceding region is sufficient to justify their right to secede and the duty of the state 
(and other states) to allow them to secede on fair terms (i. e. with compensation for 
state properties, etc, where appropriate)'. 15 5 Philpott stresses the fact that, mostly, self- 
determination will lead to an enhancement of federal privileges, while secession will 
be a last resort, 156 and internal self-detennination is thus seen as of relevance to 
154 Philpott D, 'Self-Determi nation in Practice' in M Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and 
Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 79-102,81 and generally that chapter; see also 
Moore, note 35 above, especially 5 and 10. 
155 Nonnan, note 60 above, 37. 
156 Philpott, note 154 above, 86. 
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proponents of this argument. Yet if the choice theorist school of thought is to prevail 
its inevitable outcome is an increase in the number of states populating the world; an 
attendant increase in minorities, as any heterogeneous new state will contain its own 
minorities; potential increase in the movement of peoples as they seek escape from or 
entry to a state; and increased fluidity of political and legal identity. 157 
The arguments of choice theorists evidence a high degree of idealism in what has 
been termed a 'permissive principle of self-determination'. 158 The remedial right, or 
just cause, theorists stress, rather than the autonomy-based arguments of choice 
theorists, the legitimacy of self-determination only if it is required to remedy an 
injustice. Different kinds of injustice may be focused upon: prior occupation and 
seizure of territory, for example, or serious violations of human rights, although for 
some remedial right theorists discriminatory justice is 'sufficient to legitimate 
secession'. 159 There is consequently a higher burden of proof imposed by the remedial 
right theorists, even though morality plays a part, as it does in respect of the idealism 
of the choice theorists. 
160 
The group seeking to secede is essentially seeking to portray itself as a victim, in the 
sense that it can show evidence of one or more of the following: 
(i) that it has been the victim of systematic discrimination or exploitation and 
that this situation will not end as long as the group remains in the state; (ii) that 
the group and its territory were illegally incorporated into the state within 
recent-enough memory; (iii) that the group has a valid claim to the territory it 
157 Nevertheless, Wayne Norman makes the point that 'Choice theories are, in effect, nationalist 
theories shorn of the moral complications of ethnicity' (Non-nan, note 60 above, 37), and yet 'every 
serious secessionist movement [in the twentieth century] has involved ethno-cultural minorities' (38). 
158 Moore, note 35 above, 11. 
159 lbid 6. 
160 See, for example, Buchanan A, 'The Morality of Secession' in W Kymlicka (ed. ), The Rights of 
Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 350-374. 
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wants to withdraw from the state; (iv) that the group's culture is imperilled 
unless it gains access to all the powers of the sovereign state; (v) that the group 
finds its constitutional rights grossly and systematically ignored by the central 
government or the supreme court. 161 
The impacts relevant in regard to choice theorists, referred to above, may also apply 
in connection with just cause scenarios. When considering the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship both theories will prove of relevance, and an in-depth analysis of these 
theories, and their potential and significance, will be required. 162 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has explored central issues and conflicts attributable to the legal theory 
of self-determination. While self-determination has 'long lingered in the shadow of 
state sovereignty', 163 and has been subject to limitations accordingly, it is emerging 
out of that shadow, and establishing a powerful position in its own right. Hence its 
boundaries are evolving, and as a norm of public international law it has the potential 
to impinge on the Sino-Tibetan situation where other norms have failed. 
I have made clear in this chapter that the theory contributes to the fluidity of political 
and legal identity and equally that it has not succeeded in stemming the physical 
movement of Peoples. This is evidenced by various facts: population transfer and 
exchange following the First World War; that units of self-determination may be 
manipulated by altering the balance of a population, for instance by population 
movement from Turkey into Cyprus and from China into Tibet; that self- 
determination may lead to ethnic flows, for example between states arising from the 
16 1 Nonnan, note 60 above, 4 1. 
162 See section 6.2 below. 163 Philpott, note 154 above, 86. 
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former Yugoslavia; that minorities may have to flee persecution in situations where 
they are unsuccessful in achieving self-determination. The break-up of the Soviet 
Union further illustrates the fluidity of political and legal identity, as does the 
increased visibility of internal, as opposed to external, self-determination. 
International legal nonns of sovereignty and territorial integrity are continuously, and 
increasingly, being challenged by an international legal norm of self-determination, 
established as a dynamic principle of public international law, and, while the borders 
of that norm are subject to change as the theory evolves, the analysis presented in this 
chapter is evidence of the fact that a framework of the legal theory of self- 
determination is in place potentially to challenge present Chinese hegemony over 
Tibet. 164 Yet, more than fifty years after the Chinese invasion, or liberation, of 
Tibet, 165 that domination remains recognised and 'generally supported by the world 
community', despite violations of international human rights standards perpetrated by 
the Chinese state. 166 Thus, for the Tibetans, self-determination has to date failed to 
bring about the freedom they seek, and to consider why this is the case it is necessary 
164 In Chapter 6 of this thesis I shall focus further on the effects of the evolving boundaries of self- 
determination, considering key issues of the subject in greater depth, with reference specifically to 
Tibet. The significance of the ongoing debate between choice theorists and remedial right theorists will 
be analysed in the context of the Sino-Tibetan relationship, and the dynamism of the theory in the 21 st 
century, opening up space for ideas and evolution, will be seen to be of especial importance. While it is 
pertinent to recall that, at this time, in the view of the UN General Assembly, 'external self- 
determination as a right to establish an independent State does not exist for ethnic communities which 
constitute integral elements of a sovereign State and are thus able to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs of that State. Legal doctrine overwhelmingly supports this view' (Tomuschat, note 121 above, 
37), the manner in which the evolving theory may impact on sovereignty is significant and thus the 
new progression in regard to the theory will be emphasised, through concepts both of internal and 
external self-determination. 
165 On the divergence of views between 'invasion' and 'liberation' see, for example, Alexandrowicz- 
Alexander CH, 'The Legal Position of Tibet' (1954) 48(2) American Journal of International Law 265- 
274; Tieh-Tseng Li, 'The Legal Position of Tibet' (1956) 50(2) American Journal of International Law 
394-404; van Walt van Praag MC, The Status of Tiber History, Rights, and Prospects in International 
Law (London: Wisdom Publications, 1987) Chapter 9; see also the Agreement on Measures for the 
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet dated 23 May 195 1, referred to in Tieh-Tseng Li and van Walt van Praag, 
and also Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 'Tibet - Its 
Ownership and Human Rights Situation', available at <http: //www. china. org. cn, I e- 
white/tibet/index. htm>, Part One. 
166 Little D, 'Religion and Sel f- Determi nation' in D Clark and R Williamson (eds), Self-Determination: 
International Perspectives (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 141-154,149. 
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to delve more deeply into the relationship that has subsisted between China and Tibet, 
a subject to which I turn in the next chapter. 
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3 The Changing Identity of Tibet 
3.1 Introduction 
The relationship between China and Tibet is one of marked ambiguity, both 
historically' and continuing to the present day. The defining event in this relationship 
is the autumn of 1951 when Chinese troops entered Lhasa, marking the end of what at 
that time was de facto an independent Tibetan polity. 
2 Ambiguity persists some fifty 
years later as talks take place between Chinese and Tibetan delegations: Chinese 
Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang describing talks in 2004 as 'useful and 
beneficial', yet a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accusing 
the Dalai Lama of engaging in 'splittist activities'. 3 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the modem history of Tibet, looking into the 
ongoing relationship between Tibet and China from the various perspectives. Its focus 
will lead up to and include the seminal events of 1951 and the situation pertaining at 
that time, together with their aftermath. 
1 See Addy P, 'British and Indian Strategic Perceptions of Tibet' in R Barnett and S Akiner (eds), 
Resistance and Reform in Tibet (London: Hurst & Company, 1994) 15-50,16-17. 
2 Goldstein MC, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1989) 813: 'In the next few months, several 
thousand troops of the People's Liberation Army arrived in Lhasa; although the old system continued 
to exist in some form for another eight years, October 1951 marks the end of the de facto independent 
Lamaist State. ' Also Goldstein MC, 'Change, Conflict and Continuity among a Community of 
Nomadic Pastoralists: A Case Study from Western Tibet, 1950-1990' in R Barnett and S Akiner (eds), 
Resistance and Reform in Tibet (London: Hurst & Company, 1994) 76-111,92. 
3 US Department of State, 'Report on Tibet Negotiations' (April 2005) 
<http: //www. state. gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/45 015. htm>, accessed 14 July 2005. 'Splittist' is a word used by 
the Chinese authorities when referring to Tibetan separatists: Schwartz RD, 'The Anti-Splittist 
Campaign and Tibetan Political Consciousness' in R Barnett and S Akiner (eds), Resistance and 
Reform in Tibet (London: Hurst & Company, 1994) 207-237,207. 
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3.2 Tibet at the Time Prior to the Chinese Insurgence 
The legal position of Tibet is contrasted by Chinese arguments supporting unification 
of Tibet within China and territorial integrity of China, on the one hand, and Tibetan 
arguments as to the long-standing independence of Tibet, on the other. This 
dissonance resonates over centuries, but a common factor emerges in the conquest of 
China by the Mongols under Genghis Khan (1162-1227)4 and the similar absorption 
of Tibet. Thus both Tibet and China were subject to Mongol invasion, 5 and indeed the 
Dalai Lama's temporal power is said to derive from donation by Kublai Khan, 
Mongol Emperor of China in the thirteenth century. 6 In 1644 the Manchu, having 
invaded China, captured Peking (Beijing) and founded their new dynasty, to be 
78 known as the Qing, in which the Mongols 'became a junior partner'. At about the 
same time, Mongol power established the Dalai Lama as religious sovereign over 
Tibet. 9 
Although Tibet and China were both subjugated by the Mongols, the subjugations 
were unrelated. 10 Over the years, however, an interactive relationship subsisted 
between the Tibetan government and the imperial court of the Manchu, but the extent 
of Chinese influence in Tibet was sporadic, 'undergoing several changes during its 
4 Grunfeld AT, The Making of Modern Tibet, Revised Edition (Armonk, New York, and London: ME 
Sharpe, 1996) 38. 
5 International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (Geneva: 
International Commission of Jurists, 1959) 75. 
6 Rubin AP, 'A Matter of Fact' (1965) 59(3) American Journal of International Law 5 86-590,586. See 
also Richardson HE, Tibet and Its History, Second Edition, Revised and Updated (Boulder and 
London: Shambhala, 1984) 34 and van Walt van Praag MC, The Status of Tibet. - History, Rights, and 
Prospects in International Law (London: Wisdom Publications, 1987) 5-6. 
7 Richardson, note 6 above, 43. 
8 Bulacy UE, The Mongols at China's Edge. - History and the Politics of National Unity (Lanham, C) Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002) 6. 
9 See Richardson, note 6 above, 41; International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 75. 
10 Van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 7. 
63 
existence of nearly two centuries between 1720 and 1912'. 11 During this latter period 
the principal symbol of Chinese control over Tibet comprised two representative 
residents known as ambans, first installed at Lhasa in 1720, who were, rather than 
exerting internal control, mediators between local rulers and the Qing authorities; to 
all intents and purposes, Tibet during this time was 'an integral political entity, 
governed by the local religious leaders and feudal lords'. 12 The precise Sino-Tibetan 
relationship, though, is subject to extensive and polarised debate, 13 and it is clear that, 
for instance, the power of the ambans 'varied considerably in accordance with many 
factors such as their personality and competence in relation to that of the leaders of 
Tibet, and the nature of the political situation in China and Tibet at any point in 
time'. 
14 
The Chinese Qing Empire was overthrown in 1911, and with its collapse and the 
subsequent four decades of turmoil in China Tibet 'en oyed virtually complete de i 
facto independence'. 15 
3.2.1 Turmoil in China and Repercussions in Tibet 
The 1911 revolution followed hard upon an attempt by China to increase its influence 
in Tibet. By February 1910 the Chinese general Zhao Erfeng had controlled the 
eastern borderlands of Tibet by force and had reached Lhasa, compelling the 
11 Richardson, note 6 above, 50. 
12 Wang Lixiong, 'Reflections on Tibet' (2002) 14 New Left Review, March-April, 78-111,79, 
emphasis added; see also 80. Early Tibetan government, going back to the seventeenth century, 
'expressed its religious ideology with the term ch6si nyitrel, which translates as "religion and political 
affairs joined together"' (Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 2); Tibetan religious and political affairs 
remain intertwined today. 
13 See, for example, Richardson, note 6 above; Grunfeld, note 4 above; van Walt van Praag, note 6 
above; International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above. 
" Goldstein MC, The Snow Lion and the Dragon. - China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997) 20-21. 
15 Wang Lixiong, note 12 above, 8 1. see also section 4.4.2.3 below. 
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Thirteenth Dalai Lama to escape and seek refuge in India. ' 6 In addition, for the first 
time, Tibet had appealed to Great Britain and other foreign powers for assistance 
against the Chinese. 17 The Chinese encountered resistance from the Tibetans, and 
subsequent to the 1911 revolution the Chinese troops in Lhasa mutinied against their 
officers. 18 Tibetans followed this lead, and after an anarchic period and intervention 
by the Nepali Resident in Lhasa all Chinese soldiers were removed from Tibet. By 
April 1913 all Han Chinese had been expelled and none remained in Tibet. 19 
At this time there was a complete severance of Tibetan ties with the Manchus, and 
this leads Michael van Walt van Praag to argue that no legal or political ties 'existed 
between the new Chinese President and the Dalai Lama, in 19111.20 A political 
vacuum existed in China and this strengthened the position of both Britain and Russia 
in the region. One outcome was the Simla Conference, which opened in October 
1913, involving China, Britain and Tibet. In their opening statements, the Tibetan 
representative emphasised that Tibet was an independent state, whereas China 
forcefully expressed the claim that Tibet was an integral part of the territory of the 
Republic of China. 21 An agreement was achieved at the Conference whereby, inter 
alia, Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognised '22 the autonomy of Outer Tibet23 
16 Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 51-54. The advance units of Zhao's force arrived in Lhasa on 12 
February 19 10. 
" Richardson, note 6 above, 95-98; Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 5 1, referring to the message of the 
Dalai Lama to Great Britain as contained in the Tibetan Blue Book of 1910, India Office Records and 
Archives. 
18 Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 59. 
19 See, for example, Richardson, note 6 above, 95-102; Grunfeld, note 4 above, 63-64. Also, Goldstein 
(1989), note 2 above, 59. 
20 Van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 136; see generally 134-136, and see also Alexandrowicz- 
Alexander CH, 'The Legal Position of Tibet' (1954) 48(2) American Journal ofInternational Law 265- 
274,270 and International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 85; 'Tibet unquestionably controlled 
its own internal and external affairs during the period from 1913 to 1951 and repeatedly attempted to 
secure recognition and validation of its de facto autonomy/independence': Goldstein (1989), note 2 
above, 815. 
2' Goldstein (1997), note 14 above, 32. 
22 Suzerainty may be defined 'as a kind of international guardianship, since the vassal state [here Tibet] 
is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally by the suzerain state [here China]': Dibyesh 
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was recognised, and China agreed to 'respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and 
abstain from interference with the administration of Outer Tibet ... which was to 
remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa' . 
24 However, while all 
parties initialled the agreement it never entered into force as the Chinese Government 
refused to sign it and therefore give it effect. 25 Had the negotiating parties been able to 
come to terms at this point the legal position of Tibet would have been fully 
clarified. 26 Nevertheless, and although the Simla Convention is not binding on China, 
'it is the best evidence of what the negotiating parties thought of Tibet's status at the 
time - or, perhaps, of what they hoped Tibet could successfully claim'. 27 Thus in 
1914 it may be concluded that, while Tibet benefited from substantial autonomy, it 
was not regarded as an independent country dejure, either by Britain or by China. 28 
The next decades were punctuated by instances of overtures by China to Tibet and 
periods of hostilities, during a period when China sought internal stability. 
29 The 
Anand, 'The Tibet Question and the West: Issues of Sovereignty, Identity, and Representation' in B 
Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet. - Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed 
Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 285-304,288, referring to van Wait van Praag, note 6 
above, 107, quoting from Oppenheim L, International Law, ed. H Lauterpracht, Eighth Edition 
(London: 1955). The difficulty so far as Tibet is concerned in overcoming the hurdle of suzerainty and 
the status of a vassal state lies in its failure to participate in international relations and its pursuit of an 
insular policy: section 3.4.3 below. 
23 Outer Tibet, which excluded a buffer zone, designated Inner Tibet, to the north and east - considered 
a buffer region for China. 
24 International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 86. See also Grunfeld, note 4 above, 64-67; van 
Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 54-60; Alexandrowicz-Alexander, note 20 above, 271; and Park N, 
Between Heaven and Earth. - A Study of Tibetan Self-Determination (Unpublished BA Thesis: Flinders 
University of South Australia, 1994) 16. Article 2 of the Convention. 
25 See, for example, Grunfeld, note 4 above, 67; van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 58. See also 
Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 74-75 and, for the text of the Simla Convention, Appendix C. 
26 Tieh-Tseng Li, 'The Legal Position of Tibet' (1956) 50(2) American Journal of International Law 
394-404,400. 
27 Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006)325. 
28 Also Goldstein (1997), note 14 above, 34: 'Since China did not agree to the convention, Tibet still 
had no de jure status accepted by China. ' 
29 See, for example. International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 88. In 1917, for instance, the 
Chinese made military advances into Kham, which were met with a major victory by the Tibetan forces 
(Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 83). Equally a Chinese initiative in 1930 was premised on the basis 
'that the time was right for Tibet and China to settle their differences' (ibid 215) and led to cordial 
negotiations. However, fighting again broke out in Kham, and this escalated into the Sino-Tibetan war 
of 1930-1932 (ibid 215-22 1). 
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Chinese Nationalist Government and Chinese Communist Party were in ever- 
increasing conflict, and by October 1949 the Nationalist rump had fled to Taiwan and 
Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People's Republic of China. 30 
3.2.2 Governance, Religion and Culture in Tibet 1911-1950 
At the core of governance, religion and culture in Tibet is Buddhism. It was this way 
of life, and all appurtenant to it, that ultimately came under threat from Chinese 
Communism. 
The Buddhist religion first arrived in Tibet, initially on a small scale, from Nepal, 
India and China in the seventh century, gradually displacing while absorbing the 
former animist religion of Bbn. Towards the end of the eighth century, key doctrinal 
debates took place over whether Chinese or Indian teachings should be followed, with 
the latter prevailing. By 1642 the Tibetan Buddhist church had acquired absolute 
31 dominance in temporal affairs and had come to dominate Tibetan life. 
At the heart of Tibetan Buddhism lies the system of reincarnating lamas, the Dalai 
Lama being the prime exemplar. 32 It is through this system that the elite can maintain 
power, and that power can be transferred in a peaceful and orderly fashion. The 
religion was reformed in the early fifteenth century, and it is from that time that the 
power of the religion itself increased and the power of the Gelugpa sect within the 
30 See, for example, Addy, note I above, 40. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on I 
October 1949: Cohen JA, 'Introduction' in JA Cohen (ed. ), China's Practice of International Lavv. - 
Some Case Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) 1-13,1. 
31 See Snellgrove D and Richardson H, .4 Cultural History of 
Tibet (Boulder: Prajild Press, 1980) 73- 
79; also Richardson, note 6 above, II ff. 'From that time Church and State were almost interchangeable 
terms and all political matters were looked on as subordinate to the needs and interests of religion', at 
H. 
32 By this system lamas such as the Dalai Lama are 'believed to be continuallý' reincarnated in human 
form': Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 35. 
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religion dated. " It is the Gelugpa sect, led by the incarnation of the Dalai Lama, 
which to all intents and purposes represents the Tibetan religion today. 34 
Buddhism exerted influence over Tibetan society to such an extent that it became all 
embracing. The scope of literature was restricted to religious works; culture was much 
influenced by religion, for example paintings and woodcarvings are virtually entirely 
religious in nature; and education and social organisation revolved around religion 
and the monasteries. 35 Society became dependent upon the religion and in turn fed the 
religion. The counterpoint of this religious dominance was a feudal society, which 
persisted into the twentieth century. 36 
This was the situation that pertained at the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 
December 1933, and his death left Tibet in a state of some difficulty, with increasing 
hostility evident from China. 37 Tibet came under the administration of a regent, as it 
had done in the past, pending the selection of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and 
his subsequently attaining his majority and the ability to take up the reins of power. 
The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the current incarnation, was discovered in 1937 at 
Takster, in the Amdo province, and was officially recognised by the Tibetan 
Government in August 193 9.38 He ultimately assumed full powers over Tibet when 
still a minor, at the age of fifteen, at the request of the National Assembly, on 17 
33 The Gelugpa sect is also known as the Yellow Hat sect because its monks wear yellow hats. This is 
in contrast to the other Tibetan Buddhist sects which all wear red hats. The literal meaning of Gelugpa 
is 'the ones of the virtuous path'. See Goldstein ( 1989), note 2 above, 1. The three major monastic seats 
of the Gelugpa sect were the monasteries of Sera, Drepung, and Ganden, which 'were enormous, 
resembling bustling towns as much as sanctuaries for the pursuit of otherworldly studies' (ibid 24). 
3' This thesis does not pretend to incorporate a history of the Tibetan religion. For further details as to 
this see, for example, Grunfeld, note 4 above, 40-41 and attendant footnotes; Richardson, note 6 above, 
40-42; Snellgrove D, Himalayan Pilgrimage: A Study of Tibetan Religion (Boulder: Prajfid Press, 
1981) 177-203. 
35 Richardson, note 6 above, 12-16. 
36 See, for example, Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 3-6,37. 
37 The pressures from China were such that, with the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, MeIvyn 
Goldstein writes: 'Tibet's fight to maintain her de facto independence was on': Goldstein (1989), note 
2 above, 145. 
38 Jbid 316-3324. 
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November 1950. This was at a time of political crisis following the military invasion 
of Eastern Tibet by Chinese forces. 39 The feudal nature of the Tibetan society had 
continued to that time, an inherent disadvantage of the system. 40 
As at 1950 Tibet had established an independent and unique, if flawed, culture, which 
was soon to be dominated by China. The societal contrast with China was significant, 
although not without parallels, even though each society had experienced Buddhism 
and had experienced common threads in their relationship over the centuries. 
3.2.3 Buddhism in Tibet and Confucianism in China 
As has been noted above, the dynamic of Buddhism had come to dominate life in 
Tibet. The Buddha's message is seen as one of non-violence and compassion, as a 
result of which for Tibetans 'the path of non-violence is a matter of principle'. 
41 It is 
this path that led to acceptance by the people of their position in society, perpetuating 
the feudal nature of the society, and also led to the society being unable to counter 
invasion by force. War had been abandoned as an instrument of national policy as the 
of lif 9.42 populace 'sought to respect every form e 
Buddhism had been introduced into China during the Han period, 206 BC-220 AD, 
from Persia, Central Asia and India, and subsequently gained in influence, before 
declining under persecution in the ninth century. 43 Buddhism in China thus pre-dates 
39 See Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 638-707. See also van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 144-145. 
40 For Wang Lixiong, the price extracted by Buddhism was fear - by worshipping and obeying the 
devotee received reassurance - Wang Lixiong, note 12 above, 92. 
41 Tenzin Gyatso, 'Tibet: Communist China and Human Rights' (1997) 63(14) Vital Speeches of the 
Day 423-424,423. 
42 Ibid. 
43 References to Buddhism in China first appeared as early as 130 AD, although there is little indication 
that it had influence at that time on Chinese life or thought. Religious belief was then based on Taoism 
but, as the Han Empire decayed, by around 300 AD a favourable climate permitted the emergence and 
spread of Buddhism throughout China, in the face of a rejection of Confucian thought tainted by a 
failing Han order. It should not be presumed that Buddhism prevailed to the extent that a resurgence of 
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Buddhism in Tibet. The corollary, though, was that Tibetan Buddhism gained 
influence in China, particularly during the period of Mongol domination. At the time 
of the initial introduction of Buddhism into China, predominant in the country were 
Confucianism and Taoism. Confucianism had drawn on Taoism and had from various 
sources created a new rationale of imperial power, adapting itself to the realities of the 
Han Empire. Both this empire and the Confucians opposed feudalism, some two 
millennia ago 44 _a feudalism opposed in Tibet in the last half century by the 
Communist successors of early Han China. Confucianism is the thread that weaves 
through Chinese society, just as Buddhism is the backdrop to Tibetan society. 45 
The doctrines of the classical Chinese thinkers Confucius and Mencius survived 
Buddhism, and indeed survive to the present day. Traditional Chinese ideas, enshrined 
in the doctrine of Confucianism, influence modern China, as they influenced China in 
the Qing and Republican eras, and Chinese Communism owes much to the Mencian 
belief that 'safeguarding people's material needs was not only one of the obligations 
of govermnent, but its principal obligation'. 46 
This obligation to safeguard people's material needs provides a reason for Chinese 
intervention in Tibet, apart from arguments relating to unification and territorial 
Confucianism was precluded though, and indeed Confucian thought was revived. Long before the ninth 
century official action was taken to restore Confucianism. See Wright AF, Buddhism in Chinese 
History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959) 21-32,86-87. 
44 Wright, ibid, 15. 
45 For historical background of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, which this thesis does not 
purport to attempt to cover in any depth, see, for example, Wright, ibid, and also Wright AF (ed. ), 
Confucianism and Chinese Civilization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964, reissued 1975), 
especially Schwartz B, 'Some Polarities in Confucian Thought' 3-15. 
46 Weatherley RD, The Discourse of Human Rights in China: Historical and Ideological Perspectives 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997) 161, emphasis in original; see 
also Weatherley generally in this context. A basic criterion of Confucianism, a commitment to public 
service, is also of relevance in this connection, and in Confucianism 'A central polarity ... is the 
polarity of self-cultivation ... leading to personal self-realization ... and the ordering and 
harmonizing 
of the world' (Schwartz, ibid, 5). For Mencius, 'the good social order was the outer manifestation of 
spiritual and moral capacities innate in the individual human being' (Schwartz, ibid, 8). These tenets 
materialise in the People's Republic in the stress given to the collective interests of the family and 
society rather than the individual: see section 2.3.3 above and section 5.3.3 below. 
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integrity. 47 This reasoning relies heavily on the need to emancipate what might be 
termed the proletariat from the feudal society subsisting. 
Thus there is evidence that the basis of each of the Tibetan and Chinese societies 
differs. Each society has parallels, in the existence of beliefs stretching back over 
many centuries, but the root beliefs are at variance. In turn the societies produced by 
these beliefs came to be very different, and with this in mind I turn to the events of 
1950-1951. 
3.3 An Invasion or Liberation? 
3.3.1 A Synopsis 
In the dying days of the Republican regime of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, the Regency 
in Tibet proclaimed Tibetan independence. 48 The incoming Chinese Communist 
Government denounced that declaration, and insisted that 'both the Chinese and 
Tibetan peoples were anxiously awaiting the region's "liberation" from oppressive 
colonialism and reactionary exploitation'. 49The upshot was that in 1950 the Peking 
Government despatched troops into eastern and north-eastern Tibet. Appeals by Tibet 
to the outside world, including the United Nations, were ignored; Tibet had 
insufficient military capacity to repel the Chinese troops; Tibet capitulated; and on 23 
47 The People's Republic portrays pre-1951 Tibet as a dark and backward region - 'a house of horrors' 
where serious human rights violations were prevalent: Sautman B and Dreyer JT, 'Introduction: The 
Tibet Question in Contemporary Perspective' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: 
Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 3 -22, 
8. 
48 Ginsburgs G, 'Peking - Lhasa - New Delhi' (1960) 75(3) Political Science Quarterly 338-354,338. 
See also Grunfeld, note 4 above, 79, referring to the 'most daring gesture' made by the 'Lhasa 
government ... 
in asserting its independence: it ordered the Chinese Mission to leave Lhasa'; 
Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 613: 'One step the Tibetan government took was to close the Chinese 
Mission and expel all Chinese officials from Tibet. ' 
49Ginsburgs, ibid, 339. Indeed, if there is one subject on which the Chinese Republican regime and the 
Communists were in agreement, it was that both 'believed that historically Tibet was a part of China 
and [both] sought to reunify it with the "mother" country': Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 815. tn 
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May 1951 the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was 
signed . 
50 Following the Agreement, Chinese troops entered Lhasa . 
51 
3.3.2 The Agreement on Measuresfor the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 
This Agreement, commonly known as the Seventeen-Point Agreement, was to define 
the relationship between China and Tibet during the 1950s and, even though 
n" 
52 
abrogated by the Chinese, is of relevance to the present day in interpreting this 
relationship. The Chinese Government and the Tibetans view its inception, together 
with the surrounding circumstances, very differently, and their views are the subject 
of sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 below. This section concentrates on briefly outlining the 
main provisions of the Agreement itself. 53 
Article I provides that 'the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the 
motherland - the People's Republic of China', thus emphasising that Tibet is an 
50 Ginsburgs, ibid, 338-342. Also Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, chapters 18-20 for comprehensive 
detail of this period. The Indian Government protested to China against the decision to send troops into 
Tibet, and this attitude was supported by both the US and British Governments. However, Tibet's 
claim for full political independence found no formal support, and India believed it was essential that 
friendly relations should be maintained between India and China: see Keesing's Record of World 
Events, 'Chinese "Liberation" Invasion of Tibet', vol. VII-VIII, 1950 Chinese, page II 10 1; van Walt 
van Praag, note 6 above, 143, quoting from a Note from the Indian Foreign Ministry to the Chinese 
Government of 26 October 1950. No resolutions were passed by the UN Security Council or General 
Assembly with respect to Tibet either in 1950 or 1951. At this time the General Assembly was 
preoccupied with the Korean question - see section 3.4.3 below. In 1950, EI Salvador asked the UN 
General Assembly to consider the Tibetan appeal but, particularly due to a US offensive in Korea, 
consideration of the draft resolution was postponed sine die; other factors included India's failure to 
support a discussion in the General Assembly, British and American deferral to the Indian viewpoint, 
and the urging of an adjournment by the Russian delegate: see van Walt van Praag, ibid, 145; Sloane 
RD, 'The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet' (2002) 16 
Emory International Law Review 107-186,144; and Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of the 
Shows. - A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (London: Pimlico, 1999) 55-57. The Indian 
Government's attitude to the Seventeen-Point Agreement was fatalistic, and India was 'prepared to 
accept the new situation created by the Seventeen-Point Agreement as afait accompli' - van Walt van 
Praag, ibid, 149; see also Foreign Relations of the United States 7 (1951) 1691-1693: the British 
continued to support the Indian position. 
51 See note 2 above and related text. 
52 See section 3.4.2 below. 
53 The translated text of the agreement can be found in various places including, for example, van Walt 
van Praag, note 6 above, 337-340; also <http: //www. fTeetibet. org/info/file/file2. html>, accessed on 3 
August 2005. 
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integral part of Chinese territory. By Article 2 the People's Liberation Army were 
pennitted 'to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences', 'national' here 
referring to China, and by Article 8 Tibetan troops were to become part of the national 
defence forces. 
Article 3 is of importance in that it accords 'the Tibetan people ... the right of 
exercising regional autonomy', and the issue of autonomy will be reverted to below, 54 
while Article 4 states that the existing political system in Tibet will not be altered. 
Freedom of religious belief is protected by Article 7, and Article 14 provides for the 
'Central People's Govermnent' - the Chinese Govermnent - to handle 'all external 
affairs of the area of Tibet'. 
Other articles in the Agreement deal with, inter alia, the status, functions and powers 
of both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the second most authoritative 
incarnate lama in Tibet, and also language, education, commerce and reforms. 
3.3.3 The Chinese Perspective 
The Chinese view can be surnmarised as one revolving around liberation of Tibet and 
enhancement of the territorial integrity of the state. Following the foundation of the 
People's Republic of China, in January 1950 the authorities in Tibet were requested to 
send delegates to Peking with a view to negotiating a 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet. 
The Tibetan Regent rejected this call, after which the People's Liberation Army 
crossed the 'Jinsha River' in October 1950 to liberate the people of Tibet and to 
consolidate national defences. ýý Specifically, on 24 October Peking announced that 
54 See especially sections 3.5.2 and 6.4. 
55 See the White Paper published by the Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 'Tibet - Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation', available at 
<http: //www. china. org. cný/e-white`/tibetJindex. htm>. Part One: Ownership of Tibet; also van Walt van 
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the People's Liberation Army had advanced into Tibet 'to free three million Tibetans 
from imperialist oppression and to consolidate the national defences of China's 
western frontier'. 56 This needs to be seen in the context of the declaration from Peking 
57 
on I January 1950 that it still had to liberate Tibet, Taiwan and Hainan Island . 
China's essential position as to Tibet has been constant over centuries. This is that 
Tibet's central government was not a national government, but a 'local' 
government. 58 Hence the involvement of Chinese troops is justified as an internal 
matter relating to territorial integrity and unification of the state; it was not the 
invasion of an independent state. In so far as self-determination is of relevance, 
therefore, it is to emphasise territorial integrity, in this case of China. The 
involvement of China in Tibet is then one that emphasises non-intervention of the 
international community in the internal affairs of China, in addition to emphasising 
the collective interest of the state. 59 
Praag, note 6 above, 142. The White Paper is a document forming a historical and political 
presentation. See also Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 690: the Jinsha is otherwise known as the 
Yangtse. There had in fact been talks in Delhi in September and early October 1950, prior to the 
incursion of the People's Liberation Army, between a Tibetan Mission and Chinese representatives in 
India. As a result of the offensive the talks broke down and the Dalai Lama assumed full powers in 
November 1950: see generally Goldstein, ibid, 671-707, also section 3.2.2 above. The Chinese version 
of events, rather than referring to the negotiations of the Tibetan Mission and the difficulties and delays 
it encountered, for example over passports, instead centres on the rejection by Tibet of the call for 
negotiations. 
56 International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 94. 
57 Grunfeld, note 4 above, 95; Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 638. 
58 lbid 255. A local government in the sense of not being a state government. 
59 See section 2.3.3 above. Intervention of the international community, of other states, is seen as 
aggression. For example, the Chinese Communist Party Secretary in Tibet in 2000 stated that 'So 
called "Tibetan independence" is the outcome of imperialist aggression against China in modem 
history, in a vain attempt to divide the Chinese nation. It is the outcome of class struggle on an 
international scale': Sautman and Dreyer, note 47 above, 8, quoting from Xizang Ribao, 18 October 
2000,1 (Xizang Ribao is a Chinese regional newspaper from Tibet). JK Fairbank notes that 'the 
revolution, which brought a sort of self-determination to the Chinese people, kept them in a colonialist- 
imperialist posture toward the adjoining peoples in Tibet, Sinkiang, and Mongolia': Fairbank JK, The 
Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1987) 167-168; also Sloane, note 
50 above, 140-14 1. 
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Subsequent to the 1950 invasion the Chinese Government again requested the Tibetan 
authorities to despatch delegates to Peking to negotiate. 60 In February 1951 a 
delegation was sent to Peking, and in May 1951 the Seventeen-Point Agreement was 
concluded, defining the legal position between China and Tibet. 61 The Chinese 
position is that the Dalai Lama 62 agreed to the provisions of the Agreement before it 
was signed by the Tibetan delegation and that the Tibetan National Assembly ratified 
the Agreement. Further, that there was no international protest at the time it was 
signed, and that the United Nations would not enter into discussion on it. In addition, 
the Agreement was recognised both by India and Nepal in international treaties of 
1954 and 1956 respectively, 63 and the Dalai Lama did not protest the Agreement for 
almost a decade. 64 Thus the validity of the Seventeen-Point Agreement is not open to 
question, and indeed, from the Chinese viewpoint, due to the internal nature of the 
situation, no state and no one would have any standing to cast doubt on the legality of 
the Agreement. 
The position is therefore that Tibet is part of China, that Tibet was liberated in 1950 
and 195 1, reinforcing the territorial integrity of the state, and that the Seventeen-Point 
60 Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 742ff. 
61 See 'Tibet - Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation', Part One: Ownership of Tibet, note 55 
above, and Tieh-Tseng Li, note 26 above, 403-404; Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 745ff. 
62 By that time vested with his powers. 
63 The particular relevance being that India and Nepal are neighbouring states, and states with which 
Tibet had dealings, both religious and political: see section 3.2.2 above and section 4.4.2.4 below. The 
Sino-Indian Trade Agreement over Tibetan Border of 29 April 1954 referred to 'mutual respect for 
each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty' and thus India implicitly recognised Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet: accessed through <http: //www. tibetjustice. org/materials/china/china4. html>, 27 
February 2007. In October 1956 an Agreement on Economic Aid between China and Nepal was 
signed, under which Nepal recognised China's sovereignty over Tibet; thus Nepal has received 
economic aid from China, and in turn has provided support to China over issues such as Tibet, Taiwan 
and also human rights: see, for example, People's Daily Online, 'China, Nepal Pledging Closer Ties' 
(2002) 
<http: //engIish. people. com. cn/200207/1 I/print20020711 - 
99490. htmi>, accessed 27 February 2007. 
See, too, Rubin AP, 'The Position of Tibet in International Law' (1968) 35 The China Quarterly I 10- 
154,145: 'India in 1954, and Nepal in 1956, recognised Chinese sovereipty over the territory of 
Tibet'; and van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 168. If of course the Seventeen-Point Agreement 
violated international law, the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet would not be of 
significance in international law; the violation would be determinative. See also note 76 
below. 
6' Grunfeld, note 4 above, 258. 
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Agreement clarified Tibet's legal status. The state of China is not, of course, even 
now entirely unified, and cannot be until Taiwan returns to 'the motherland'. 
Nevertheless, for China: 
The peaceful liberation put an end to imperialist aggression against Tibet, 
enabled the Tibetan people to shake off political and economic fetters, 
safeguarded the unification of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
realized equality and unity between the Tibetan ethnic group and all other 
ethnic groups throughout the country as well as the internal unity of Tibet, and 
laid the foundation for regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet. 65 
This stresses not only the territorial integrity of China, but also the right of Tibet to 
regional autonomy, which in turn, as referred to in the Seventeen-Point Agreement, 
involves the Chinese undertaking 'not to alter the existing political system of Tibet or 
the status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama'. 66 It reflects the fact that China 
regarded Tibet as part of its domain, while allowing a large measure of autonomy. 67 
This view that Tibet is a part of China was the view of China in 195 1, as it had been 
in 1914.68 
65 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 'Tibet: China's Policy 
Paper on Tibet' (2004), Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation Home Page, 3 
<http: //www. unpo. org/article. php? id=655>, accessed 4 November 2004. See though, with regard to 
terminology of ethnic groups and minority nationalities, section 2.3.1 above and section 3.5.2 below. 
66 Ginsburgs G and Mathos M, 'Tibet's Administration in the Transition Period, 1951-1954' (1959) 
32(2) Pacific Affairs 162-177,162; see Seventeen-Point Agreement, Article 4, as referred to in section 
3.3.2 above. 
67 Tieh-Tseng Li, note 26 above, 394. 
6' This attitude of China goes some way to explaining the contrasting situation concerning the Republic 
of Cyprus. Cyprus was not an independent state until 1960, achieving independence in that year 
following 'drawn-out negotiations between the Governments of Greece and Turkey': Crawford, note 
27 above, 242. Cyprus was recognised as an independent state subsequent to the agreement of the 
Greek and Turkish Governments (although for the Greek Cypriots the aim was enosis - unification 
with Greece), and as a result 'No question of its independent status has been raised by other States or 
international organizations' following its admission to the UN on 20 September 1960 (ibid 243). Tibet, 
on the other hand, has not had Chinese support for its independence, despite its de facto independent 
state in the years prior to 1950. Although the independent status of Cyprus may not have been in issue 
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3.3.4 The Tibetan Perspective 
The counter-argument is one of invasion by China of an independent country, Tibet, 
and duress with respect to the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Proponents of this position 
view Tibet, at the time, as ruled by her own theocratic government and completely 
independent of Peking: 'no ethnic Chinese government ever ruled Tibet until it was 
overrun in the 1950s by the Communists'. 69 Thus the invasion and the Seventeen- 
Point Agreement brought an end to Tibet's de facto independence. 70 
The duration of the de facto independence is an issue of dispute. Advocates of the 
Tibetan argument can though point to a general agreement that Tibet was fully 
independent after 1912, if not during the period of the Qing dynasty. 7 1 By 1912 Tibet 
was free of any Chinese control, and this freedom persisted until 1950, certainly with 
regard to Outer Tibet - what may be termed 'political' Tibet as opposed to 
' ethnographic' Tibet. 72 If Tibet was an independent state at the time of the invasion 
and Seventeen-Point Agreement, then the Agreement must be looked at in terms of an 
since it achieved independence, Cyprus has not been at peace and violence between the Greek and 
Turkish communities broke out as early as December 1963. UN peacekeeping forces were 
subsequently stationed on the island in 1964 and remain there today. In effect, Cyprus has been 
partitioned since 1974, and to date there has been no agreed settlement between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. Attempts to reunite Cyprus prior to EU accession on I May 2004 failed: Palley C, An 
International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 
1999-2004 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005) 14-15 and 22. Cyprus then is another 
issue that has rumbled on over the last half-century. 
69 Seymour JD, 'Introduction' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet Through Dissident 
Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1998) xi- 
xxviii, xviii; see also Ginsburgs, note 48 above, 341. 
70 Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 66 above, 162; Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 765. 
71 Song Liming, 'Reflections on the Seventeen-point Agreement of 1951' in Cao Changching and JD 
Seymour (eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New 
York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1998) 55-70,58, and note also the comments at note 7 thereof-, see, in 
addition, Wei Jingsheng, 'A Letter to Deng Xiaoping' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet 
Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME 
Sharpe, 1998) 75-89,82; Sloane, note 50 above, 146. Note also that Article I of the Seventeen-Point 
agreement refers to Tibet's return to the motherland, as mentioned in Song Liming, 60. 
72 See Goldstein (1994), note 2 above, especially 87; also Seymour, note 69 above, xviii. An assertion 
that Tibet was independent in 1912, and remained so until 1950, does not carry with it the implication 
that Tibet was always an independent state: Sloane, note 50 above, 13 1. 
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international treaty rather than an agreement internal to the affairs of the Chinese 
state. 
73 
Despite China's argument that the Agreement was voluntary, this is contradicted by 
the Tibetan reaction, in the first place, to the October 1950 invasion. In December of 
that year the Dalai Lama left Lhasa in secret for the town of Yatung, close to the 
Indian border, following a request from the Tibetan National Assembly who feared 
his capture by the People's Liberation Army. In his absence from the capital the 
Cabinet empowered a delegation to negotiate directly with China in Peking. During 
the negotiations this delegation was out of communication with the Tibetan 
Government, and suffered threats of personal violence and also further military action 
against Tibet. Under such duress they certified the Agreement, unauthorised by the 
Dalai Lama and Cabinet. 74 It is, though, true that the United Nations declined to 
consider the case of Tibet, but it is equally the case that this was on the 
recommendation of India, whose principal concern was not with Tibet per se but 'to 
minimize friction with China', 75 an example of realism at work within the 
international arena. 
As to the assertion that the Dalai Lama failed to condemn the Agreement, it is worth 
quoting from the Dalai Lama's statement at Mussoorie, India, after he had left Tibet 
in 1959 for exile: 
73 In this context a preliminary question would centre on whether Tibet is indeed a state. See Article I 
of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States: section 2.3.2 above and section 4.2.1 
below. 
74 Avedon JF, In Exilefrom the Land ofSnows: The Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest 
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1994, reissued 1997) 34-36; see also on the question of duress and 
coercion Song Liming, note 71 above, 57, and van Wait van Praag, note 6 above, 154-155; Goldstein 
(1989), note 2 above, 743, regarding the departure for Yatung, and with regard to the Agreement, 77 1: 
'Surprisingly the Tibetan delegation did not stipulate that they wished to delay the announcement of the 
agreement until they could inform their own government. ' 
75 Avedon, note 74 above, 34, cf Addy, note I above, 40-41, van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 142- 
143. 
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The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was also thrust upon its 
people and Government by threat of arms. It was never accepted by them of 
their own free will. Consent of the Government was secured under duress and 
at the point of bayonet. My representatives were compelled to sign the 
agreement under the threat of further military operations against Tibet by 
invading armies of China leading to the utter ravage and ruin of the country 
While I and my Government did not voluntarily accept that agreement we were 
obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to abide by its terms and conditions in 
order to save my people and country from the damages of total destruction. 76 
The reference to the obligation to acquiesce to and abide by the Agreement reflects 
the imposition of the Agreement by China, and the difficulty and danger the Dalai 
Lama would have had in protesting the same while in Tibet, bearing in mind the 
subsisting fear of China and the potential repercussions. 
The Tibetan argument is that the Agreement was imposed on a sovereign state 77 by 
China, under duress: effectively the terms of the Agreement were in the nature of an 
ultimatum as opposed to resulting from a negotiated settlement. Thus the Agreement 
76 Quoted in International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 96; the statement was made on 20 June 
1959. See also van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 155. By Article 51 of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 'The expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been 
procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be 
without any legal effect': done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980,1155 
UNTS 331. Thus if Tibet was a state in 1951, and the Seventeen-Point Agreement was therefore 
entered into between states, it is arguable that if the Agreement were entered into under duress then it 
would not be valid. Also note, though, that the Vienna Convention is not to be applied retrospectively 
(Article 4). However, Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits 'the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state', and therefore, if Tibet was 
a state prior to the Chinese insurgence, the actions of China in the threats and use of force against Tibet 
would breach this paragraph of the UN Charter: the People's Republic of China was not though a 
member of the UN at that time (nor indeed was Tibet), China's seat being held by the Republican 
Chinese Government. it is worth bearing in mind that 'The international community has with 
considerable consistency refused to accept the legal validity of acts done or situations achieved by the 
illegal use of force': Crawford, note 27 above, 132. The international community, however, has in 
effect accepted the validity of acts effected by the People's Republic in Tibet: see section 3.4.3 below. 
77 See Chapter 4 below with reference to sovereignty. 
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78 had no legal effect and was void ab initio . This then 
is perceived as an injustice 
sufficient in itself to legitimate secession from China, even if a claim of independence 
79 
as of right is not admitted. 
However, before considering further the question of remedial right theory it is worth 
turning to consider events in the aftermath of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. 
3.4 The Aftermath and Impacts of the Seventeen-Point Agreement 
Following the conclusion of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, Chinese troops entered 
Lhasa in September 195 1,80 and China remains in control of Tibet more than fifty 
years later. Initially the Dalai Lama and his government remained in place, 81 as 
provided for by the Agreement, as indeed did the traditional political economy. 
Further, the economic system, based on feudalism, remained intact. 82 Nevertheless, 
Chinese policy was directed towards the reform of the Tibetan social system even if 
this was, at least notionally, to be implemented by the Tibetan local government under 
the principles of autonomy referred to in the Agreement. 83 
Within three months of the occupation, Chinese forces in Lhasa alone numbered 
20,000 troops, while at the same time Tibetans received assurances of religious 
freedom, new hospitals, schools and roads. 84 Despite such assurances, resistance to 
78 See van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 155. See in this context Article 51 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 76 above. 
79 See Moore M, 'Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession' in M 
Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 1-13, 
11 regarding remedial right theorists. See also section 6.2 below. If Tibet is a part of China then China 
is entitled to use force to quell civil strife: cf the situation if Tibet were not a part of China - note 76 
above. 80 Avedon, note 74 above, 37. 
81 The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa on 23 July 195 1: Goldstein (1989), note 2 above, 798. 
82 Goldstein (1994), note 2 above, 92. 
83 See Articles 3 and 4. also Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 
note 65 above, 3-4. 
84 Avedon, note 74 above, 37. 
80 
the Han Chinese quickly manifested itself, through posters, propaganda and 
marches. 85 The resistance led to the ousting of the two Tibetan co-prime ministers, 
under pressure from the Chinese. This amounted to interference by China in the 
political system of Tibet, and is an example of violation by the Chinese of the terms 
of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. 86 
In spite of the occupation the formal institutions of Tibetan administration were little 
altered, on the surface, in the years immediately following the Agreement. However, 
George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos note certain apparent changes. First, moves 
were made to improve accessibility of the people to the Dalai Lama, thus divesting 
him of divinity, prestige and authority, and at the same time channels of 
communication between the Dalai Lama and the conventional administration were 
broken. Secondly, the Chinese authorities attempted to extend the control of the 
secular authorities over the ecclesiastical court. Thirdly, the Chinese authorities 
adopted the policy of building up the stature of the Panchen Lama, weakening the 
Dalai Lama's position. 
87 
These changes, too, breached the Seventeen-Point Agreement, and another early 
breach was evidenced by an economic crisis within nine months of the occupation. 
The People's Liberation Army took from the civilian population what it required, and 
with a second demand for 2,000 tons of barley the Chinese Army in Lhasa broke the 
back of the capital's economy, causing spiralling inflation and the possibility of 
85 Grunfeld, note 4 above, 115. 
86 See Grunfeld, note 4 above; also Phuntsok Tashi Taklha, 'Historical Sino-Tibetan Relations, 1949- 
1951 and the Seventeen-Point Agreement', Paper presented to the Potomac Conference, 5-6 October 
1992, Sino-Tibetan Relations: Prospectsfor the Future 
<http: //www. columbia. edu/cu/lweb/indiv/area/tibet-potomac/histofical/taklha. htmi>, accessed 8 
August 2005. 
87 Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 66 above, 170-17 1. 
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famine. 88 This directly breached Article 13 of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, 
whereby the People's Liberation Army 'will also be fair in all buying and selling and 
will not arbitrarily take even a needle or thread from the people' . 
89 Not all reforms 
introduced, though, were unpopular with the general population and initial efforts 
were made to eliminate 'the more objectionable survivals of feudal practices in 
Tibet'. 90 
Opposition within Tibet to the occupation brought about a swift integration of the 
Tibetan Army into the People's Liberation Amy-91 The continuing opposition to 
China's attempt to control Tibet through a puppet government led to China deciding 
to intervene directly in the administration of Tibet, and the Chinese Communist Party 
thus decided to supersede the Seventeen-Point Agreement. The 1954 Constitution 
adopted by the People's Congress formally abolished the autonomous position of 
Tibet specified in the Agreement, and the Chinese State Council adopted a resolution 
to further integrate the administration of Tibet with that of the People's Republic of 
China. Consequently the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet 
(PCART) was set up to prepare Tibet for assimilation into the administrative 
framework of the Chinese People's Republic. 92 
" Avedon, note 74 above, 38. 
89This wording itself echoes the words of Heinrich Himmler in a speech to SS officers: 'We have no 
right to take a single pfennig off property confiscated from Jews. Since the very beginning I have 
decreed that any SS man who took even a mark would be condemned to death' - Himmler H, Discours 
secrets (Paris: Gallimard, coil. 'Folio histoire', 1978) 167, quoted in Finkielkraut A, In the Name of 
Humanit),. - Reflections on the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 2001) 53. Thus the words of the 
Nazi are echoed by the Communist, two totalitarian regimes expressing a similarity of outlook. The 
aims of the one, racial dominance; the other, the subordination of the individual to the community - the 
two regimes providing 'two radically antagonistic versions of history': Finkielkraut, ibid, 63. 
90 Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 66 above, 171. 
91 Avedon, note 74 above, 38; Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 66 above, 173. 
92 Avedon, note 74 above, 3 8-4 1; Grunfeld, note 4 above, 118; van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 160- 
161. 
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3.4.1 The Collapse of Tibet as a State 
The Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet was established on 9 
March 1955. The intent was that the Committee would gradually assume greater 
responsibility for the governance of Tibet. Its remit was to enhance industrial 
development, promote class cohesion and education, and in addition to protect 
freedom of religion and monasteries and 'to guard against excessive zeal in the 
imposition of reforms'. 93 Despite the direct intervention of China in Tibet, the intent 
of the Central Government was that Tibet would ultimately be eligible for regional 
autonomy, 94 as indicated by the title of the Committee itself. 
The Committee, under the chairmanship of the Dalai Lama, was intended to be the 
agency of administration in Tibet, but at the same time steps were taken to ensure 
Peking held an effective absolute majority on the Committee, even though on the 
Committee Tibetans substantially outnumbered Han Chinese. There was ongoing 
resistance to Chinese authority within Tibet, which caused slow progress in the 
inauguration of the Committee and there was monastic opposition, for instance, to the 
introduction of secular education. Communist groups started operating within Tibet 
and power became concentrated in Chinese-dominated organisations sanctioned by 
PCART and therefore ostensibly by the Dalai Lama as Chairman of that Committee. 
The effect of the Committee was direct subversion of Tibet's government. 95 
Opposition within Tibet persisted, and in February 1957 Mao Zedong stated that Tibet 
was not yet ready for democratic reforms, that these had not been carried out as yet 
and that they would not be proceeded with during the upcoming five-year plan. Han 
93 Grunfeld, note 4 above, 118. 
94 Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 66 above, 176-177; Ginsburgs G and Mathos M, 'Tibet's 
Administration During the Interregnum, 1954-1959' (1959) 32(3) Pacific Affairs 249-267,249-25 1. 
95Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 94 above, 253-258; Avedon, note 74 above, 43. 
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personnel in Tibet were to be reduced. Nevertheless the situation continued to 
deteriorate and Tibetan uprisings and discontent continued as violence and repression 
escalated. China endeavoured to secure its dominant position in Tibet following 
repeated uprisings in 1958, for example in June of that year setting up in Tibet a 
branch of the Chinese People's Supreme Court and Procuracy, and tightening the 
Chinese military grip in the face of ongoing guerrilla warfare. 96 
In the attempt to put down the opposition, repressive action was taken by the People's 
Liberation Army, particularly in the province of Kham. Entire villages were 
obliterated, monasteries were destroyed and public executions were carried out to 
intimidate the population. Monasteries were principal targets: 'Monks were compelled 
to publicly copulate with nuns and desecrate sacred images before being sent to a 
growing string of labor camps in Amdo and Gansu. 97 The repression exerted by the 
People's Liberation Army caused Tibetans to flee from the east towards Lhasa, and it 
is against this background of escalating violence that the events of March 1959 
unfolded. 
3.4.2 The Flight of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Response 
On 10 March 1959, a spontaneous protest broke out in Lhasa following an influx of 
refugees and increasing tension in the capital. The protesters that day gathered in 
thousands outside the Norbulingka, the summer residence of the Dalai Lama. 98 In the 
course of the protest a meeting resolved to renounce the Seventeen-Point Agreement 
96 Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 94 above, 259-261; Avedon, note 74 above, 47. 
97 Avedon, note 74 above, 48. See also Phuntsok Tashi Taklha, note 86 above, 6, and section 5.4 below 
regarding religious oppression. 
98 The estimate as to the number of the crowd varies. Grunfeld refers to a crowd between 10,000 and 
30,000, note 4 above, 134; Avedon, note 74 above, 50 refers to an assembly of almost 30,000 people; 
whereas the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic refer to more than 2,000 
people: see note 102 below. 
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and also to expel the Chinese from Tibet. Protests continued over several days, and in 
the face of rumours of an attack by the People's Liberation Army the Dalai Lama fled 
Lhasa at night on 17 March. The insurrection was violently suppressed by the 
People's Liberation Army who shelled the Norbulingka on 20 March. The Dalai 
Lama established a provisional government while en route to exile in India, where he 
arrived two weeks after leaving Lhasa. On 23 March 1959 the Chinese authorities 
declared martial law and Military Control Committees were established throughout 
Outer Tibet, 99 with the exception of Shigatse. 100 In the course of the fighting in Lhasa 
it is said that thousands of Tibetans were killed, and tens of thousands imprisoned. ' 01 
The Chinese version of events differs from that propounded by supporters of Tibet 
and the Dalai Lama, and China maintains, for example, 'that the populace was forced 
to gather around the palace [the Norbulingka] under threats of fines and physical 
punishment'. 102 Nevertheless the revolt, for whatever reason, is a fact and, even 
though it was centred almost exclusively on Lhasa and the surrounding region, 
China's response extended to the entirety of Outer Tibet. In addition to the 
establishment of martial law and the Military Control Committees, 'On 28 March the 
State Council dissolved the Tibet Local Government, elevating PCART "during the 
period of the Dalai Lama's abduction, " while the eighteen members of the body who 
99 Later, from 1965, to be known as the Tibet Autonomous Region: comprising the Tibetan provinces 
of G-Tsang and western Kham. This comprises less than half of historic Tibet, the remainder having 
been incorporated in subsisting Chinese provinces. See van Walt van Praag, note 6 above, 264 note 2. 
100 The base of the Panchen Lama, to whom Peking turned, in the absence of the Dalai Lama, 'to 
bolster its image of Tibetan collaboration': Avedon, note 74 above, 222. 
101 See, for example, Grunfeld, note 4 above, 134-139; Yan Jiaqi, 'Federalism and the Future of Tibet' 
in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes. - Essays on Self- 
Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1998)107-120,107; Song Liming, note 
71 above, 63; Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 94 above, 261-262; van Walt van Praag, note 6 above 162- 
163; Avedon, note 74 above, 221-222; and Phuntsok Tashi Taklha, note 86 above, 6-7. 
102 Grunfeld, note 4 above, 137. See also 'Tibet - Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation', note 55 
above, Part One, section 11: 'the rebels coerced more than 2,000 people to mass at Norbu Lingka'. See 
generally Part One, section 11 for the Chinese version of 'Origins of So-Called "Tibetan 
Independence"'. 
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fled to India were officially relieved of their posts and replaced. ' 103 Thus did Tibet 
forfeit its autonomy. 104 At the same time the Dalai Lama makes the point that the 
Chinese had abrogated the Seventeen-Point Agreement, and therefore that Tibet 
repudiated that Agreement. 
105 
The position subsequent to the events of March 1959 appears to be thus: 
1. De facto Tibetan independence ceased in 1951 by virtue of the Seventeen-Point 
Agreement. Further, no country had recognised dejure Tibetan independence. 106 
2. Such autonomy as was granted to Tibet by the Seventeen-Point Agreement ceased 
in March 1959. 
3. China increased its direct control over Tibet following the insurrection. 
These points raise issues of sovereignty, which will be considered below in Chapter 4. 
The immediate result, though, of the 1959 insurrection was a crackdown by the 
Chinese authorities and total military conquest by the People's Liberation Army. 107 
3.4.3 Severe Measures in Tibet and the International Response 
The Chinese response to the revolt and the departure of the Dalai Lama was one of 
repression. All unauthorised movement was banned and, in addition, work 
committees were created to control the populace. Reforms were commenced based on 
class division, and redistribution of possessions instituted; land reforms were 
implemented, and '[c]lass struggle was the crucible in which the order of the future 
103 Grunfeld, note 4 above, 139. 
104 Song Liming, note 71 above, 63. 
105 International Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 99. 
106 See in this context, for example, note 28 above and related text 
107 Ginsburgs and Mathos, note 94 above, 263. 
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was to be forged' . 
108 Re-education through thamzing 
109 took place, as elements of the 
population were set against each other in a people's revolution. 110 
The aristocracy and the monasteries were deprived of their rights and privileges in 
1960 and a commune system was introduced as Tibet was communised. Hundreds of 
prisoners had been transported from Lhasa towards the end of 1959, and prison 
gulags, or forced labour camps, were established. As collectivisation was pursued, 
famine and starvation was prevalent in the period from 1959 to 1963: not necessarily 
attributable directly or solely to collectivisation, as Tibetan harvests were either 
consumed by the People's Liberation Army or were shipped out of Tibet into 'the 
motherland' to ease hunger there. Thus for various reasons food needed in Tibet was 
not available to Tibetans. "' 
In addition to the confiscation of food, Chinese authorities confiscated Tibetans' 
wealth and belongings. 112 Although resistance continued in Tibet, on a guerrilla basis, 
many Tibetans gave up the struggle and an exodus began as a result of Chinese 
suppression. Between March 1959 and March 1962, 'more than sixty thousand fled 
Tibet for Nepal and India'. 113 During the Cultural Revolution, 114 tens of thousands 
108 Avedon, note 74 above, 228. 
'09 Public 'struggle' sessions, enabling 'the accused himself, "with the help of his revolutionary 
brothers", [to cleanse] his mind of reactionary thoughts': ibid 229. 
110 Ibid 222-230. 
111 Ibid 23 1-23 7; Phuntsok Tashi Taklha, note 86 above, 7. 
112 Phuntsok Tashi Taklha, ibid. 
113 Yan Jiaqi, note 101 above, 107. This figure is not definitive: Avedon (note 74 above, 90) comments 
that by 1966 'settlements harboring almost 60,000 people had sprung up throughout India, Nepal and 
Bhutan', Goldstein ((1989), note 2 above, 825) refers to approximately 80,000 Tibetans fleeing in the 
two years following the Dalai Lama's exile. 
114 Launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 to secure Maoism as China's dominant ideology and to eliminate 
political opposition. 'The Cultural Revolution caused unparalleled destruction throughout the PRC and 
especially Tibet, where the Chinese authorities were clearly intent on wiping out Tibetan culture': Tibet 
Information Network, Unity and discord Music and politics in contemporary Tibet (London: Tibet 
Information Network, 2004) 46. The era may be seen as a dynamic whereby 'the minorities [as being 
backward and feudal] could be completely assimilated into an ideal of a modem, socialist ([Han] 
Chinese) PRC': ibid 44. 
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more left the devastation that enveloped Tibet. 115 indeed this migration continues to 
this day. 
The reaction of the international community to these events has been limited, if not 
muted. No United Nations General Assembly resolution succeeded until 1959 and 
only three in all have to date been passed. ' 16 It is pertinent to consider why the 
international community did not react more positively than it did, not just to the 
events of 1959 but also to the incursion in 1950 and the inception of the Seventeen- 
Point Agreement - in essence why Tibet failed to harness the support of the 
international community, and in particular the unequivocal support of the major 
powers. 
Three principal reasons can be seen to be of relevance in this regard. First, Tibet had 
pursued an insular policy, making little effort to 'join the family of nations' and 
making efforts to keep foreigners out of Tibet. 117 The result was that Tibet was almost 
a mythic entity, instead of a focus of international attention. Secondly, the political 
self-interest of bordering states and major powers not anxious to oppose or provoke 
115 Yan Jiaqi, note 10 1 above, 107. 
116 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV) in 1959,1723 (XVI) in 1961 and 2079 
(XX) in 1965. 
117 See, in this context, Hedin S, Central Asia and Tibet: Towards the Holy City of Lhasa, Vols I and 11 
(Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1997) (first published 1903), for example, and his problems travelling 
in Tibet, especially the impossibility of reaching Lhasa; cf Harrer H, Seven Years in Tibet, translation 
by Richard Graves (London: Rupert Hart-Davis and The Book Society, 1953). Note also references by 
Hedin to the influence of Chinese ambans in Tibet in 1907 in Hedin S, A Conquest of Tibet (New 
York: EP Dutton & Co, Inc, 1934): at 309 he refers to his 'caravan escorted by Tibetan horsemen, 
upon orders from the high Chinese Mandarins in Lhasa, Tang and Lien'; and at 352 to the fact that a 
route 'had been closed to me by the Chinese ambans in Lhasa, Tang Darin and Lien Darin and by the 
Tibetan authorities'. Foreigners were also kept out of Tibet after 1950; in 1972 Philippe Ardant 
referred to Tibet, inter alia, as being a 'province' that 'foreign diplomats may not visit, and this has 
been the case for several years': Ardant P, 'Chinese Diplomatic Practice during the Cultural 
Revolution' in JA Cohen (ed. ), China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) 86-128,95. Robert Sloane comments that 'the isolation Tibet's 
government had self-consciously cultivated to shield Tibet from foreign domination proved the 
principal reason that Tibet found itself unable to achieve political recognition as a modem nation-state 
- and thus powerless to resist 
foreign domination by communist China': Sloane, note 50 above, 136. 
Thus the isolationist history of Tibet is a root cause of the problems it faced in 1950, as by virtue of this 
policy most states had no reason to give any consideration to Tibet's status: Sloane, ibid, 142,149. 
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the incipient major power of China - and both Communists and Republicans in China 
were of one view so far as Tibet was concerned. 1 18 Thirdly, what might be termed 
4events' on the international stage, 119 or accidents of history. At the time the Tibetan 
crisis came to prominence in 1950 and 1951, the USA was already involved in 
hostilities in the Far East, the Korean War having broken out in June 1950.120 The 
other major power that might have intervened, Britain, which China certainly viewed 
as having had imperialist designs on Tibet, was withdrawing from the region, having 
granted India independence in 1947. Britain was not in a position to give Tibet direct 
assistance or support, and also was not in a position to take a stance opposed to that of 
India. To do so would inevitably have been seen as rekindling regional imperialist 
designs. 12 1 Tibet was thus reliant on 'a ground swell of popular sympathy', not only at 
that time but subsequently. 122 
Of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the first, in October 1959, some 
seven months after the insurrection, called for 'respect for the fundamental rights of 
the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life', and expressed 
concern that 'fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have 
118 See, for example, note 50 above regarding political self-interest of India; also note 63 above with 
reference to both India and Nepal. 
119 To borrow the word from former Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who when asked, 
in a different context, what can most easily steer a government off course, apocryphally replied, 
'Events, dear boy, events. ' Macmillan was British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963. 
120 The USA was therefore 'otherwise occupied', with forces committed elsewhere. It is also 
noteworthy that, in both the Korean war and the later Vietnam war, the American and Chinese forces 
were not in direct opposition. Had the USA seen fit to intervene in Tibet there would have been no 
buffer state acting as a proxy for direct US-China confrontation. The war between major powers would 
not have been limited, and potentially would have been disastrous for both. Viewing global 
implications of such a conflict strategically, realism would implicitly dictate a higher level of threshold 
for conflict, and therefore that in any event the USA would not have directly intervened on behalf of 
Tibet against China. See also Ignatieff M, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003) 111, who argues that 'America will not risk military 
confrontation with Russia or China simply because the human rights of their subject populations are at 
risk. ' 
12 1 Britain thus 'deferred to the newly independent government of India, which it viewed as the 
inheritor of any strategic interests in [sic] may once have maintained in Tibet': Sloane, note 50 above, 
137. 
122 For an example of reference to such a ground swell, see Avedon, note 74 above, 66 - in that 
instance, in India. 
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been forcibly denied them'. 123 In the second, the General Assembly renewed 'its call 
for the cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental 
human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination', 124 and the 
third similarly called for an end to practices 'which deprive the Tibetan people of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which they have always enjoyed'. 125 In 
addition, on 23 August 1991 the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted by nine votes to seven (with four 
-1-stentions) Resolution 1991/L. 19 calling on the Govemment of the People's au 
Republic of China 'fully to respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the 
Tibetan people'. 126 This last-mentioned is significant as the first UN resolution on 
Tibet since the People's Republic replaced Taiwan as the representative of China at 
the United Nations in 1971.127 
Despite these resolutions, human rights abuses continued in Tibet. 128 China therefore 
has not complied with the resolutions and its position as a Permanent Member of the 
United Nations Security Council appears to give it immunity in this context, 
123 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1353 (XIV); adopted by 45 votes to 9, with 26 
abstentions. 
124 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1723 (XVI) of December 1961; adopted by 56 votes 
to 11, with 29 abstentions. 
125 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2079 (XX) of December 1965; adopted by 43 votes to 
26, with 22 abstentions. 
126 Resolution E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1991/L. 19. In the resolution 'the Sub-Commission noted its concern at 
continued reports of violations of Tibetans' fundamental rights': Tibet Justice Center, Reports and 
Publications, 'UN Interventions' (2007) 
<http: //www. tibetjustice. org/reports/un/unint2. html>, accessed 27 February 2007. 
127 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI). See also Free Tibet Campaign, 'Tibet 
File No. 9 United Nations Resolutions on Tibet' (2005) 
<http: //www. freetibet. org/info/file/fiIe9. html>, accessed II August 2005. Although the 1991 resolution 
is of significance, the title of the Sub-Commission itself is nevertheless of import here: thus Tibet is 
merely seen as a minority within another state, rather than a state in its own right. As a minority within 
a state, Tibetans would, however, have certain rights: 'in community with other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, ... to use their own 
language' - International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976,999 UNTS 171, Article 27. The ICCPR contrasts rights of minorities 
with rights of peoples who, by virtue of Article 1, have the right to self-determination: see Sloane, note 
50 above, 129-130. See Chapter 5 below with reference to the ability of Tibetans to enjoy their own 
culture, profess and practise their religion, and regarding the use of their own language. 
128 See Chapter 5 below; see also, for example, Phuntsok Tashi Taklha, note 86 above, 7. 
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reinforcing its claim that Tibet is an internal Chinese matter not brooking external 
interference. Member states of the United Nations have not been prepared to oppose 
China over the issue of Tibet and realism in the form of political self-interest can be 
seen to have prevailed. 
3.5 Issues 
In the course of this chapter certain key issues have become identifiable. These relate 
to the fluidity of political and legal identity, considerations of autonomy, the 
relevance of the remedial right theory to Tibet, and also the physical movements of 
people. These will now be considered in turn. 
3.5.1 Fluidity ofPolitical and Legal Identity 
While, for China, Tibet is seen to be an integral part of the Chinese state, and thus 
Tibetans are seen as Chinese citizens having, for example, the benefit of Chinese 
passports, but also having obligations to China, as exemplified by the integration of 
Tibetan troops into the national defence forces, 129 this is not the Tibetan outlook. 
There is a distinct Tibetan identity, having its roots first and foremost in identity with 
Buddhism, what indeed may be termed Tibetan Buddhism. 
The Tibetan identity is not just, therefore, to Tibet, but to a religion, and religion is 
effectively anathema to Communism, 130 which in turn holds sway in China. It is 
through Communism that China finds a pretext for its presence in Tibet: 131 to 
safeguard the material needs of the populace - an emancipation of the people from 
feudal dominance. For China, self-determination emphasises the territorial integrity of 
129 Article 8 of the Seventeen-Point Agreement; see also section 3.4 above. 
130 Although, by Article 36 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution, all citizens of the People's Republic of 
China are professed to enjoy freedom of religious 
belief. 
131 In addition to arguments relating to unification and unity of the state. 
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the state, but at the same time it is this concept of integrity that has brought an end to 
the de facto independence of Tibet, leading to discontent and uprisings. 
Thus the legal identity of the Tibetan has changed. Although international resolutions 
refer to 'the Tibetan people', 132 no step has been taken to recognise the independence 
of the Tibetan nation, and whereas, prior to the Seventeen-Point Agreement, Tibet 
was perceived to be independent, 133 this is clearly not the case now. This ongoing 
situation is recognised by the Dalai Lama, who has sought a solution to the Sino- 
Tibetan relationship based on autonomy rather than on independence. 134 
The position in respect of political identity is somewhat different. The political 
identity can be seen to be fluid, in that the power of the religious sovereign waned 
following the Seventeen-Point Agreement, as outlined above. 135 Yet personal loyalty 
to the Dalai Lama is evident following his exile to India in 1959. It is reflected in the 
fact that tens of thousands of Tibetans have followed him into exile, and in the 
warmth and enthusiasm with which his representatives were greeted on visits to Tibet 
132 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV) in 1959,1723 (XVI) in 1961 and 2079 
(XX) in 1965; also Resolution 199ML. 19 of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. See section 3.4.3 above. 
133 See, for example, the material cited in note 20 above. See also McCabe DA, 'Tibet's Declarations of 
Independence' (1966) 60(2) American Journal of International Law 369-371 and the references to 
Tibet's Capacity to Enter into International Relations at section 4.4.2.4 below. David McCabe argues 
(at 371) that by 1914 Tibet had 'expressly declared its independence at least twice': in the Urga Treaty 
with Mongolia of 1912 (the existence of which treaty is disputed: see section 4.4.2.4 below) and in the 
opening brief at the Simla Conference. However, while commentators may have perceived Tibet to be 
independent, states appear to have taken a contrary view and, for instance, at Simla the British view did 
not confirm a dejure Tibetan sovereignty. Article 2 of the Simla Convention remains of difficulty to an 
argument for Tibetan independence from China prior to 1950, despite the contention of the 
International Commission of Jurists that 'Tibet was an independent state as of 1950': International 
Commission of Jurists, note 5 above, 15; also Sloane, note 50 above, 13 1. Note also the conclusion of 
James Crawford that Tibet was not regarded as an independent country de jure in 1914, which 'has 
always been the British view, and it was the Chinese view in 1951': Crawford, note 27 above, 325 
(footnotes omitted). 
134 As confirmed in his speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 24 October 200 1, where the 
Dalai Lama emphasised that he has no demand for independence for Tibet, but for real autonomy: 
reported in, for example, Milj6partiet de Gr6na, 'Pressconference [sic] by European Parliament 
Delegation for relations with the Peoples Republic of China' (2002) 
<http: Hwww. mp - se/te mp 
late s/te mplate_7 8. asp_Q_avdnr_E_ 12 16 5_A_number_E_43 90 8 >, accessed 25 
September 2005. See also Plunk RL, The Wandering Peacemaker (Charlottesville, VA: Hampton 
Roads Publishing Company, Inc., 2000) 48; and sections 3.5.2 and 6.4 below. 
"' Section 3.4. 
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in subsequent years. 136 Political continuity in this context reflects conflation of 
politics and religion; on the pure Political level here there is fluidity, on the religious 
level there is obedience. Not, though, unchanging obedience, as within the exiled 
Tibetan diaspora there is by no means complete agreement upon the Dalai Lama's 
current negotiating position based on autonomy. 137 
3.5.2 Autonomy 
The Seventeen-Point Agreement itself refers, in Article 3, to the Tibetan people 
having the right to exercise regional autonomy. This concept of Tibetan autonomy 
continues throughout the subsequent period. Even though the autonomous position of 
Tibet was abolished in the 1954 Chinese Constitution, the Preparatory Committee for 
the Autonomous Region of Tibet was established in the following year with the intent 
that Tibet would attain autonomy. 
The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 138 came into being on 1 September 1965. By 
Article 4 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution, it is provided that 'in areas where people 
of minority nationalities live in compact communities ... organs of self-government 
are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy'. Clearly the TAR is one such 
area. Section 6 of the Constitution, Articles 112 to 122, deals with the organs of self- 
government of national autonomous areas. The relevant issue is therefore one of what 
is meant by 'autonomy', in circumstances where, according to Article 4 of the 
Constitution, each national autonomous area is an inalienable part of the People's 
Republic. 
136 See Avedon, note 74 above, Chapter 11. 
137 See, for example, Plunk, note 134 above, 72. 
138 As to the extent of the TAR, which effectively comprises political rather than ethnographic Tibet, 
see note 99 above and Grunfeld, note 4 above, 8; also Hannum H, . 4utonomy', Sovereignty, and Self- 
Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 423-424. 
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Section 6 of the 1982 Constitution in part provides the answer and gives a 
considerable margin of interpretation to the central authorities. Thus by Article 115, 
the organs of self-government of the autonomous regions 'exercise the right of 
autonomy within the limits of their authority as prescribed by the Constitution, the 
law of regional national autonomy and other laws, and implement the laws and policy 
of the state in the light of the existing local situation'. Further, Article 116 provides, 
inter alia, that the 'autonomy regulations and specific regulations of autonomous 
regions shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress for approval before they go into effect'. Central authority therefore 
dominates, and there is perhaps just one area in which there is, on the face of the 
Constitution, real autonomy. By Article 119: 
The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas 
independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health 
and physical culture affairs in their respective areas, sort out and protect 
the cultural legacy of the nationalities and work for the development and 
prosperity of their cultures. 139 
In addition, by Article 118, the organs of self-government have authority to 
administer local economic development, albeit under the guidance of state plans. That 
article further provides that the state shall give 'due consideration to the interests of 
[autonomous] areas' when 'developing natural resources and building enterprises' in 
such areas. 
An autonomous area may be defined as comprising 'a region within a country [that] 
has its own government and decides issues of local nature, leaving national issues to 
139 Emboldened text in original. 
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140 the national government'. It is by no means clear that the TAR can properly be 
described as being in possession of autonomy, noting both the theory of the wording 
of the Constitution and also the practice of governance within the TAR. 14 1 The Dalai 
Lama's view is that Tibet should have autonomy, and China views the TAR as being 
autonomous; the question thus becomes one of how to construe meaningful 
autonomy, and effectively one of internal self-determination in a scenario where, to 
date, international norms have failed to resolve the Sino-Tibetan relationship. 142 The 
treatment of Tibetans by China becomes relevant and this leads back to issues 
surrounding self-determination, and in particular the remedial right theory. 
3.5.3 The Relevance of the Remedial Right Theory to Chinese Tibet 
The utilisation of the remedial right, or just cause, theory of self-determination is 
significant in respect of Tibet, although it apparently sets a higher threshold with 
regard to self-determination than does the choice theory of self-determination, which 
latter theory places greater emphasis on internal self-determination or autonomy 
through referendum or plebiscite. Geopolitical events may influence issues such as 
those that surround self-determination, and political realities may bring about a 
situation where thresholds for self-determination in any given state are increased or 
reduced. Increasing globalisation is of relevance, a process characterised as 'the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct localities in such a 
140 Plunk, note 134 above, 46. 
141 See above, this chapter, and also Chapter 5, below, on human rIghts. 
142 See note 134 above, and related text with reference to the Dalai Lama's view. Also see generally 
section 6.4 below in respect of elements of autonomy and the divergence between autonomy as 
practised in the TAR and the Dalai Lama's genuine autonomy proposal. 
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way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa . 
143 
According to remedial right theorists, secession will be legitimated if it is required to 
remedy an injustice. 144 Injustices against Tibet and Tibetans, referred to in this 
chapter, include the military invasion of Tibet in 1950, the threats to the Tibetan 
delegation during the negotiation of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, the breaches by 
the Chinese administrators of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, and the repression by 
the People's Liberation Army subsequent to the Seventeen-Point Agreement. 
Generally, injustices will be considered in greater depth in Chapter 5 below, but the 
fate of the people of Tibet has been noted as a reminder 'of the injustice and violence 
that can befall minorities who are given no legal and peaceful means to exit a state 
that does not, to say the least, treat their interests equally'. 145 
If the injustices suffered by Tibetans are sufficient to justify secession, 146 then equally 
a case for meaningful autonomy may be made. The burden of proof imposed is high, 
143 Giddens A, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990) 64. 
See also Twining W, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000) 4. 'In the last 
three decades, transnational interactions have shown a dramatic intensification, from globalization of 
production systems and financial transfers, to worldwide dissemination of images through the mass 
media and communication technologies, and to mass translocation of people, as tourists, as migrant 
workers or as refugees': Santos B de S, Toward A New Legal Common Sense. - Law, Globalization, And 
Emancipation, Second Edition (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) 165, for whom globalisation 
is 'the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe 
and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as local' (178). 
144 See section 2.4.3 above; also section 6.2.2 below. 
... Non-nan W, 'The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics' in M Moore (ed. ), 
National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 34-61,42. 
146 The fact that injustices have been perpetrated on the Tibetan people has been admitted by the 
Chinese Communist hierarchy. For instance, in 1980 Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party, during an inspection visit to Tibet, publicly conceded that there had been 
maladministration in Tibet and that Tibetan people had been subjected to suffering, also that almost 
thirty years of Chinese rule had produced no significant improvement in the people's livelihood: see 
van Wait van Praag, note 6 above, 175 and the sources cited in the notes appurtenant thereto. 
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and it is for this reason that injustices perpetrated against Tibet and its populace will 
be focused upon. 
147 
3.5.4 Physical Movement ofPeoples 
It is in the physical movement of peoples that we can see some evidence of the 
injustice referred to. This movement has manifested itself in various ways. 
First it can be seen in the very exile of the Dalai Lama in March 1959, in fear of 
attack by the People's Liberation Army -a fear born out of the manner in which the 
Chinese had treated the Tibetans subsequent to the 1950 invasion. This exile has 
proved permanent, unlike the escape of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to India in 1910 
and the temporary exile of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama from Lhasa to Yatung in 1950. 
The Dalai Lama's exile has been followed over the decades by a migration of 
Tibetans, many to follow the Dalai Lama to India and most due to the repressive 
treatment received from the Chinese or the conditions pertaining in Tibet as a result of 
Chinese governance. 148 Escalating violence prior to March 1959 led to an exodus 
from the country towards Lhasa, and subsequent instances of violence and in ustices i 
have led to the flight from Tibet itself 
149 
There is a further physical movement that also evidences injustice to the Tibetans, and 
that is the influx of Han Chinese into Tibet subsequent to 1950. There has been 
massive immigration especially since 1983. In one estimate Han Chinese outnumber 
Tibetans not only within the traditional region of Tibet but also in the TAR itself-, in 
147 See Chapter 5 below. The words of Amitai Etzioni echo in the Tibetan context: 'Self-determination 
movements gained support because they fought against oppression .. Etzioni A, 'The Evils of Self- 
Determination' (1992) 89 (Winter) Foreign Policy 21-35,35. 
148 See, for example, sections 3.4-1 and 3.4.3 above, and Chapter 5 below. 
149 See Grunfeld, note 4 above, 190-191; also Hannum, note 138 above, 425, referring to the 
devastating impact of the Cultural Revolution, note 114 above, particularly on Tibetan religion and 
culture. 
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Lhasa it has been said that Tibetans are outnumbered three to one by Chinese. 150 The 
impact of the population influx into Tibet is to dilute the indigenous population, to 
drive it out, to take work, to contribute to food shortages: in short, to change the 
nature of Tibet. 
3.5.5 Final Words 
These issues are all of significance in the context of self-determination for Tibet, but 
they also bear on another concept, that of sovereignty. I shall now consider that topic, 
as it may be sovereignty rather than self-determination that has the greatest bearing on 
the Sino-Tibetan relationship. 
150 Hannum, note 138 above, 426. See also section 4.4.2.1 below. 
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4 Issues Pertaining to Sovereignty and Tibet 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I aim to examine issues surrounding sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, with particular reference to the Sino-Tibetan relationship. I will consider the 
criteria applicable to statehood, look into its various elements, and also have regard to 
changing concepts in this context. This will lead on to a discussion of sovereignty in 
respect of Tibet, analysed from both Chinese and Tibetan views and taking into 
account world views and perceptions as to Tibet and sovereignty. I will apply the 
concept of sovereignty to Tibet as at the start of the twenty-first century. The aim of 
the chapter is to determine whether sovereignty rather than self-determination has the 
greatest potential to unlock the Sino-Tibetan dilemma, and thus I will conclude by a 
determination as to whether the changing concept of sovereignty can assist in 
resolving questions of importance regarding Tibet: questions which relate to key 
issues already identified with regard to the fluidity of political and legal identity, 
considerations of autonomy, the relevance of the remedial right theory to Tibet, and 
also the physical movement of peoples. 
4.2 Sovereignty 
4.2.1 As Criteriafor Statehood 
The concept of 'sovereignty' as understood today represents the entirety of 
international rights and duties that are recognised by international law to be residing 
in what may be termed 'an independent territorial unit', in other words the state. In 
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essence, therefore, sovereignty is a description of statehood, ' and the criteria of 
statehood are laid down by international law. 2 By Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 'The State as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a pennanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States. ý3 
These four criteria, while not necessarily exhaustive, tend to be adopted in substance 
by j uriStS, 4 and they will be considered in turn below as reflecting 'sovereignty'. 
5 Sovereignty is inextricably linked with the concept of 'territorial integrity', which is 
of fundamental importance to this thesis. Certain provisions of Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter evidence that both concepts are peremptory norms of international 
1 Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006) 32; see also Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949,174,180. Indeed, only states can be sovereign: Hannum H, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. - The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Revised Edition 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 15. However, sovereignty is not only a 
description of statehood, and there are various ways in which the term 'sovereignty', which for many 
scholars means more than 'the state', is used: see, for instance, James A, Sovereign Statehood. - The 
Basis of International Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986) 14-22. New lines of thought on the 
issue of sovereignty have opened up as sovereignty has been transformed, for example, in the EU 
states. Questions arise as to whether sovereign states may mutate into post-sovereign states, whether 
sovereignty may survive within the compass of the EU, or survive devolution of power, for example 
within the UK. In that context issues of subsidiarity become apparent, as do issues of the politics of 
identity. See, for instance, MacCormick N, Questioning Sovereignty Law, State, and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 191-192 and 198, who argues for a 
new order transcending the sovereign state, and in turn weakening the concept of exclusive 
territoriality, the idea as a whole developing out of the broad idea of subsidiarity. Contrast Neil Walker, 
who argues that, in what is a post- Westphalian phase of sovereignty, although there are pressures on 
sovereignty, it is necessary to conceive of new political values and virtues flourishing 'through the 
operation of sovereignty', not in its absence: Walker N, 'Late Sovereignty in the European Union' in N 
Walker (ed. ) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 3-32,31 (emphasis in original). 
See also section 4.3 below. 
2 Brownlie 1, Principles of Public International Law, Sixth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003)69. 
3 165 LNTS 19. The Convention was signed at Montevideo on 26 December 1933 and entered into 
force on 26 December 1934. 
4 Brownlie, note 2 above, 70. 
5 See, for instance, Preamble to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted 4 
December 1982; also Werner WG, 'Self-Determination and Civil War' (2001) 6(2) Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 171-190,173 and the references to UNGA Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960 and 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 thereat. While sovereignty is generally associated with the 
territory of a state, Cezary Mik distinguishes it from the principle of territorial integrit), in the context 
of extradition and asylum: Mik C, 'State Sovereignty and European Integration: Public International 
Law, EU Law and Constitutional Law in the Polish Context' in N Walker (ed. ), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 20033) 367-400,377-378. 
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law. 6 Article 2(l) reads: 'The organization is based on the principle of sovereign 
equality of all its Members'. while Article 2(4) states: 'All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. ' 7 
4.2.1.1 A Permanent Population 
The first of the four criteria for statehood laid down by Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States is that the state should possess a permanent 
population. Consequently a permanent population is necessary for statehood, and 
whereas this presupposes a permanent community 8 there is nothing that precludes the 
population of a state, either in part or in whole, being nomadic, 'although one may 
require that the areas within which they move are defined when such a State is 
established, if there is no other fixed population 5.9 
6 Certain overriding principles of international law exist, forming a body ofjus cogens, rules, rights or 
duties that may be termed fundamental, inalienable or inherent: Brownlie, note 2 above, 488. That this 
is so is confirmed by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969: 'For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character': Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969,1155 UNTS 
331. See also Crawford, note I above, 100-101. However, not only are sovereignty and territorial 
integrity peremptory norms of international law, so is the right to self-determination, the principle of 
which is recognised by international law: Crawford, ibid, 127,447; see also section 2.4.1 above. With 
reference to non-self-governing territories, it has been asserted that 'administering States are ipsojacto 
not sovereign with respect to their Chapter X1 territories, i. e. that the effect of colonial self- 
determination is to displace sovereignty rather than to qualify its exercise': Crawford, ibid, 613. Thus, 
where applicable, the norm of self-determination has overridden the norm of sovereignty. Of course, in 
addition, states can give their consent to restrict their sovereign rights, for example permitting foreign 
troops on to their territory or allowing a foreign army to establish a military base on their territory. 
While external self-determination may be seen as a peremptory norm, this is not the case with internal 
self-determination, and, for example, in any event a state may give away power to exploit natural 
resources within its territory. 
7 Brownlie I and Goodwin-Gill GS, Basic Documents on Human Rights, Fourth Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 3. 
8 Brownlie, note 2 above, 70. 
9 Detter 1, The International Legal Order (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1994) 
38- 3) 9. 
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While Article I requires the state to have a permanent population, this is not a 
provision that relates to the nationality of that population. Nationality thus depends 
upon statehood and not the reverse. ' 0 Finally, in this regard, no minimum is necessary 
in the context of a permanent population: even small states, such as Nauru' 1 and San 
Marino, 12 are acknowledged as states, and thus to be sovereign. 13 
4.2.1.2 A Derined Territorv 
By the second criterion in question the state must have a defined territory, and in their 
very nature states are territorial entities. States must have boundaries, and therefore 
territory, but this territory may be small. 14 The existence of fully defined frontiers is 
not a requirement and it is in fact feasible that a state can exist without territory: as an 
instance, before the 1929 Lateran Treaty gave it territory, the Holy See was treated as 
a state. 15 Nevertheless it is clear that a state must comprise 'a reasonably stable 
political community and this must be in control of a certain area'. 16 This point leads 
directly to questions of govermnent and also to the issue of recognition of states and 
govemments. 
17 
10 Crawford, note I above, 52. 
11 Nauru was admitted to the United Nations Organisation on 14 September 1999, and at 2005 its 
Fopulation is estimated to be approximately 13,000. 
2 San Marino was admitted to the United Nations Organisation on 2 March 1992, and at 2005 its 
population is estimated to be approximately 29,000. 
13 Crawford, note I above, 46-47. 
14 Nauru, for example, comprises 21 square kilometres. 
" Detter, note 9 above, 37,136. 16 Brownlie, note 2 above, 7 1. 
17 See respectively sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 below. Recognition, though, is not an element of 
statehood, and indeed a state can meet required elements of statehood without being recognised, for 
example Israel is not recognised by the majority of Arab states. Equally a state may be recognised by 
other states in the absence of certain criteria of statehood; for instance, the recognition of successor 
states to the former Yugoslavia particularly by member states of the European Community on 6 April 
1992, although the criteria of statehood were not fully in place, in this instance early recognition being 
seen 'as a way of containing the violence and limiting the issues to be resolved': Crawford, note I 
above, 416, also 40 1. See further note 20 and related text below. Recognition, not only of governments 
but also of states, thus has political connotations. 
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4.2.1.3 Government 
Effective government is evidence per se of a stable political community and might be 
seen to be inherent in any claim for statehood. Additionally, territorial sovereignty is 
4goveming power' with regard to territory, rather than ownership. 18 Effective 
government is perhaps best evidenced by centralised administrative and legislative 
bodies, yet in certain instances the existence of effective government has been seen to 
be 'either unnecessary or insufficient to support statehood'. 19 So far as the question of 
necessity is concerned, Ian Brownlie cites instances of states that have arisen before 
government was well organised: Poland in 1919, and also Burundi and Rwanda, states 
admitted to the United Nations on 18 September 1962.20 
As a corollary to this, James Crawford makes the well-founded observation that '[t]he 
point about "government" is that it has two aspects: the actual exercise of authority, 
and the right or title to exercise that authority'. 21 Entitlement to exercise authority 
proved sufficient in the case of the Congo in 1960. Thus the potential to actually 
exercise authority can prove adequate to establish effective government as a 
22 
necessary, but not in itself sufficient, criterion of statehood , 
for statehood itself 'is 
not lylý a factual situation. It is a legally circumscribed claim of right, 
specifically to the competence to govern a certain territory'. 23 
" Crawford, note I above, 56. 
19 Brownlie, note 2 above, 71. The views of Wouter Werner are also of interest in this regard. He 
makes the point that, despite ineffective government in an existing state, international law still treats 
territorial entities as sovereign states, for example Lebanon in the 1980s; similarly, despite the transfer 
of considerable powers by EU states to the supranational EU, such states are still treated as sovereign 
states by the international community: Werner, note 5 above, 181. Werner argues that therefore 
sovereignty cannot be accounted for in terms of effective control or the existence of legal powers 
alone; rather, he sees it as a legal institution. 20 Brownlie, ibid. 
21 Crawford, note I above. 57. 
22 See, in this context, Detter, note 9 above, 40. 
23Crawford, note I above, 6 1. 
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4.2.1.4 CaDacitv to Enter into Relations with Other States 
The final criterion for statehood specified by Article I of the Montevideo Convention 
on Rights and Duties of States is the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
Yet such capacity is by no means exclusive to states; multinational companies, for 
instance, may enter into contractual relations with states. Thus it is more pertinent to 
equate this particular criterion for statehood with the concept of independence, which 
arguably is the decisive criterion for statehood. 24 
Central to independence is a lack of foreign control exercised over the decision 
making of the state. Should there be foreign control, then it may be that such a state is 
a puppet state, which leads to difficulties in the context of recognition. 25 Consequently 
independence is the sine qua non of an established state, and is indicative of the fact 
that the state is not bound to accede to any authority other than international law; 26 
indicative in essence that it is a sovereign nation. There will be prima facie evidence 
of statehood if, for example, the entity in question manifests evidence of 
independence through such as having its own executive and other organs, conducting 
its foreign relations through its own organs, and having its own legal system and 
system of courts. 
27 
The independence of an existing state is protected by the rules of international law 
against illegal invasion and annexation. Therefore a state may continue to exist as a 
legal entity for a considerable time after such an invasion and annexation, even 
though it lacks effective government. Conversely a new state, fonned by virtue of 
24 See Brownlie, note 2 above, 71-72, Crawford, note I above, 61-62. 
25 See section 4.2.2 below. 
26 See Detter, note 9 above, 48-49. 
27 Brownlie, note 2 above, 72. 
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secession, needs to demonstrate substantial independence before it will be regarded by 
28 the international community as created . 
4.2.2 Recognition ofStatehood 
In the context of recognition it is necessary to distinguish between recognition of 
statehood and recognition of a government of a state, and in respect of the fonner both 
declaratory and constitutive theories of recognition persist. 
By the declaratory theory of recognition, recognition is perceived to be simply a 
declaration or an acknowledgement of a subsisting state of law and fact, legal 
personality of an existing state having previously been conferred by operation of law. 
Thus the legal effects of recognition of one state by another are limited, and a state 
exists regardless of whether or not it is recognised. Ian Brownlie argues that there is 
considerable state practice advancing the declaratory view in that unrecognised states 
are, for instance, subject to charges of aggression or breaches of the United Nations 
Charter by states that refuse to grant recognition. 29 
According to the constitutive theory of recognition, by contrast it is the very act of 
recognition upon which the creation of a state depends. In other words, a state does 
not come into existence until it is recognised. 
30 If the constitutive theory is accepted, 
then clearly recognition is of the greatest significance, yet in practice the creation of a 
state does not depend on acts of recognition by all other states. It is this practice that 
28 See Crawford, note I above 63. 
29 See Brownlie, note 2 above, 86-87; for example, charges 
by Arab states against Israel. 
30 See Detter, note 9 above 63, also Brownlie, note 2 above, 
87-88. Tanja Aalberts also argues for the 
constitutive theory of recognition: Aalberts TE, 'The 
Sovereignty Game States Play. (Quasi-) States in 
the International Order' (2004) 17(2) International Journalfor the 
Semiotics of Law 245-257,25 1. 
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defeats the view of certain scholars that 'recognition is constitutive, but that there is a 
31 legal duty to recognize' . 
This then would suggest that the declaratory theory of recognition is correct, and that 
therefore the legal effects of recognition are limited. Nonetheless they are significant, 
and can be seen to be so for instance in the non-recognition of Tibet as a state in the 
1950s and subsequently. Alternatively, non-recognition of an entity as a state can be 
seen to be evidence of a means whereby the status quo of established territorial 
boundaries may be achieved, for example in respect to a claim for self-determination 
by a minority within a subsisting state. 
It is perhaps collective recognition of a state by an organisation such as the United 
Nations that is of practical relevance. A state is de facto a state if elected to 
membership of that organisation, even if it is not recognised as a state by all 
members. 32 This view aligns with the declaratory theory of recognition, in that 
membership of the United Nations is restricted to states, and that, by allowing a state 
to join, the United Nations acknowledges it is in all material respects a state as such, 
even though all United Nations members may not recognise the state. 33 The legal 
effects of this recognition though are not limited, as implied by the declaratory theory: 
they are significant, if only in that they permit United Nations membership and the 
benefits thereof, and because of the contrast evident with regard to non-recognition of 
other entities, those bodies that do not attain the benefits of statehood. 34 In all 
31 Brownlie, note 2 above, 89; referring to the position adopted by Lauterpracht and Guggenheim. 
32 As exemplified by the situation pertaining in respect of Israel. 
33 It would also be consonant with the idea that 'statehood is legitimised by the fact of its existence 
rather than by the act of its recognition': Aalberts, note 30 above, 250 (emphasis in original) - but for 
whose conclusion see note 30 above. 
" 'Nonrecognition by states and international organizations renders an entity that otherwise satisfies 
the criteria for statehood unable to exercise the associated sovereign fights, particularly the right to 
freely conduct its own foreign relations': Sautman B and Drever JT, 'Introduction: The Tibet Question 
in Contemporary Perspective' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporag Tiber Politics, 
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practical respects the United Nations protects and promulgates the independent 
sovereign state, as evidenced by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. 35 
Recognition of statehood by other states is clearly a political decision by the 
recognising state, and as the existence of an effective government is one of the criteria 
for statehood 36 very often the recognition of a state will take the form of recognition 
of a government. This though is not always the case, and indeed non-recognition of a 
particular regime does not necessarily mean that the state under the rule of that regime 
does not qualify for statehood. For example, a coup in one state does not necessarily 
affect the status of that state, even though the new government may not be 
recognise . 
37 Non-recognition or recognition of governments is thus perceived to be 
more political than that of states. 38 
The fact that recognition of govermnents and states is intensely political at its root is 
particularly evident from the situation that followed the proclamation of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949. China had been a founding member of the United Nations 
in 1945, but by October 1949 the Republican Chinese government was confined to 
Taiwan, where it established a provisional capital of that government, the People's 
Republic holding sway over mainland China. The Republican government, though, 
retained China's seat at the United Nations, and in the United Nations organs, despite 
Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 3-22,18 note 
5. 
35Especially Article 2.4, quoted in section 4.2.1 above. 
36 See Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States: sections 4.2.1 and 
4.2.1.3 above. 
37 There is a distinction in international law between 'change of State personality and change of the 
government of the State. There is a strong presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights 
and obligations, despite revolutionary changes in government, or despite a period in which there is no, 
or no effective, government': Crawford, note I above, 34 (footnote omitted). Even so, 'the continuance 
of even an illegal occupation for a sufficiently long time after the cessation of hostilities will lead to the 
extinction of the occupied State by debellatio: this was the case with Hyderabad': Crawford, ibid, 74; 
see also Das T, 'The Status of Hyderabad During and After British Rule in India' (1949) 43(l) 
American Journal of International Law 57-72,72 and Eagleton C, 'The Case of Hyderabad Before the 
Security Council' (1950) 44(2) American Journal o International Law 277-302,301. !f 
38 Brownlie, note 2 above, 90. 
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the fact that the People's Republic was evidently not a puppet of any other state 39 but 
was a 4genuine revolutionary govenu-nent'. 40 Other states were slow to recognise the 
People's Republic, during the time of the Cold War, and it was not until the mid- 
1970s (more than a quarter of a century after the Communist revolution in China) that 
the People's Republic had been recognised by a majority of states. However, by 
October 1971 the People's Republic of China had taken the place of the Republic of 
41 China in the United Nations General Assembly, the Republic having been expelled . 
The People's Republic had refused to take part in the United Nations so long as the 
Republic participated. This refusal applied to the People's Republic of China's 
participation in other international organisations 42 _ and the policy was formulated on 
the premise of avoiding a situation of 'two Chinas'. 43 
Thus both recognition of states and governments can be seen to be of significance and 
it is in the forum of the United Nations that such recognition and its repercussions are 
manifest. 
4.2.3 China and International Law 
In the discussion on sovereignty up to this point, I have largely been examining the 
topic through the prism of the Western doctrine established at the Peace of 
39 c The term "puppet State" is used to describe nominal sovereigns under effective foreign control, 
especially in cases where the establishment of the puppet State is intended as a cloak for illegality': 
Crawford, note I above, 78. 40 lbid 199. 
" lbid 200-201. 
42 See with regard to the International Red Cross, for example, Draper GIAD, 'The People's Republic 
of China and the Red Cross' in JA Cohen (ed. ), China's Practice of International Law: Some Case 
Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) 344-398. 
43 Weng BSJ, 'Some Conditions of Peking's Participation in International Organizations' in JA Cohen 
(ed. ), China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1972) 321-343,328-329; see also Edgar Snow, China, Russia and the US. A.. - Changing 
Relations in a Changing 11 "orld (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1962) 760. 
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Westphalia, a series of treaties that brought an end to the Thirty Years War. 44 As 
'international law seeks ... to mediate amongst 
different and often conflicting ethical 
traditions', 45 it is now appropriate to turn to China's interpretation of international 
law, and of 'sovereignty' in particular. 
Although the People's Republic was not seated at the United Nations until October 
1971, the support of the Chinese Communist Party for the United Nations body is on 
record as early as April 1945, some six months prior to the founding of the 
Organisation, and more than four years before the proclamation of the People's 
Republic. 46 This though is not to imply that the People's Republic has uncritically 
approved the practice of the United Nations, and indeed prior to its admission to 
membership it viewed the United Nations 'as a tool for American aggression or a 
market-place for Soviet-American political deals'. 47 This perhaps emphasises political 
differences between Western states and Communist China, but, following its 
admission to the United Nations, the People's Republic has become more and more 
integrated into the international legal system, and 'is now fully engaged in 
international affairs', attaching importance 'to the role of international institutions and 
the rule of law in international affairs'. 48 Indeed, 'many generally accepted 
international rules and practices have been incorporated into Chinese laws'. 49 
44 In essence the concept of sovereignty is of vital importance to the state system devised at Westphalia 
in 1648 as a compromise solution to the religious wars in Europe. As a result, sovereign states enjoyed 
independence, equality and unanimity, and each state enjoys exclusive and unfettered authority within 
its territorial boundaries. Sovereignty grounds the modem state system and derives as such from 
seventeenth-century Europe: Farley LT, Plebiscites and Sovereignty The Crisis of Political 
Illegitimacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 7-8. 
45 Hurrell A, 'International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries' in A Buchanan and M 
Moore (eds), States, Nations, and Borders. - The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 275-297,277. 
46 Hungdah Chiu and Edwards RR, 'Communist China's Attitude Toward the United Nations: A Legal 
Analysis' (1968) 62(l) American Journal of International Law 20-50,2 1. 
47 lbid 50. 
48 Hanqin Xue, 'China's Open Policy and International Law' (2005) 4(l) Chinese Journal of 
International Law 133-139,139, see also 136. As evidence of Chinese participation in public 
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It would be wrong to assume, however, that the views of the People's Republic in 
respect of the role of international law are the same as the views taken in Western 
countries. 50 For China, law is an instrument of the state -a device that must serve the 
state: this is a policy in harmony with former Soviet Communist policy. Following 
from this, the role of international law is 'to act as an instrument of a state's foreign 
policy', 
51 
and international law per se is confined as a law among states. Thus no 
other actors, be they individuals or international organisations, may be subjects of 
international law and granted legal personality. 
This then provides reasoning underpinning China's interpretation of the concept of 
sovereignty: an emphasis on territorial integrity and non-interference in a state's 
domestic affairs. 52 The state is the focal point of the 1982 Constitution of the People's 
Republic, and the Preamble thereof emphasises territorial integrity: 'The Chinese 
people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army have thwarted aggression, sabotage 
and armed provocations by imperialists and hegemonists, safeguarded China's 
national independence and security and strengthened its national defence. ' 53 
Largely it can be said that the People's Republic of China's concept of sovereignty is 
congruent with the Western doctrine in essentials, but it is in respect of recognition 
international law, see Qiang Chen, 'Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2004(il)' (2005) 4(2) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 607-645. 
49Hanqin Xue, note 48 above, 138. See also section 5.3 below. 
50 Hungdah Chiu, 'Communist China's Attitude Toward International Law' (1966) 60(2) American 
Journal of International Law 245-267,246. 51 lbid 248. 
52 See Ginsburgs G and Pinkele C, 'The Genesis of the Territorial Issue in the Sino-Soviet Dialogue: 
Substantive Dispute or Ideological Pas de Deux? ' in JA Cohen (ed. ), China's Practice of International 
Law. - Some Case Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) 167-238,176. Note in 
addition China's representative, Wang Guangya, to the UN Security Council at its 5028th meeting, on 
2 September 2004, S. PV. 5028: 'Respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs in international relations constitutes the centrepiece of 
China's foreign policy' (also quoted in Qiang Chen, 'Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 
2004(l)' (2005) 4(l) Chinese Journal of International Law 285-296,296). 
53 Preamble, paragraph 2, Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted 4 December 1982, 
accessible, for instance, at <http-//english. peopledaily. com. cn/constitution/constitution. 
html>. 
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that difference becomes evident. The break-up of states through secession following 
the exercise of self-determination is a particular anathema to China, 54 as such break- 
up is a direct affront to the principle of territorial integrity and the policy that 
international law must serve the state. This then evidences a divergence in 
interpretation between the People's Republic and the former Soviet Union concerning 
self-determination. The latter recognised the right to self-detennination for its national 
minorities following from Lenin's theory of capitalist imperialism, and enshrining 
that right in the Soviet Constitution. 55 The disintegration of the Soviet Union has 
arguably been facilitated by this incorporation. 56 The People's Republic, however, did 
not pursue the rights of its own national minorities to self-determination, having 
rejected the principle on attaining power, and has declared itself to be a multinational 
unitary state, opting f 57 or a system of regional autonomy within that unitary state. 
For China, therefore, sovereignty appears to be an inflexible doctrine inextricably 
linked with territorial integrity; while for Western states the doctrine has some 
54 This though was not always the case for Chinese Communists. See paragraph 14 of the 1931 
Constitution of the [Chinese] Soviet Republic proclaimed by the First All-China Soviet Congress in 
November 1931: 'The Soviet government of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the 
national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an 
independent state for each national minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans, and 
others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self-determination, i. e. they may 
either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer. ' 
Brandt C, Schwartz B and Fairbank JK, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (New York: 
Atheneum, 1971) 223. Once the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949, however, it 
rejected the principle of national self-determination: Hannum H, note I above, 420. Secession from the 
state is indeed anathema to all states, and it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union consented to its own 
break-up, although Russian unhappiness at this may be gauged on an ongoing basis, for example in its 
relations with the Ukraine: see section 2.4.2.1 above. Russia has not been willing, nevertheless, to 
countenance the secession of Chechnya, regarded as a federal unit within Russia: see note 105, Chapter 
2 above. Despite what may be termed a global outlook on unilateral secession, the EU has accepted 
unilateral secession from the former Yugoslavia, see note 17 above; and also note the situation 
regarding the future status of Kosovo: section 6.3.3 below. 
'5 For instance, by Article 72 of the last Constitution of the Soviet Union, adopted on 7 October 1977, 
'Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR. ' 
56 The break-up of the Soviet Union and the reasoning behind it is a topic beyond the scope of this 
thesis. See, though, section 2.4-2.1 above for further comment on the subject. 
57 See Dawa Norbu, China's Tibet Policy (Richmond. Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001) 366-368; also the 
1982 Constitution of the People's Republic, paragraph 3 of the Preamble: 'The People's Republic of 
China is a unitary multi-national state built up jointly by the people of all its nationalities. ' 
flexibility being constrained by the criteria, particularly perhaps that of effective 
government, laid down by Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States. 58 This flexibility may be seen in the reaction of Western Countries to 
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, although this reaction may be interpreted as an 
exception to a failure to support secessionist entities rather than a support for the 
concept of secession. States have not, for example, doubted that Chechnya is a part of 
Russia and as such is not entitled to secede; hence any criticism of Russian policy and 
activities in Chechnya is muted. 59 
4.3 Changing Concepts of Sovereignty 
It would be wrong to view sovereignty as a static concept. Just as self-determination 
evolves, so does sovereignty. 60 As a starting point, though, '[t]he absolute power of 
the sovereign state has been the foundational doctrine for political theory and 
practice', 
61 
a view shared by Thomas Hobbes 
62 
and Jean Bodin, 
63 
and one which the 
People's Republic of China would not dispute. 
5' See sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.1.3 above. 
59Nevertheless there may be a new tendency towards a support for secessionist entities. See especially 
the situation re Kosovo, section 6.3.3 below. 
60 A norm of customary international law may evolve, and a violation of that norm, rather than creating 
a new norm, may form an exception to that norm, thus confirming the existence of the non-n. See, for 
example, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986,14, confirming that a violation, or conduct inconsistent with 
a given rule of customary international law, should not be considered as creating a new norm but 
confirming the existence of an old norm: see para. 186 of the Judgment dated 27 June 1986. Similarly 
an extension of the principle of self-determination to Kosovo, if brought to fruition, see section 6.3.3 
below, will not necessarily bring about a new norm permitting secession, but may take the form of an 
exception to norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Equally, in the case of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq: this in probability constitutes an exception to and violation of the customary rule against the use 
of armed force rather than the creation of a new norm. 61 MacCormick, note I above, 124. 
62 lbid 123. 
63 See Bodin J, On Sovereignty Four chaptersftom The Six Books of the Commonwealth, Edited and 
Translated by Julian H Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), for example at 1: 
'Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a Commonwealth' (footnote omitted). 
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Nevertheless certain factors have come about to check the powers of the sovereign 
state. One such has been the evolution of human rights covenants and conventions, 
which check and control external sovereignty - the authority granted to each state by 
international law to exert legal control over the territory within its boundaries without 
deferring to any claim in respect of legal superiority made by any organisation or third 
state. 64 The existence of such covenants and conventions exerts a cooling influence on 
the powers of a state to act without impediment within its borders. There may be 
criticism of its actions, and indeed direct interference within its territory by, for 
instance, human rights organisations - attached to the United Nations or otherwise. 
Otherwise sectoral challenges also affect the independent function of the state - 
exemplified by the World Trade Organization: 65 an example of globalisation in 
practice. 
66 
Thus, then, while for such as Lawrence Farley sovereignty is 'the defining 
characteristic of the modem state system', 67 this becomes ever less the case. This 
evolution is buttressed by such developments as the Internet, which has the potential 
to impinge on the sovereignty of the state. 68 The onward march of technology ensures 
64 MacCormick, note I above, 129,134; also see Chapter 5 below. As William Twining puts it, 
&municipal law can no longer be treated in isolation, either internally or externally ... the twin 
doctrines of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states are 
being steadily challenged, most prominently, but not exclusively, by international humanitarian and 
human rights law': Twining W, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000) 5 1. 
There is an increasing influence of human rights law evident on international discourse. Humanitarian 
intervention has been criticised on the basis that it is 'deeply corrosive' of the rule of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of states: Kaldor M, 'American Power: From "Compellance" to 
Cosmopolitanism? ' in D Held and M Koenig-Archibugi (eds), American Power in the Twenty-First 
Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 181-213,204, referring to Bull H, 'Conclusion' in H Bull 
(ed. ), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 181-195,183. 
65 Tierney S, 'Reframing Sovereignty: Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to 
the Nation-State' (2005) 54(l) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 161-183,164. 
66 Globalisation poses challenges to the independent function of the state, and presents challenges to 
traditional legal theory, for instance challenging "'black box theories" that treat nation states, societies, 
legal systems, and legal orders as closed, impervious entities that can be studied in isolation': Twining, L_ 
note 64 above, 252. 67 Farley, note 44 above, 8. 
68 As instanced by calls on websites for attack on the integrity of the state, for example by Islamists in 
the UK such as the Britishjihad group Al Ghurabaa. 
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a dissemination of information into states, which governments cannot entirely control, 
thus undermining the ability of governments to control their own population and, in 
turn, sovereignty . 
69 This is evidently of significance in the case of 'closed' societies: a 
new source of infon-nation filters into society and its members, giving new insights to 
the population potentially at the expense of state authority. This serves to emphasise 
the importance of political realism: while the state possesses considerable power it 'is 
a construct of social practices', therefore 'a possible object of political contestations' 
and open to developments in the wider world, both in respect of dissemination of the 
views of individuals and in the dissemination of other political and legal ideas. 70 In 
the context of China, it is worth noting that the country now has III million 
4netizens', people with connection to the Internet; this represents 8.5 per cent of the 
country's total population. 71 Even in this regard, though, the power of the state should 
not be ignored, as evidenced by the 'cave in' by Google, the Internet search engine, 
reported on 25 January 2006, 'to pressure from the Chinese Government by launching 
a local website that strips out information not approved by the Communist 
authorities'. 72 Search terms blocked by Google on Google. cn as a result are said to 
include references to Taiwanese and Tibetan independence. 73 Developments of this 
69 See, in this context, Stem DS, 'State Sovereignty, the Politics of Identity and the Place of the 
Political' in ME Denham and MO Lombardi (eds), Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty: The 
Postmodern Paradox (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 28-38,28. 
70 Ibid 37. 
71 People's Daily Online, 'When III million people gather online' (2006) 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200601/19/eng2OO6Oll9 - 
236756. html>, accessed 19 January 2006. 
72 Sabbagh D, 'No Tibet or Tiananmen on Google's new Chinese site' (2006) 
<http: //business. timesonline. co. uk/tol/business/markets/china/article7l9l92. ece>, accessed 25 January 
2006. 
73 It is of note that in 2005 Google referred to Taiwan as a province of China, leading to protests from 
Taiwan: BBC News, 'Taiwan protests over Google map' (2005) 
<http: flnews. bbc - co. uk/ I 
/hi/world/as ia-pac ific/43 0 8678. stm>, accessed 27 March 2007. Google Earth 
still refers to Taiwan as part of the PRC and to the Taiwan Provincial 
Government. The People's 
Republic realises the potential importance of the Internet and at the start of 2006 a website 
for the 
Central People's Government of the PRC was launched (www. gov. cn): see People's Daily Online, 
'China effectively promotes administrative transparency' (2007) 
<http: //engIish-people. com. cn. '200703/ý23/print2OO7O-'l23_360429. htm1>, accessed 27 March 
2007. 
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nature will provide a battleground for the concept of sovereignty in the early years of 
this century. 
74 
A third development impinging upon sovereignty is a combination of sub-state 
nationalism and supranationalism. This is particularly evident in Western liberal 
democracies, and is best evidenced by the continued advance of the European Union 
(EU) - representing an 'ever closer union' of the states of Europe. 75 Through the 
supranational body of the EU, states pool elements of their sovereignty, but at the 
same time in Europe a move towards subsidiarity pulls at the strings of sovereignty 
from the opposite direction. The federal principle of subsidiarity may be shortly 
defined as 'the principle that each social and political group should help smaller or 
more local ones accomplish their respective ends without, however, arrogating those 
tasks to itself . 
76 Thus smaller units seek greater power as against the state, at the 
74 Matters are by no means clear-cut. For example, a search for 'tibetan independence' on Google. cn on 
26 January 2006 elicited the initial entry, among 282,000, of 'Tibet Online', which 'Provides 
information about the plight of Tibet and serves as a virtual community space for the movement to end 
the suffering of the Tibetan people by returning the right of self-determination to the Tibetan people' 
(<http: //www. google. cn/search? hl=zh-CN&inlang=zh-CN&ie=GB2312&q--tibetan+ind ... >). Although 
the author cannot say with certainty that a search from China on Google. cn would have the same result, 
Chinese people would seem to have such access on Google. cn. 
75 As in the evocative title of Dinan D, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 
Second Edition, Revised (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1994). 
76 Carozza G, 'Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law' (2003) 97(l) 
American Journal of International Law 3 8-79,3 8, note 1. Indeed, for Carozza, subsidiarity is seen as a 
structural principle of international human rights law, capable of mediating tensions between 
sovereignty and human rights, between the nation state and internationalism, and between various 
visions of human dignity and the diversity and freedom of cultures (ibid 38,68). He argues that, 
'despite its potential to encourage pluralism in human rights, subsidiarity does not undermine the 
universal and fundamental nature of human rights in theory, nor the political effectiveness of human 
rights norms. It respects the inherent problems of unifying law and the legal diversity in legal norms 
while mitigating the risk that a global rule of law will impose uniformity at the expense of the diversity 
of human cultures ... Subsidiarity offers a contrast to prevailing patterns of understanding on the place 
of human rights in the international order, which are based largely on more limited conceptions of 
sovereignty' (ibid 78). Thus in this respect, in the sphere of public international law, subsidiarity itself 
becomes an alternative principle to sovereignty, rather than a part of its developing concept. Note also 
in this context MacCormick, note I above. It is though of relevance that developments at EU level are 
based on consent of member states, either unanimously or through use of qualified majority voting, and 
it is in the EU that the main debate on subsidiarity lies; there is in the EU a 'conscious confusion 
written into the definition of subsidiarity', a term that is in its meaning open to a number of possible 
interpretations: Ward 1, .4 Critical Introduction to 
European Law (London: LexisNexis, 2003) 47. It 
has been seen as 'a device for reinvesting primary competences in the nation states' (ibid 58), but at its 
most basic it is a federal concept (Dinan, note 75 above, 152) providing that 'decisions should be taken 
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same time as the supranational body of the EU seeks greater powers for itself. The 
sovereignty of the state is caught in between. Although international law is a powerful 
force in defence of the power of the state, being concerned with the order of states, 
subsidiarity enhances human rights obligations in opposition to sovereignty, affirming 
diversity more than universal state values. 77 
Consequently it is evident that challenges are being mounted to the supremacy of the 
concept of sovereignty, to the nation state as the pre-eminent site of territorial 
integrity. 78 In turn one may perceive the declining power of the nation state, yet this 
may be over-emphasised. 79 Sovereignty as a construct is still of fundamental 
relevance. Indeed modern realists view sovereignty as a given, a fact of life '80 and 
sovereignty is not something that disappears easily. The state maintains a normalising 
power and each state may be viewed as 'a continuous homogeneous project' .81 Even 
in the EU, nation states maintain powers and continue to seek advantage. 82 
The fact that sovereignty evolves as a concept will not by any means necessarily 
diminish its importance, although in its development interstices may open up, 
at a level as low as possible': van Kersbergen K and Verbeek B, 'The Politics of International Norms: 
Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competitive Regime of the European Union' (2007) 13(2) European 
Journal of International Relations 217-23 8,218. 
77 See Carozza, ibid, especially 68-69; Tierney, note 65 above, especially 171. 
78 See Tierney, note 65 above, 164. 
79 Lombardi MO, 'Third-World Problem-Solving and the "Religion" of Sovereignty: Trends and 
Prospects' in ME Denham and MO Lombardi (eds), Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty The 
Postmodern Paradox (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 152-163,153. See also James, note I 
above, 275. 
80 Walker RBJ, 'Space/Time/Sovereignty' in ME Denham and MO Lombardi (eds), Perspectives on 
Third- World Sovereignty The Postmodern Paradox (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 13 -27, 
23 and 25. 
81 Shapiro MJ, 'Moral Geographies and the Ethics of Post- S overe ignty' in ME Denham and MO 
Lombardi (eds), Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty The Postmodern Paradox (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 39-59,45. 
82 As sovereignty has been seen to erode within the EU, the concept of sovereignty does not go down 
without a fight. For example: 'As state sovereignty has eroded into a relative concept, a significant 
portion of the German juridical debate has responded by over-emphasising the sovereignty of the 
German state over and above its European and international commitments as part of its crusade against 
what is seen by many as the "withering away" of the state' (footnotes omitted) - Aziz M, 'Sovereicynt,, 
Ober 41les: (Re)Configuring the German Legal Order' in N Walker (ed. ), Sovereignty in Transition 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 279-304,28 1. 
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allowing additional space for wider interpretation of such concepts as self- 
determination in an international law dominated by rights and obligations of states 
toward each other, in other words in a state of affairs under the dominant system of 
sovereignty. With that in mind the thesis proceeds to discuss sovereignty in the 
context of Tibet and its relationship with China. 
4.4 Tibetan Sovereignty 
4.4.1 Introductory Words 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to perform an in-depth analysis of the status of Tibet 
at the time of the 'liberation' or 'invasion' by the Communist government in 195 0.83 
As indicated in Chapter 3 above, there is polarised debate as to the precise Sino- 
Tibetan relationship: Tibetans arguing that Tibet was a fully independent state at this 
time, 84 and the People's Republic arguing that Tibet was an integral part of the 
territory of China. 
85 
83 The thesis is particularly concerned with the situation as it now pertains. This is not to say the 
historical status is of no significance, however, as if Tibet had been an independent state in 1950 then 
China would have been internationally responsible for its aggression and use of force against another 
state: Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. If the criteria for statehood of Tibet existed in 
1950 then Tibetan sovereignty would have been infringed, even though Tibetan sovereignty was not 
recognised at the time. This though is a separate historical question and the point to bear in mind is that 
no state in the intervening period has recognised Tibetan sovereignty. See Chapter 3, note 76 above. 84 See section 3.3.4 above. 
85 See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Foreign 
Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue's Response to the Second Presidential Report on the "Tibet Issue" 
Submitted by the US Government to the Congress' (2004) 
<http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/xwfw/2510/2535/tl42928. htm>, accessed 29 March 2006: 'Tibet is a 
part of China and the Tibetan affairs completely fall within China's internal affairs. ' This is 
compounded by the Chinese emphasis that 'Civil conflicts are, in the final analysis, the internal affairs 
of sovereign countries': Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Stepping up 
International and Regional Cooperation to Put an End to Armed Conflicts and Remove their Sources' 
(2004) 
<http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/tl42395. htm>, accessed 29 March 2006. See also Qiang 
Chen, note 48 above, 622. 
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Each side adduces evidence 86 and an impasse is reached as to Tibet's status. 87 
Nevertheless, prior to 1950 it would appear that sovereignty was at best exercised 
over Tibet by China in an ad hoc fashion and with a light touch such as to appear to 
have been imperceptible. 88 Thus it is difficult to maintain a position that China 
89 exercised absolute political authority over Tibet and therefore sovereignty. In the 
end, sovereignty is a concept applicable to power, 90 and certainly during the first half 
of the twentieth century China did not exercise power over Tibet. 
There is evidence that the Tibetan government exercised power during this period, 91 
but in its secrecy and its failure to modemise, and particularly in its failure to establish 
foreign relations with all but a few countries, lie the failure of other countries to 
recognise it as a state. 92 It maintained a policy of isolationism, and as Tibet was not 
86 See, for example, the sources cited at note 13 of Chapter 3; also, for instance, Alexandrowicz- 
Alexander CH, 'The Legal Position of Tibet' (1954) 48(2) American Journal ofInternational Law 265- 
274 and Tieh-Tseng Li, 'The Legal Position of Tibet' (1956) 50(2) American Journal of International 
Law 394-404. 
87 In this context it may be history is of limited use in asserting a given proposition regarding the 
sovereignty of Tibet, and it is worth noting the words, inter alia, of Nikita Khrushchev in a letter to the 
governments of all countries dated 31 December 1963 in connection with a Sino-Soviet territorial 
issue: 'In many cases, references to history are of no assistance. Who can affirm, say, that a reference 
to the 17th century which one state puts forward in substantiation of its territorial claim, is more valid 
than, for instance, a reference to the 18th or 19th century by which the other state tries to bolster its 
own counter-claim? ' Quoted in Ginsburgs and Pinkele, note 52 above, 215. 
88As Tsering Shakya noted in the context of a small Chinese mission installed at Lhasa in 1939, 'The 
Tibetans never accepted that the presence of the Chinese mission meant that they had acknowledged 
Chinese sovereignty': Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of the Shows. - A History of Modern 
Tibet Since 1947 (London: Pimlico, 1999) 7. 
89 In this context see Groarke P, Dividing the State. - Legitimacy, Secession and the Doctrine of 
Oppression (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004) 49. 
90 Curry S, Indigenous Sovereignty and the Democratic Project (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2004) 47. 
91 See, for example, Tsering Shakya, note 88 above, 4. 
92 'Tibet fell because it failed to cope with changes in the modem world - more specifically Tibetan 
elites' failure to modernize their state structure, traditional economy and social system': Dawa Norbu, 
note 57 above, 174. See also Jane Ardley regarding the role of the monasteries in 'thwarting the 
progress of Tibef: Ardley J, The Tibetan Independence Movement. - Political, religious and Gandhian 
perspectives (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) 18; and Melvyn Goldstein's comment 
that 'Tibet's religious segment was ultimately responsible for its military backwardness': Goldstein 
MC, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1989) 815. 
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perceived to be of pivotal importance to major powers they had no incentive to 
recognise and support Tibet against the power of China. 93 
Consequently the legal status of Tibet at the time of the entry of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet in 1950 is uncertain and clouded in controversy. It 
is therefore appropriate to turn to analyse the issue of sovereignty of Tibet at the start 
of the twenty-first century, a time, some fifty years on, when Tibet finds itself ever 
more integrated into the People's Republic of China. 
4.4.2 Tibet at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century 
Ethnographic Tibet today spreads over a number of provinces of China. The Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) includes the Tibetan province of O-Tsang and its western 
extensions, while the Tibetan provinces of Amdo and Kham are largely incorporated 
within Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. The ethnic boundaries of Tibet have not 
been congruous at all times with its political boundaries. The latter have been 
delineated on China's maps and these historically define an area representing the 
TAR. Tibetans spill over those boundaries, however, not only into the other Chinese 
provinces mentioned but also into Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Ladakh. 94 Even though 
at the start of the twenty-first century Tibet does not benefit from statehood, bearing 
93 This is in contrast to the instance of Outer Mongolia, which gained independence from China with 
the aid of Russian support. Russia, in the early years of the 20th century, carved out a 'sphere of 
interest' in Outer Mongolia, recognised explicitly by Britain, France and Japan, and implicitly by other 
major powers. The burgeoning power of the Soviet Union supported Outer Mongolia against China, 
and ultimately China, under the Kuomintang government, recognised the independence of Outer 
Mongolia on 5 January 1946. It is at least arguable that at the start of the 20th century the positions of 
Outer Mongolia and Tibet vis-A-vis China were similar. See, generally, re Outer Mongolia: Friters GM, 
Outer Mongolia And Its International Position (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 195 1) and 
Nemzer L, 'The Status of Outer Mongolia in International Law' (1939) 33(3) American Journal of 
International Law 452-464. It should be noted that Tibet's policy of isolationism was deliberately 
pursued, and in this context Tibet had decided against joining the League of Nations in the 1920s: 
Tsering Shakya, note 88 above, 53. 
94 See Grunfeld AT, The Making of Modern Tibet, Revised Edition (Armonk, New York, and London: 
ME Sharpe, 1996) 249. 
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in mind the disputed nature of its past it is pertinent to consider at this stage of the 
thesis the different elements of sovereignty as they may be applied to present-day 
Tibet. This will enable an analysis of the situation in the context of the changing 
concepts of sovereignty. 95 
4.4.2.1 A Tibetan Population? 
While the precise population of Tibet half a century ago is a matter of estimate and 
debate, what is not so much in dispute is the make-up of that population in the TAR. 
In the summer of 1952, the Tibetan population is said by Mao to have been between 2 
and 3 million, 96 which largely tallies with a Chinese estimate of 'just under three 
million in the early 1950s' referred to by Tom Grunfeld, 97 whereas Hugh Richardson 
refers to an official Chinese estimate in 1951 of 3.75 million and a later Chinese 
98 Communist figure of 1,274,969 Tibetans. It will be recalled that in 1913 no Chinese 
remained in Tibet, 99 and in the early 1950s little had changed in this regard. Mao is 
quoted as stating in 1952 that, 'while several thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, 
there are hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority 
nationality area'. ' 00 Even in 1960 Han civilians in the TAR have been said to number 
only 50,000.101 
These figures are in the nature of estimates, but a 1990 census 'found a Tibetan 
population of 4.59 million, about one-half (2.2 million) of whom live within the 
95 See the discussion at section 4.3 above generally re the changing concepts of sovereignty. 
96 See Tsering Shakya, note 88 above, 114. 
97 Grunfeld, note 94 above, 250. 
"Richardson HE, Tibet and Its History, Second Edition, Revised and Updated (Boulder and London: 
Shambhala, 1984) 6. 
99 See section 3.2.1 above. 
100 International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet and Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 
(ICLT and UNPO), The Case Concerning Tibet. - Tibet's Sovereignty and the Tibetan People's Right to 
Self-Determination (New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary & Policy Research Centre, 2000) 5. 
101 See Grunfeld, note 94 above, 252. 
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, 102 boundaries of the [TAR] . The Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples Organization 
(UNPO) currently estimate a Tibetan population of about 6 million within the area of 
ethnographic Tibet, of whom approximately 2.44 million live within the TAR. At the 
same time, though, the UNPO estimate that there are 7.5 million Chinese settlers now 
within ethnographic Tibet, of which number about 160,000 are within the TAR. 103 
Tibetans are now said to represent one of fifty-six ethnic groups within the People's 
Republic; and through the organ of the People's Daily China continues to estimate the 
population of Tibetans at 4.59 million. ' 04 
Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States provides that a 
state should possess a permanent population. Tibet, certainly the TAR, potentially 
meets this criterion as an entity, in that Tibetans represent a distinct population. They 
are recognised by the People's Republic as a minority nationality, 105 and even today 
represent a significant majority of the population of the TAR. Indeed, in any event, 
statehood does not depend upon nationality; it is nationality that depends upon 
statehood. Therefore while Tibetans are Chinese in circumstances where Tibet is a 
part of China, if Tibet achieves statehood its population would be recognised as 
Tibetans. 
It can thus be concluded that notionally Tibetans represent a pennanent population 
sufficient to meet this particular criterion of Article I of the Montevideo Convention, 
and the Dalai Lama is quoted as saying 'Tibet was and is in fact different from China 
102 lbid 253. 
103 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 'Tibet' (2007) 
<http: //www. unpo. org/member_profile. php? id=73>, accessed 14 September 2007. Though note 
Avedon JF, In Exile from the Land of Shows. - The Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest 
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1994, reissued 1997) 376; Hannum, note I above, 426. 
104 See People's Daily Online, 'The Tibetan ethnic minority' (2006) 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/data/minorities/Tibetan. html>, accessed 24 January 2006 and 
People's Daily Online, 'Ethnic Groups' (2006) 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/china/19990914AI04. html>, accessed 24 January 2006. 
105 ICLT and UNPO, note 100 above, 5. 
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- racially, culturally, linguistically, geographically and historically. No 
knowledgeable person would for a moment think that Tibetans are Chinese. ' 106 Yet, 
more problematic, is the question of 'a defined territory', with distinctions being 
drawn between the TAR and other Tibetan provinces. 
4.4.2.2 Tibetan Territory 
At this juncture Tibet, incorporated within China, has no state territory, although 
China concedes a Tibetan territory to the extent of the TAR. Remaining territory that 
Tibet would lay claim to comprises the former Tibetan provinces of Kham and 
Amdo. 107 As states must ultimately have boundaries, is it feasible to delineate an area 
for a Tibetan state? Bearing in mind the de facto state of affairs pertaining it is 
necessary to look at this from the Chinese point of view. 
A starting point realistically is Article 52 of the 1982 Constitution: 'It is the duty of 
citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the unity of the country 
and the unity of all its nationalities. ' 108 This Article emphasises not only territorial 
integrity, but also the unity of all fifty-six Chinese nationalities within that territory. 
There are in particular three additional factors that stress China's state commitment to 
the entire area of ethnographic Tibet. 
The first of these factors attaches to external security, itself directly linked to 
territorial integrity and the unity of the country. Although Tibet is now integrated in 
China, in the first half of the twentieth century an essentially independent Tibet acted 
as a buffer zone between the Chinese state and the British Empire in India. While 
Britain showed interest in Tibet at this time, its withdrawal from India in 1947 
106 See Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 313. 
107 See section 4.4.2 above. 
108 Emboldened text in original. 
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brought an end to its direct interest in the region, and thus a buffer zone of Tibet 
would then separate China and India. By incorporating Tibet, China has removed this 
buffer zone, with the result of a direct Sino-Indian border. The border is at points 
disputed, and one result of the incorporation of Tibet from China's viewpoint is to 
transfer Tibet's previous functions as a buffer state to Nepal and Bhutan. In addition 
China supports rights of national self-determination in neighbouring areas of 
Kashmir, Nagaland and Sikkim. China thus seeks to encourage anti-Indian 
nationalism in Himalayan states with the idea of increasing its own security, and Tibet 
becomes intrinsically of value in the context of Sino-Indian relations, no longer as a 
buffer state but as an integral part of the Chinese state. If India were to have access to 
an independent Tibet, this would provide a 'back-door' opening for India into the 
Chinese mainland. Tibet thus assumes a geopolitical importance, of crucial strategic 
value to the People's Republic. 109 In this sense, therefore, from a security aspect Tibet 
is of specific value to the Chinese Govermnent. 
The other two factors also have security connotations. The first relates to nuclear 
installations. Chinese strategists have chosen Amdo and Kham for their nuclear sites, 
and it is believed missiles are based at sites in the Qaidam Basin, now within Qinghai 
province. " 0 In addition to missile deployment and launch sites, the Tibetan plateau 
has been used for nuclear experimentation and testing. Control over ethnographic 
Tibet thus gives a strategic initiative to China, and generally reinforces its security 
and territorial integrity. III 
'09 See Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 246-247 and 228-229. 
'10 See Norris RS and Arkin WM, 'Chinese nuclear forces, 1999' (1999) 55(3) Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 79-80; also Wilderness Society (The), 'Tibet 2000: Environment And Development Issues, 
part 2' (2000) 
<http: //www. wilderness. org. au/campai. --"ns/intemational/tibet/tibet2OOOb/>, accessed 
4 April 2006. 
III Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 245. 
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The last of the factors relates to communications. Since 1950 China has funded the 
building of roadways in Tibet. These arterial routes not only open up the TAR, for 
example to enable the extraction and transport of mineral deposits, but also enable a 
free movement of military personnel and supplies to strategic border areas. Similarly, 
construction of a major rail link between Golmud in Qinghai and Lhasa commenced 
in July 200 1. The 71 0-mile line was completed in October 2005, and links Lhasa to 
Xining, capital of Qinghai, and on to other major cities in China. 112 This too will ease 
the transportation of, for instance, raw materials from Tibet, and of course goods into 
Tibet, but will also potentially aid the transport of military equipment and personnel. 
Lastly in this context, the construction of a network of air bases in the TAR has the 
potential for military use. 113 
These factors all dovetail in with the People's Republic of China's emphasis on 
territorial integrity, security, and non-intervention by others in its internal affairs. The 
totality renders it unlikely that China would be prepared to cede any territory to an 
independent Tibet. Yet other factors may come into play, and it may prove necessary 
to distinguish between the TAR and other regions of ethnographic Tibet. In that 
context it should be noted that the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951 related only to 
the TAR, and not to Kham and Amdo, which China considered not to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the government of the Dalai Lama at Lhasa. 114 This in itself raises an 
interesting point: if China considered in 1951 that Kham and Amdo did not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama's government, by implication there seems a tacit 
112 See BBC News, 'China completes railway to Tibet' (2005) 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4345494. stm>, accessed 30 January 2006, and China 
Daily, 'Qinghai-Tibet railway project steams ahead' (2006) 
<http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/english/doc/2005-03/08/content-422679. htm>, accessed 30 January 
2006. 
113 See, generally, Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 228-242. 
114 lbid 189,219. 
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acceptance that the area of what is now the TAR did fall within that jurisdiction, 
which tacit acceptance may be seen as an acknowledgement of de facto Tibetan 
independence at that time over that territorial area. 
It is also noteworthy that China's nuclear security is based in Qinghai, not in the 
TAR. It may be, therefore, that a Tibetan territory comprising the TAR rather than 
ethnographic Tibet may prove an option to be considered. ' 15 Geopolitical factors may 
also prove to have relevance in this respect, as may factors relating to the changing 
concepts of sovereignty, which will be considered below, 116 but to conclude this 
section, while a state needs to comprise a political community which is reasonably 
stable and be able to control a certain area, the existence of fully defined frontiers is 
not a necessity and a state is able to exist without territory. 117 
4.4.2.3 Effective Tibetan Government 
The third element of sovereignty to be considered in respect of Tibet is that of 
effective government, or specifically the competence of Tibetans to effectively govem 
a certain territory. Historically, at the time of the PLA entry into Tibet in 1950, 
Tibetans governed Tibet through the person of the Dalai Lama or, during his minority, 
the regent, with the assistance of the Cabinet and National Assembly. It was indeed 
from what was a feudal system of govemance that the People's Republic sought to 
liberate the Tibetan people. Whether or not the system extant in Tibet in 1950 was 
appropriate to the population is clearly a matter of debate. ' 18 Nevertheless, the Tibetan 
government maintained an extensive administrative service and a judicial system, in 
'15 See below, sections 4.5 and 6.5. 
116 See section 4.5.2. 
... See section 4.2.1.2 above. 
118 This thesis, though, is not the place for that debate. 
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addition to a small army, a telegraph service and a system of taxation. Tibet also had 
its own currency and controlled its borders. 1 19 
Prior to 1951 there appears to have been effective government control by Tibetans 
over Tibet, certainly to the extent of the present TAR. The situation at that time with 
regard to Amdo and Kham is less clear. These areas enjoyed significant independence 
and freedom of action both from Lhasa and Beijing. They were remote from the 
centres of power, but in any event were not regarded by China as falling under the 
government of Lhasa. 120 That though is not to say that Amdowas and Khampas 
regarded themselves as Chinese rather than Tibetans. This is not the case. They 
identify with Lhasa as 'the epicentre of their culture and loyalty' and have 
increasingly done so during the last half-century. 121 
Since the exile of the Dalai Lama in 1959, a Tibetan govermnent, in exile has been 
created and is based in India at Dhararnsala. Tibetans see this government as a natural 
continuation of the earlier government in Lhasa. In 1963 the Dalai Lama promulgated 
the implementation of a draft democratic constitution for the future Tibet, and this has 
now been superseded by the 1991 Charter of the Tibetans in-Exile (hereafter, the 1991 
Charter), wherein a democratic system is offered to Tibetans 'in order that the Tibetan 
People in-Exile be able to preserve their ancient traditions of spiritual and temporal 
life, unique to the Tibetans, based on the principles of peace and non-violence, aimed 
at providing political, social and economic rights as well as the attainment of justice 
119 See ICLT and UNPO, note 100 above, 8-9 and Richardson, note 98 above, 16-25; regarding the 
question of boundaries and border control, see Chapter 3, note 117 and the texts referred to therein. The 
fact that, for example, Tibet had its own judicial system is important in that this is an attribute of states 
and evidence of lack of 'foreign control' over its territory and people. Compare the current situation: 
section 4.5.1 below. Also see, as to the characteristics of states, Warbrick C, 'States and Recognition in 
International Law' in MD Evans, International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 217-2175,242-24-33. 
120 Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 189,215-216. 
121 lbid 3533. 
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and equality for all Tibetan people . 
122 This 1991 Charter thus echoes the 1966 
International Covenants. 123 It provides for a clear separation of powers between 
judiciary, legislature and executive, 124 and guarantees everyone equality before the 
law and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms without discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, religion, race, language and social origin. 125 Consequently it finds its 
base in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
An Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies was established in 1960 with elections in 
September of that year and subsequently. 126 With such an institution in place and a 
constitutional charter implemented, a democratic framework for Tibetan government 
exists, though, of course, it is not an essential element of statehood that a government 
be democratic. The aim of the 1991 Charter is 'to transform a future Tibet into a 
Federal Democratic Self-Governing Republic and a zone of peace throughout her 
three regions'; 127 thus a future Tibetan state is intended by the Tibetan government in 
exile to include the entirety of ethnographic Tibet, not only the TAR. Politically this is 
important as Khampas and Amdowas have been strongly committed to the 
independence struggle, including commitment to a violent struggle. 128 
122 Preface to the 1991 Charter. The Charter is available at <http: //www. tibet. com/Govt? charter. html>. 
See also Ardley, note 92 above, 42-43. While the Charter is offered to all Tibetans, clearly such 
authority as it enjoys cannot be exercised within the People's Republic. 
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976,999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976,993 UNTS 3. 124 1991 Charter, Articles 19-70. 
125Article 9. 
126 Ardley, note 92 above, 42. 
127 Preface to the 1991 Charter. 
128 See, for example, Ardley, note 92 above, 45 and Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 216. In asserting any 
claim for independence, though, there is a potential problem to be borne in mind, and that is the Dalai 
Lama's emphasis in the Strasbourg Declaration that his negotiating position entails no demand for 
independence for Tibet: see Chapter 3, note 134. 
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The Tibetan government in exile has through its 1991 Charter provided for the 
administration of Tibetan settlements, 129 including provision that there should be 'a 
Tibetan Administrative Office in every Tibetan settlement in-exile' . 
130 Each Tibetan 
settlement is to have an administrator by Article 72, and Article 73 provides for 
elections of administrators, with appointment in default (Article 74). Article 77 
specifies the duties of administrators, and provision is also made in Chapter VII for 
local assemblies in each Tibetan settlement. 131 
Centralised administrative and legislative bodies therefore exist so far as the Tibetans 
in exile are concerned and local assemblies in each established Tibetan settlement 
pass local laws for the community in exile. 132 The Tibetan administration incorporates 
a Department of Information and International Relations, which aims, inter alia, to 
establish contacts with governments, international non-governmental organisations, 
and the United Nations to promote the Tibetan cause, and representative offices are 
maintained in ten countries, including the USA, the UK, India, Switzerland and 
Russia. 133 Even though Tibet has neither non-governmental nor observer status at the 
United Nations, 134 a Tibetan government, a modernised Tibetan government, is in 
place, potentially able to exercise governing power. Arguably Tibetans are more 
organised for effective government than Poland in 1919, or Burundi and Rwanda in 
1962.135 Among ethnic Tibetans the entitlement of the Tibetan authorities to exercise 
129 In Chapter VII. 
130 Article 7 1. 
13 1 Articles 78ff. 
132 See Central Tibetan Administration (The), 'Legislature: The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile' (2007) 
<http: //www. tibet. net/en/atpd/>, accessed 27 March 2007. 
133 Central Tibetan Administration (The), 'International Relations Division' (2007) 
<http: //www. tibet. net/en/diir/intrd. html>, accessed 27 March 2007. 
134 See International Campaign for Tibet, 'Former Tibetan Minister passes Away' (2007) 
<http: //www. saveti bet. org/news/ne ws item. php? id= 10 74>, accessed 27 March 2007. 
135 See section 4.2.1.33 above. It may also be noted that Guinea-Bissau was treated as a sovereign state 
before that Portuguese colony was granted formal independence, and while Portugal was in substantial 
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power is evidenced through the exercise of democracy, enabled by the democratic 
reforms put in place by the Dalai Lama and underwritten by the government in exile. 
This then demonstrates the potential to exercise effective authority in an independent 
state. There is actual exercise of authority over the exiled Tibetans. 
All evidence above, historical and present, is indicative of the fact that Tibetans can 
satisfy the criterion of statehood of effective government. They can show actual 
exercise of authority historically, and at present over Tibetans in exile by virtue of the 
exercise of democracy; they can show the right to exercise that authority through the 
exercise of democracy; and ostensibly can show a stable political community. This is 
a precondition of any claim to statehood, but is not sufficient. Each state must show 
traits of independence, represented in the Montevideo wording as a 'capacity to enter 
into relations with other States'. 
4.4.2.4 Tibet's Capacity to Enter into International Relations 
Tibet has in the past entered into relations with other states, although instances of 
such relations are few. Hugh Richardson cites a number, including treaties with China 
in 821-822,136 with Ladakh in 1842 
137 
and Nepal in 1856,138 a convention with Britain 
in 1904,139 the Simla Convention of 1914 involving Britain and China, the 
Declaration following which was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Britain and Tibet 
control of its territory (James, note I above, 139). This emphasises the force of political factors in 
recognition of states. 
136 A treaty referring to frontiers between Tibet and China, and a peaceful alliance of the two 
dominions: reprinted in translation in van Walt van Praag MC, The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and 
Prospects in International Lmi, (London: Wisdom Publications, 1987) 287-288. 
137 Agreement referring to friendship following war and to trade: reprinted in van Walt van Praag, ibid, 
290-29 1. See also Richardson, note 98 above, 261-262. 
138 Referring, inter alia, to aid, mutual assistance and trade: reprinted in van Walt van Praag, ibid, 292- 
295. 
139 An agreement in particular with regard to trade, but also incorporating in Clause IX(a) an 
engagement by the 'Government of Thibet' that 'No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, 
leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power': reprinted in van Walt van 
Praag, ibid, 300-303. 
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only, due to the withdrawal of the Chinese, 140 and the Anglo-Tibetan Trade 
Regulations of 3 July 1914.141 In addition a treaty between Tibet and Mongolia is said 
to have been signed at Urga in December 1912, but the validity of this agreement has 
never been clearly established. 142 
These instances demonstrate that prior to 1950 Tibet was capable of entering into 
international relations in the guise of a state, although did so on an infrequent basis. 
Similar evidence lies in the fact that Tibet remained neutral during World War 11. It 
insisted on that neutrality to China, Britain and to the United States and, for example, 
the Tibetan government refused to allow the construction of a road through Tibet 
which would have enabled military supplies to be transported from British India to 
China; US aircraft were not permitted to fly over Tibetan airspace between India and 
China; and Tibet failed to extradite two escaped prisoners of war. 143 All these 
instances are indicative that Tibet had the capacity to act as a state and indeed did so 
diplomatically if sporadically. 
144 
140 See section 3.2.1 above. 
14 ' Reprinted in van Walt van Praag, note 136 above, 326-329. 
142 The Urga Treaty is disputed to such an extent that there is a lack of consensus as to its definitive 
date: compare, for example, McCabe DA, 'Tibet's Declarations of Independence' (1966) 60(2) 
American Journal of International Law 369-371,370 and Rubin AP, 'Tibet's Declarations of 
Independence' (1966) 60(4) American Journal of International Law 812-814,812-813 (29 December 
1912); Tieh-Tseng Li, note 86 above, 401 and Richardson, note 98 above, 280 (1913). Tieh-Tseng Li 
writes, ibid, with respect to the Urga agreement: 'No documentary evidence whatsoever can be found 
to show the existence of such a treaty which was only reported in the press traceable to British 
sources. ' See generally, with regard to all these instances of relations mentioned, Richardson, ibid, 259- 
290. 
143 See ICLT and UNPO, note 100 above, 12-14. One of the prisoners of war was Heinrich Harrer: see 
Harrer H, Seven Years in Tibet, translation by Richard Graves (London: Rupert Hart-Davis and The 
Book Society, 1953). As to the refusal of the Tibetan government to allow the construction of the road, 
see van Walt van Praag, note 136 above, 70-73. 
144 Taiwan, however, is an entity that over the last half-century has entered into various agreements and 
conventions binding on its territory, has the attributes of statehood, and yet is not recognised as a state. 
James Crawford concludes that 'Taiwan is not a State because it still has not unequivocally asserted its 
separation from China and is not recognized as a State distinct from China': Crawford, note I above, 
219, and see generally re Taiwan 198-221. The power of the People's Republic is evident with 
reference to the situation regarding Taiwan, as it is regarding Tibet. Though note that Tibet was not 
recognised as a state by the international community at the time of the Chinese insurgence in 1950, 
even though it asserted its independence. 
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It is though the paucity of international relations conducted by Tibet prior to 1950 that 
contributed to Tibet's problems thereafter, as perhaps did the Tibetan neutrality in 
World War 11. In a sense that paucity is understandable: Tibet is a remote and vast 
area, with a relatively small population, at the time to an extent pastoral and nomadic. 
It is difficult to access, and this was particularly the case prior to the twentieth 
century. Such relations as it had prior to 1900 were largely with its immediate 
neighbours, and were principally on a religious basis. Few foreigners entered the 
country, and those who tried were often turned away. 1 45 Nevertheless, in 1950 the 
question arose as to whether there were any states that Tibet could rely on in its case 
against China. The answer then in essence was none - attributable in part to its 
isolation up to that date. The insurgence of the PLA into the Tibetan region in that 
year resulted in an appeal by Tibet to the United Nations for aid. The only country 
willing to put Tibet on the agenda was El Salvador, and on 24 November 1950 the 
UN voted to postpone the vote on the Tibet question. The vote was unanimous. 146 
Tibet was friendless in the international arena and it was not until nine years later that 
any UN resolution was passed in respect of Tibet. 147 
Since that time the persistence of the Dalai Lama in the international sphere has 
resulted in increased recognition of and sympathy for the Tibetan plight. His 
representatives travel the globe and he is now feted by governinents and international 
organisations, not only as a religious leader but as the head of the Tibetan government 
in exile. For instance, he consorts with US Presidents' 
48 and has addressed the US 
145As, for instance, Sven Hedin: see Hedin S, Central Asia and Tibet: Towards the Holy City of Lhasa, 
Vols I and 11 (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1997); and A Conquest of Tibet (New York: EP Dutton 
& Co, Inc, 1934). 
146 Grunfeld, note 94 above, 97. See also note 50, Chapter 3 above. 
147 See section 3.4.3 above. 
148 For the Dalai Lama's latest meeting with US President George W Bush in November 2005, see 
China Daily, 'Beijing: Bush-Dalai Lama meeting negative' (2006) 
131 
Congress, 149 and in 1988 addressed the European Parliament, issuing before it his 
framework for Sino-Tibetan negotiations, known as the Strasbourg Proposal. 15 0 The 
raised profile of the Dalai Lama and his government in exile provide a platform for 
future international relations, although it is relevant to ask what may happen in this 
context on the death of the present Dalai Lama. Such is the association between him 
and Tibet that it may be that Tibet is perceived to be the Dalai Lama. Thus on his 
death the profile of Tibet on the world stage may reduce: a case of the actor 
embodying the cause. 
Despite that potential difficulty two things can be demonstrated at this point. First, 
prior to 1950 Tibet had the capacity to enter into international relations and exercised 
that capacity, although on an infrequent basis. Secondly, in the intervening years the 
Dalai Lama and his government in exile have worked hard to cultivate relations in the 
international sphere. 15 1 They have constructed a base for the future on which 
international relations could be conducted, although they cannot now speak for Tibet 
as a state in such relationships. The issue of independence becomes of direct 
<http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/english/doc/2005-11/11/content-493744. htm>, accessed I February 
2006. 
149 For example, on 21 September 1987: see Ardley, note 92 above, 23. In 2006, Congress passed 'A 
bill to award a congressional gold medal to Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, in recognition 
of his many enduring and outstanding contributions to peace, non-violence, human rights, and religious 
understanding': GovTrack. us, 'S. 2784 [109th]: Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act' 
(2006) 
<http: //www. govtrack. us/congress/bili. xpd? bill=sIO9-2784>, accessed 27 March 2007. President Bush 
signed the Bill on 27 September 2006. Congress recognised that the Dalai Lama is 'a leading figure of 
moral and religious authority' and 'spiritual and cultural leader of the Tibetan people' who 'has used 
his leadership to promote democracy, freedom, and peace for the Tibetan people through a negotiated 
settlement of the Tibet issue, based on autonomy within the People's Republic of China': GovTrack. us, 
'S. 2784 [109th]: Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act' (2006) 
<http: //www. govtrack. us/congress/biI]text. xpd? biII=s109-2784>, accessed 27 March 2007. The Dalai 
Lama is not referred to as a head of state. 
150 Song Liming, 'Reflections on the Seventeen-point Agreement of 195 V in Cao Changching and JD 
Seymour (eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes. - Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New 
York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1998) 55-70,65; also Yan Jiaqi, 'Federalism and the Future of Tibet' 
in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), ibid, 107-120,109. See section 6.4.2 below for analysis of 
the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal. 
15 1 For example, through the work of the Tibetan government in exile through its Department of 
Information and International Relations: see note 133 above and related text. 
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relevance. Currently there is control of Tibet by China, and the authority of the 
People's Republic holds sway. 
While the independence of an existing state is said to have the protection of the rules 
of international law against unlawful invasion and annexation, this theory proved of 
no assistance to Tibet in 1950. Despite its claim for statehood then, the international 
community chose not to recognise it as such. 
152 Recognition then was key, 
153 
and it is 
so now. Tibet has the potential capacity to enter into relations with other states, but 
can the international community regard Tibet as independent? 
4.4.3 Recognition of Tibet 
In the years to 1950 few states had dealings with Tibet and accordingly few 
recognised Tibet as an independent state. The treaties mentioned in section 4.4.2.4 
above evidence forms of recognition of Tibet as do the conduct of negotiations. 
Foreign missions were maintained in Lhasa by Britain, India, Nepal and Bhutan at 
various times,, in addition to the ambans maintained in the city by China. 154 This 
limited recognition, however, provided no protection for Tibet. 155 
152 It should be noted in this context that many states have operated at the international level - and been 
recognised as states - 'which lack a full measure of sovereignty': James, note I above, 176. Hence the 
evident importance of recognition. 
153 Even though recognition is not one of the four criteria of statehood: see note 17 above. 
154 See generally Government of Tibet in Exile (The), 'The Status of Tibet' (2006) 
<http: //www. tibet. com/Status/statuslaw. html>, accessed 2 February 2006, which refers to these 
missions in Lhasa as 'diplomatic missions'; see, though, section 3.2.1 above regarding, for example, 
the British view that Tibet was not an independent country dejure. See section 3.2 above re ambans. 
British interest in Tibet began as a trade interest, and later took the form of strategic and political 
interests as part of the 'Great Game'; the other states bordered on Tibet, and thus interests were in the 
nature of trade, maintaining peace, and also of religion; China's interest revolved around trade, religion 
and also protection: see, for example, Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 358-359, van Wait van Praag, note 
136 above, 17-25. 
155 At the same time, the declaratory theory of recognition does not equate recognition with whether a 
state actually exists or not, as the criteria for statehood do not include recognition. Thus a state could 
still make a claim for statehood, even if it has not been recognised as such, if its terfitorv has been 
infringed. 
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Although a state may continue to exist after it has been illegally invaded and 
annexed, 156 this is of little assistance or comfort to that state if its statehood has not 
been recognised in the first place. The concept of recognition thus assumes 
importance, and it is the collective recognition of a state by an organisation such as 
the United Nations that is of the greatest practical relevance. This buttresses the 
declaratory theory of recognition. The few resolutions in the UN to date regarding 
Tibet coupled with the strength of the position of the People's Republic within the UN 
Security Council render any recognition of Tibet under a traditional definition of 
statehood unlikely. 157 States have shown they are not prepared to stand out against 
China, not only on issues of Tibet, but also on human rights issues. 158 
It is the case, nevertheless, that the legal identity of a state may remain in the face of 
an effective annexation of that state. An example may be found in the resurrection of 
the Baltic States following the break-up of the Soviet Union. 159The Tibetan situation 
is though rather different, particularly taking into account the differences in the 
constitutions of the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic. 160 Yet it is 
feasible to consider that the legal personality of Tibet could at a future date be 
regarded as having been preserved, 'so as to form the basis for the reconstruction of 
156 Crawford, note I above, 701: 'Belligerent occupation does not extinguish the State pending a final 
settlement of the conflict'; also, 688, 'It is well established that belligerent occupation does not affect 
the continuity of the State. ' Similarly, Yannis A, 'The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in 
International Law and Its Implications in International Politics' (2002) 13(5) European Journal of 
International Law 1037-1052,1038: 'Under modem international law, foreign invasion does not lead 
to the extinction of a state'. 
157 It must be accepted that the international community as a body did not recognise an independent 
Tibet in 1950. 
158 As exemplified by the lack of concerted sanctions against China, following the Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations and repression in 1989. 
159 See section 2.4.2.1 above. 
160 See section 4.2.33 above. 
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the State). 161 Again, though, the concept of recognition, with its heavily political 
overtones, comes to the fore. 
The UN protects the territorial integrity of existing states, 162 and the existing state of 
the People's Republic of China includes the territory of Tibet. Despite this, a Tibetan 
government in exile exists with the potential to supply effective government, and a 
Tibetan territory can be defined, as can a population. The recognition of governments 
is intensely political, and politics can change as indeed the concept of sovereignty 
changes. ' 63 It is now appropriate to surnmarise Tibet's current standing and to analyse 
how Tibet is placed in regard to the changing concepts of sovereignty, for if the 
international community recognised Tibet as a state it would seem a reasonable 
supposition that the community would recognise the Dalai Lama's government in 
exile. 
4.5 Application of Sovereignty at the Present Time 
4.5.1 Summation 
It can be seen that there is a strong argument that Tibet satisfies the criteria for 
statehood. First, Tibet had a pennanent, even if partly nomadic, population prior to 
1950. Tibetans are a distinct ethnic group within the People's Republic, and have 
been recognised by the People's Republic as a minority nationality. ' 64 Tibetans can 
still be ethnically identified, comprising in part a body of people within ethnographic 
Tibet and in part a body in exile, and Tibetans represent a permanent population 
161 Crawford, note I above, 703. 
162 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
163 Although the recognition of governments is essentially political, this should not be confused with 
recognition of states. 'That an entity is recognized as a State is evidence of its status': Crawford, note I 
above, 27. 
164 See section 4.4.2.1 above. 
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sufficient to meet the relevant criterion specified by Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States. The fact of a rising Han Chinese 
population in Tibet would not of itself preclude statehood for Tibet. 165 As to territory, 
prior to 1950 Tibet had boundaries - and indeed even today 'Tibet' on a world map 
would be identified by the international community. It certainly comprised the TAR; 
whether governance from Lhasa extended beyond into Amdo and Kham is less 
certain. A state must possess some territory, although can subsequently remain in 
existence without any territory. 166 
The potential to exercise authority can prove adequate to establish the third criterion 
of effective government, as evidenced by the Congo in 1960,167 and the Tibetan 
government in exile manifests the required potential, as well as maintaining a legally 
defined historical claim to the competence to govern Tibet. The potential is evidenced 
not only by the existence of the exile government, but by the effective control 
exercised by the Tibetan authorities prior to 1950 over their territory, at least to the 
extent of the present TAR. 168 Similarly the Tibetan government in exile has shown 
itself capable of entering into relations with other states, as did the Tibetan authorities 
pre- 195 0, albeit on an infrequent basis. 169 
It is, however, the stance taken by the People's Republic (and indeed its predecessors) 
that undermines any claims to sovereignty by Tibet. China argues, inter alia, that 
165 See Crawford, note I above, 52: statehood is not dependent upon nationality, but nationality upon 
statehood - see section 4.2.1.1 above. 166 For example, Kuwait, after the invasion by Iraq in 1990, continued to exist as a state despite being a 
non-effective entity. The government of Kuwait in exile was still recognised even though it had no 
territory and could not control a particular area: Crawford, ibid, 97,688. 
167 See section 4.2.1.3 above. 'Anything less like effective government [than that which was in place in 
the Republic of the Congo after independence in 1960] would be hard to imagine. Yet despite this there 
can be little doubt that in 1960 the Congo was a State in the full sense of the term': Crawford, ibid, 57. 
Similarly, Bosnia Herzogovina and Croatia did not exercise effective authority when they were 
recognised by EU states: see, for example, note 17 above, and Crawford, ibid, 93. 168 See section 4.4.2.3 above. 
169 See section 4.4.2.4 above. It is worth noting that the fact that a state conducts relations with an 
entity does not mean that the state recognises the entity as a state also. 
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Tibet's government pre-1950 was a local government, not a national one, 170 and that 
its distinct language and culture are not prerequisites for independence. 171 In addition, 
Tieh-Tseng Li argues that there has been reluctance, indeed incapacity, on the part of 
Tibet to enter into international relations. 172 He also asserts that the position of Tibet 
in Chinese domestic politics is clear. In this context he quotes an explanation given to 
the General Committee of the United Nations by a delegate of the Chinese Nationalist 
Government in 1950: 'Tibet has been and still is a part of China; all Chinese whatever 
their party or religion regard it as such. ' 173 This, to all intents and purposes, remains 
the position of China today under the govermnent of the People's Republic. 
The overall effect is that Tibet is unable, at the start of the twenty-first century, to 
demonstrate a lack of foreign control over its territory and people: it cannot show 
independence. The corollary is that Tibet is not recognised as a state, a situation that 
is unchanged from 1950, when such government and status as Tibet had was 
insufficient to protect it from the People's Liberation Army and annexation and 
incorporation into the People's Republic. Tibet is bound to accede not only to the 
authority of intemational law, but also to the absolute authority of the People's 
Republic. 
170 See section 3.3.3 above. 
17 ' Grunfeld, note 94 above, 255. 172 See Tieh-Tseng Li, note 86 above, 402. 
173 lbid 404. The unity of the motherland is of paramount importance. In a different context a 
spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated, in 2004, that 'The Chinese people's will and 
determination to safeguard the integrity of the motherland is firm and unswerving': Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan's Remarks on the 
Japanese Diet Panel's Resolution Concerning the Diaoyu Islands' (2004) 
<http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/xwfw/2510/25-'35/t82104. htm>, accessed 29 March 2006. 
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4.5.2 Potentialfor Recognition of Tibet 
Tibet has the potential to exert substantial independence, so it is of relevance to 
consider whether the changing concepts of sovereignty may assist. 174 It has been 
demonstrated that the creation of states does not depend on acts of recognition of all 
other states, but that the declaratory theory of recognition is pertinent, particularly 
through collective recognition of a state by an organisation such as the UN. 175 Equally 
though it is through non-recognition of new states that the status quo is maintained 
and existing states are able to maintain their territorial integrity. Issues of recognition 
are political, and in this sense international law is mediated through politics, although 
the legal elements themselves should not be forgotten. 
Politics is of course subject to change, both in the international arena and internally. 
The Communist revolutions in China and also in the Soviet Union in the first half of 
the twentieth century perhaps exemplify both. As a corollary to the former revolution 
Tibet found itself em-neshed within the People's Republic. Having established its state 
through revolution, China lays stress on its territorial integrity and on non-interference 
by the international community in its domestic affairs, while at the same time 
pursuing its claim to unify 'the motherland', for example by incorporating Tibet, 
recovering Hong Kong, and seeking to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. 
The Communist revolutions have not produced a static situation in the resultant states. 
This has been particularly the case in the Soviet Union, which in the last twenty years 
has broken up into its constituent parts. Differences in the Soviet and Chinese 
constitutions have facilitated this eventuality, yet its existence establishes that history 
174 The concept of sovereignty is not static: see section 4.3 above. The development of the law of self- 
determination, for example, has had 'a substantial impact on the content of the criteria of statehood': 
Warbrick, note 119 above, 263. 
175 See section 4.2.2 above. 
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remains fluid, and the politics of the Communist revolutions is not definitive. 176 The 
fact that the People's Republic has declared itself to be a multinational unitary state, 
and has opted for a system of regional autonomy therein, is not conclusive. The 
political situation in China does and will evolve - the present regime is very different 
from, for instance, Mao's Cultural Revolution of the 1960s - as does the concept of 
sovereignty, which should not be seen as a static principle. 
The absolute power of the sovereign state is now being tested in an increasing variety 
of ways. The monolith that was the Soviet Union disintegrated as the politics of 
Communism failed to bind a disparate number of composite parts, and this 
phenomenon finds increasing expression in the combined forces of supranationalism 
and sub-state nationalism. The supranational European Union provides an impetus for 
subsidiarity in Europe; sub-state units seek greater powers against the state and this in 
turn may give greater impetus to nationalist tendencies - national groups demanding 
self-determination 'in the form of independent statehood'. 177 Nationalism may have 
the effect of leading to independence, either peacefully or following violence, as in 
the case of the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 178 or may lead to national 
parliaments within a subsisting state, such as Scotland within the United Kingdom. 
China is not immune from such forces, although its status as a multinational unitary 
state as defined in its constitution reinforces the integrationist state. ' 79 
176 See section 4.2.3 above. 
177 Gans C, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 3. In the EU, 
sub-state units are able to seek and obtain greater powers against the state because the states have given 
consent; in this context the consent of the state is paramount. Subsidiarity chimes with a desire for 
decentralisation in parts of the EU at the expense of the nation state. This finds expression, for 
example, in devolution for Scotland, and in ongoing claims by the Catalans, who currently have 
autonomous rights within Spain: with regard to the latter, see, for instance, Guibemau M, 'Spain: 
Catalonia and the Basque Country' (2000) 53(l) Parliamentary Affairs 55-68. 
178 See section 2.4.2.2 above. 
179 See note 57 above, and related text. 
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The emphasis of the People's Republic on territorial integrity and non-interference in 
its domestic affairs is jeopardised by the increasing reach of the Internet. Although 
China attempts to curtail the information available to its populace, a greater 
dissemination of news and views to the Chinese people occurs and is inevitable. The 
trend is for increased access of information, not only in China but throughout the 
world as a whole. With increasing numbers of Chinese citizens having access to the 
Internet, and to an increasing number of international search engines, even if the 
Chinese authorities are able to exert some control over the content available on the 
Web total control will not prove possible. A globalised information technology is a 
fact. One repercussion will prove to be a wider availability in China of ideas and 
doctrine that differ from the official Party line, for example on Tibet, resulting in an 
ever-increasing public scrutiny of the decision making of the state. 180 
A broadly based dissemination of information will mean that the views on Tibet of 
Chinese dissidents will gain a wider audience. 18 1 The official Chinese view of Tibetan 
history, which places Tibet firmly within China, and the events of 1950 as a liberation 
of Tibet, will be challenged. It is not possible to say what the outcome will be, but the 
challenge to the accepted position within China of Tibet will increase and be more 
widely apparent. 
This challenge to Chinese authority already finds an opening in the context of human 
rights. The human rights covenants and conventions pose competition to the state, 
checking and controlling sovereignty and the power of the state to exert ftill legal 
180 See Hanqin Xue, note 48 above, 138. 
18 1 Dissidents such as Song Liming and Shen Tong. See, for example, Song Liming, note 150 above; 
and Shen Tong, 'Tibet: An Unavoidable Issue' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet 
Through Dissident Chinese Eyes. - Essa , i, s on 
Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME 
Sharpe, 1998) 41-54. This is significant as generally the Chinese Government controls the information 
that is disseminated to the people. 
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control over its boundaries and the territory therein. The work of human rights 
organisations criticises the actions of states on a daily basis, and in instances there is 
direct interference by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within a state's 
territory. This can lead to conflict between NGOs, or indeed the UN, and an 
individual state' 82 or it may lead to direct participation of UN organisations within a 
state - for instance through the dispersal of food aid, or to separate warring 
factions. 183 Human rights organisations can influence the direction a state takes, and 
there has been criticism of human rights abuses in China 184 and specifically in 
Tibet. 1 85 
A growing pressure on the integrity of the state is apparent through the forces of 
globalisation. 'Sovereignty' becomes less the defining characteristic of the modem 
state system. Although the nation state retains its pre-eminence, its supremacy is 
subject to challenge from a variety of directions. Yet it remains of significance and 
perhaps no state retains its power more than the People's Republic. It is able to do this 
through its seat on the UN Security Council, through its control on information within 
its boundaries, through its constitution and its very size. Its historic emphasis on 
territorial integrity 186 and the importance of the motherland ensure that Tibet will not 
easily be able to break away and form an independent nation. 187 
It is perceived that the doctrine of state sovereignty has sacrificed Tibet, which 
became a 'target of Han nationalism whose external expression was Chinese 
182 For instance, Zimbabwe in 2005. 
183 Such intervention by the UN happens with the consent of the state concerned. Thus prior to 2007 the 
UN did not directly intervene in the Sudan: see Chapter 7, note 69 below. 
184 For instance, in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and repression. 
185 Such abuses in Tibet will be considered more fully in section 5.4 below. 
186 Exemplified by Article 52 of the 1982 Constitution. 
187 Despite the unforeseen capitulation into its various parts of the former Soviet Union. Despite also 
the developments in respect of Kosovo, including the Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status 
Settlement presented by Martti Ahtisaari in March 2007, which is, in its essentials, a proposal for 
independence, to be supervised initially by the international community: see section 6.3.3 below. 
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, 188 expansionism . By virtue of the commitment of the 
People's Republic to the 
territorial integrity of Tibet within China and the importance of Tibet to China, 
emphasised by security considerations, "9 it is not likely that current changes in the 
concepts of sovereignty will improve the likelihood that the People's Republic will be 
prepared to willingly accede to an independent Tibet, either an independent 
ethnographic Tibet or with respect to an independent Tibet comprising the present 
TAR. 
The international community has failed to recognise an independent Tibet and 
continues to do so; and international law and the UN Charter protect the territorial 
integrity of existing states, 190 including the People's Republic, despite changing 
concepts of sovereignty. It is thus in the theory of self-determination that the Tibetan 
nation must seek its future and it is necessary to consider in detail whether the 
expansion of that theory will lead to a reconsideration of the status of Tibet. In this 
context it is appropriate to consider the nexus between self-determination and human 
rights, in particular because, as we have seen, the human rights covenants and 
conventions provide the potential to challenge the state, and to examine how the 
organs of the Chinese state have oppressed the lives of the Tibetan people. 
188 Dawa Norbu, note 57 above, 95. 
189See section 4.4.2.2 above. 
190 See, for instance, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
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5 Human Rights in the Sino-Tibetan Context 
5.1 Introduction 
The international human rights movement gained momentum at the end of the Second 
World War and was first given 'formal and authoritative expression' by the 1945 
United Nations Charter, ' whereby the peoples of the United Nations determined 'to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small'. 2 
Impetus had been given to the movement by the atrocities committed during the War 
and the revelations emanating from the Nuremberg war trials, and 'the protection of 
human rights has largely been a result of the post-war settlement'. 3 
The Charter makes various references to human rights, 4 yet these references are 
essentially aspirational rather than substantive. Arising from the Charter, however, the 
Commission on Human Rights was established by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), itself an organ of the United Nations, in 1946.5 The Commission is 
rightly said to have evolved to be 'the world's single most important human rights 
organ 5,6 and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, currently Louise Arbour, 
1 Steiner HJ and Alston P, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and 
Materials, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 137. 
2 Preamble to the United Nations Charter. 
' Galbreath DJ, 'Dealing with Diversity in International Law: Self-Determination and Statehood' 
(2005) 9(4) International Journal of Human Rights 539-550,548. See also Steiner and Alston, note I 
above, 112,115,137. 
' In the Preamble, note 2 above, and also in Articles 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55,56,62(2) and 68. 
5 Under Article 68 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC has power to 'set up commissions in economic and 
social fields and for the promotion of human rights'. The Commission on Human Rights was 
established by Resolution of the Economic and Social Council of 16 February 1946 (document E/20 of 
15 February 1946). See also Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004) 658. 
6 Steiner and Alston, note I above, 138. The Commission in 2006 became the UN Human Rights 
Council by UNGA Resolution 60/25 1 dated 15 March 2006, which reaffirmed, inter alia, 'that all 
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former member of the Supreme court of Canada, remains the principal United 
Nations Commissioner responsible for United Nations activities in the field of human 
rights, with a wide mandate to promote all human rights, be they civil and political or 
economic, social and cultural. 7 
The United Nations system in respect of human rights incorporates a number of 
Charter bodies 8 as well as seven human rights treaty bodies. 9 In addition there are 
several other important United Nations bodies concerned with the promotion and 
protection of human rights, 10 and many agencies and partners of the United Nations 
are also involved in this regard. " Regional human rights mechanisms also exist, such 
as the African Commission on Human and People's Rights in Africa and the 
European Court of Human Rights in Europe, together with thousands of human rights 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Asia Human Rights Commission' 2 
and the Asia-Pacific Forum. 13 
human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing' and 
further recognised 'the importance of ensuring universality, objectivity and non-selectivity in the 
consideration of human rights issues, and the elimination of double standards and politicization' - see 
though section 5.2 below. The Commission was abolished on 16 June 2006 accordingly. China did not 
oppose the GA resolution. 
7 OHCHR [Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights], 'The High 
Commissioner' (2006) 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/about/hc/index. htm>, accessed II April 2006. 
8 The Human Rights Council, the Commission on Human Rights, Special procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights. See OHCHR [Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights], 'Human 
Rights Bodies: Mechanisms for the protection and promotion of human rights' (2006) 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/bodies/>, accessed II April 2006. See note 6 above as to the 
Commission on Human Rights. 
9 lbid: the seven bodies are identified as the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee Against Torture, the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on Migrant Workers. 
10 lbid: these bodies include the United Nations General Assembly, the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Intemational Court of Justice. 
11 lbid: for example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Labour Organization and the United Nations 
Development Programme. 
12 
<www. ahrchk. net>. 
13 <www. asiapacificforum. net>. 
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Set against the background of what is now a huge number of human rights bodies are 
the two principal human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) 14 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 15 
5.2 Priorities under the Human Rights Regime 
5.2.1 Universalism and Relativism 
The essential purpose of the human rights regime is 'to promote and protect vital 
human interests', 16 a purpose made evident in the Preamble to each of the two 1966 
International Covenants. The similar wording of the two preambles refers to the 
principle that 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world' and recognises 'that these rights derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person'. The Covenants further recognise that 'the ideal of free human 
beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well 
as his civil and political rights'. 17 
Common to both Covenants is the wording of the first sentence of Article I. (I): 'All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. ' Thus primacy is given to an essentially 
positive human right, and not only to a positive human right but to one given to 
4 peoples' as opposed to individuals. As is evident from Chapter 2 above, this right has 
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976,999 UNTS 171. 
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976,993 UNTS I 
16 Bauer JR and Bell DA, 'Introduction' in JR Bauer and DA Bell (eds), The East Asian Challengefor 
Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 3-23,3. 
17 ICESCR, Preamble; see also ICCPR, Preamble. 
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proved to be awkward and subject to a considerable margin of interpretation despite 
its apparently straightforward wording. The lack of definition of 'peoples' especially 
has caused particular difficulty and contention. 18 
This primacy given to self-determination is indicative of its considerable 'historical 
significance for several phases of the human rights movement', 19 and also its inherent 
position within that regime. Not all countries, however, give the Conventions the 
same priority or significance. The Conventions both came into force in 1976, but by 
way of example China did not sign the ICESCR until 27 October 1997, and did not 
ratify it until 27 March 2001; further, China has not even now ratified the lCCPR, 
although it signed that Convention on 5 October 1998 . 
20 Thus self-determination and 
human rights may not only mean different things to different states, but they also 
attract different priorities. 
Questions of interpretation of human rights are important and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)2 1 has been central to establishing the 
18 This key issue has been referred to in Chapter 2, and will be considered further in Chapter 6. 
19 Steiner and Alston, note I above, 1248; also at 1256, quoting Orentlicher D, 'Separation Anxiety: 
International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims' (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 1. 
20 Information accessed through [OHCHR] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 'Ratifications and Reservations (Last Update 8 May 2006)': 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/countries/ratification/index. htm>, accessed 15 May 2006. Of the states 
that have not ratified the ICCPR, 'a disproportionate number are from Asia, including China, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Singapore': Harris, note 5 above, 
678. It is on ratification (or other acceptance, approval or accession as appropriate) that a state is bound 
by a treaty, assuming that it has come into force: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, done 
at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980,1155 UNTS 331, Articles 11-16. 
See also ICCPR, Article 49. Thus, until ratification by China of the ICCPR, that treaty does not bind 
China. The ICCPR itself entered into force on 23 March 1976, and the ICESCR on 3 January 1976: see 
notes 14 and 15 above. It is of note that, 'Before joining the UN, when discussing international 
standards of human rights Chinese Communist leaders made known their contempt for the Western 
view of human rights and criticized capitalism for its emphasis on political and civil rights without 
regard for economic rights': Copper JF, 'Defining Human Rights in the People's Republic of China' in 
Yuan-li Wu, F Michael, JF Copper, Ta-ling Lee, Maria Hsia Chang, and AJ Gregor (eds), Human 
Rights in the People's Republic of China (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988) 9-17,15. 
21 The UDHR was a seminal work adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948 by the General 
Assembly of the UN by a vote of 48-0, with 8 abstentions. Member states were requested to publicise 
the text of the Declaration but it was on]y with the 1966 International Covenants that legal force was 
given to the rights outlined in the UDHR- 
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framework of the consensus achieved in respect of human rights from an international 
perspective. The United Nations vote on the Declaration in 1948 is notable for the 
lack of opposition, and in the context of this thesis it should be mentioned that PC 
Chang of China contributed to the drafting of the Universal Declaration. 22 Despite this 
'the universality of both the notion of human rights and the nature of human rights has 
23 been, and remains, highly contested' . In view of this contestation, the use of 
'universality' attributable to human rights can be seen to be something of a misnomer, 
and it has been argued that the UDHR should be made more 'relevant for the present 
times and ... acceptable to all nations and peoples'. 
24 
Thus relativism in respect of human rights becomes prominent, and in two senses: 
first between periods of time, and secondly from state to state or from region to 
region. As to whether human rights should be adapted from one era to another, this 
has the appearance of being specious. If moral values, values regarding human rights, 
underpin society as norms (which, if universal, they should), it is arguable that they 
are fundamental in nature, and should not be subject to adaptation due to, for instance, 
a change in the governance of certain states to dictatorship. 25 However, the question 
of 'acceptable to all nations and peoples' finds expression in the 'Asian values' 
debate. In this, the elites 'of almost all East Asian countries insist that some of the 
rights included in the United Nations and other Western-inspired declarations of 
22 Donnelly J, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Second Edition (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2003) 22. Note though that the People's Republic was not seated at the UN at 
that time, indeed the People's Republic had not been proclaimed, and also of course that the UN was a 
far smaller organisation then than it is now. 
23 Hurrell A, 'Power, principles and prudence: protecting human rights in a deeply divided world' in T 
Dunne and NJ Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 277-302,291-292. 
2' Per Tun Daim Zainuddin, senior adviser to the Malaysian Government, quoted in Klug F, Valuesfor 
a GodlessAge. - The Story, of the UK's New Bill of Rights (London: Penguin Books, 2000) 2 10. 
25 Relevant to this is that international human rights standards are seen to impose limits on territorial 
sovereignty: Falk R, On Humane Governance. - Toward a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995) 67. Thus human rights are seen as a direct challenge to the concept of sovereignty. 
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human rights are incompatible with their values, traditions and self-understanding, 
and that Western governments should be more tolerant of their attempts to define and 
prioritise them differently'. 26 The argument is that 'the conventional declarations of 
human rights explicitly or implicitly prescribe the standard Western liberal- 
democratic form of government and brook no departures from it'. 27 
In the 1990s a backlash developed to the role played by the United Nations in 
standard setting with regard to human rights, 'based on a claim that alleged violations 
[of human rights] were being used as a pretext for a new cycle of Northern-led 
interventionary diplomacy', and China 'emerged as the informal leader of this 
movement of resistance'. 28Rather than specifically temporal, the relativism relating to 
human rights can be viewed as political, and as cutting across states and their cultures. 
It is argued, as a result, that 'Human rights norms are not persuasive in and of 
themselves; instead they are imposed as the values of the dominant state. ' 29Thus the 
argument as to whether human rights are universal in nature, or fundamental, 
unchanging, or unchangeable, itself diminishes in relevance. Arguments as to the 
26 Parekh B, 'Non-ethnocentric universalism' in T Dunne and NJ Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in 
Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 128-159,154. 
27 Ibid 155. Such arguments in part explain the reluctance of the People's Republic of China to ratify 
the ICCPR, while it has ratified the ICESCR. In essence the Chinese Government 'argues that human 
rights turn to some extent on cultural values and traditions, and that while the human rights movement 
emphasises the universality of rights, cultural differences cannot and should not be ignored. Human 
rights norms are inevitably subject to cultural mediation': Peerenboom R, China's Long March toward 
Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 536, footnotes omitted. Parekh, though, 
argues that the Chinese leaders' contention that their traditional values are incompatible with human 
rights is unconvincing, and further that the rejection of human rights is both self-serving and suspect: 
Parekh, note 26 above, 157-158. 
2' Falk, note 25 above, 26; see also the Bangkok Governmental Declaration, section 5.2.2 below. 
29 Ming Wan, Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relation: Defining and Defending National Interests 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) 12. Further, as Andrew Hurrell remarks: 
'Writers such as Berlin and Elster have underlined the extent to which formal political democracy can 
entrench murderous majorities of all kinds - but most dangerously, perhaps, murderous ethnic 
majorities': Hurrell, note 23 above, 280 - see in this regard Berlin 1, 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in Four 
Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), especially 165-169; Elster J, 'Majority 
Rule and Individual Rights' in S Shute and S Hurley (eds), On Human Rights: The OxfordAmnesty 
Lectures (New York: Basic Books, 1993) 111-134. These words have particular resonance in the 
context of the Han majority and Tibetan ethnic minority, and indeed also echo in an Islamic context 
between Sunni and Shia Muslims. 
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rights and wrongs of cultural relativism similarly command less relevance, 
30 as 
political realism comes to the fore, and issues of power become central. The political 
context of debates surrounding human rights has to be borne in mind accordingly. 31 
If human rights are perceived as a political construct, the question arises as to whether 
the People's Republic of China has its own concept of rights. The issue is well 
addressed and researched by Stephen Angle, who concludes in the affirmative, 
pointing to the fact that the contexts within which concepts of rights 'have emerged 
and have been contested are central episodes in China's cultural and political 
history'. 32 
5.2.2 The Bangkok Declaration 
The Chinese position on and interpretation of the Human Rights Covenants is integral 
to this thesis, and the following sections will focus on human rights in the context of 
the Chinese Constitution, and human rights in practice as operated in Tibet. It is 
important to recall the emphasis given by the People's Republic of China to the 
integrity of the state, and ancillary to this 'China has always maintained that human 
30 Cultural relativism may of course be the smokescreen erected by a country to maintain its power 
within the state; see also Chapter 2, note 73 above. The cultural relativist view whereby all moral 
values are relative and contingent disputes the existence of universal human rights, and is a view taken 
by advocates of Asian values today: Svensson M, Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and 
Political History (Lanham, Maryland and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2002) 47. See 
also Freeman M, 'Universal Rights and Particular Cultures' in M Jacobsen and 0 Bruun (eds), Human 
Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000) 43-58,56: general concepts of 'Asian values' or 'Western 
values' as 'more likely to be smokescreens behind which those with power indulge their traditional 
appetite for exploitation and oppression'. The question of values as 'smokescreens' is emphasised by 
Andrew Hurrell, note 23 above, 297, quoting Yash Ghai, 'Through the Declaration [of the Right to 
Development], Asian governments seek to promote the ideology of developmentalism, which justifies 
repression at home and the evasion of sovereignty abroad': Yash Ghai, 'Asian Perspectives on Human 
Rights' in J Tang (ed. ), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific (London: Pinter, 
1993) 54-67,59. Although there may be legitimate values at stake, 'authoritarian regimes have at times 
used the rhetoric of Asian values for self-serving ends, playing the cultural card to deny citizens their 
rights and then fend off foreign criticism': Peerenboom, note 27 above, 115. 
" Svensson, ibid, 65-66. 
32 Angle SC, Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 250. 
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rights are essentially matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a country 5.33 This 
view does not belong to China alone, but is widely held in Asia. Hence the Bangkok 
Governmental Declaration of 1993 emanating from a regional meeting of Asian 
countries prior to the Second World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna 
later that year. 34 Paragraph 7 of the Declaration stressed the universality of human 
rights, but against that paragraph 8 recognised that human rights 'must be considered 
in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, 
bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds', paragraph 9 recognised that 'States 
have the primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights', 
and paragraph 5 emphasised 'the principles of respect for national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States'. 
Further, while reiterating in paragraph 12 that 'self-determination is a principle of 
international law and a universal right recognized by the United Nations for peoples 
under alien or colonial domination and foreign occupation ... and that 
its denial 
constitutes a grave violation of human rights', the Declaration, in paragraph 13, 
stresses 'that the right to self-determination is applicable to peoples under alien or 
colonial domination and foreign occupation, and should not be used to undermine the 
territorial integrity, national sovereignty andpolitical independence of States' . 
35 Thus 
33 Steiner and Alston, note I above, 548; also see Chapter 4 above. Following from this, that, by virtue 
of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the UN are not entitled to intervene in matters that are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction. 
34 JCJertain world leaders of the economically successful societies of South-East Asia ... took the 
opportunity presented by the UN World Conference on Human Rights that was held in Vienna in June 
1993 to assert the propriety of culturally diverse interpretations of human rights principles', and thus 
Western liberals were faced with 'a new challenge to the idea of universal human rights': Freeman M, 
note 30 above, 44. See also, though, Chan J, 'Thick and Thin accounts of Human Rights' in M 
Jacobsen and 0 Bruun (eds), Human Rights and Asian I'alues. - Contesting National Identities and 
Cultural Representations in Asia (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000) 59-74,59: 'In the Bangkok 
Declaration, many Asian governments explicitly affirm universal human rights. ' 
35 World Conference on Human Rights, 'Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World 
Conference on Human Rights', Bangkok, 29 March-2 April 1993; Rapporteur: Mr LM Singhvi (1993): 
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the Bangkok Declaration qualified the universality of human rights, and at the same 
time the principle of self-determination, reflecting the Asian interpretation. 36 
5.3 The Chinese Constitution and Human Rights 
Against this background, the present Constitution of the People's Republic of China 37 
merits examination, and in this section I will review the Constitution by reference to 
China's stance with regard to human rights. I will then touch upon further relevant 
legislation of the Chinese state before, in the final part of the section, considering to 
what extent the People's Republic has been brought within the international human 
rights regime. 
5.3.1 The 1982 Constitution 
The 1982 Constitution came into force in the same year that the People's Republic of 
China became a member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 38 and 
subsequently its Sub-Commission. 39The 1980s proved to be a decade during which 
China progressively participated in the international human rights regime, including 
<http: //]93.194.138.190/html/menu5/wcbangk. htm>, accessed 15 May 2006 (emphasis added). See 
also Steiner and Alston, note I above, 549. So far as paragraph 5 is concerned, Tsering Shakya 
comments that in Bangkok China succeeded in gaining 'the support of all the Asian countries (except 
Japan) in endorsing the principle that human rights concerns should be guided by the principles of non- 
interference in the internal affairs of a state, and that it should stress the priority of collective rights 
over individual rights': Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of the Shows. - A History of Modern 
Tibet Since 1947 (London: Pimlico, 1999) 435. 
36 The Bangkok Declaration therefore presented a challenge to 'what was perceived as a western 
concept of human rights.... However, the universality of human rights and its place beyond the limits 
of domestic jurisdiction were reaffirmed by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on 
Human Rights 1993 that was adopted by the Vienna World Conference': Harris, note 5 above, 657. 
Accordingly, it seems that customary international law is wider than that reflected in the Bangkok 
Declaration. 
37 The current Constitution was adopted on 4 December 1982. Constitutions do not have the same 
meaning or intent, though, in all states, and 'one should view China's constitutions not as contracts 
between the governing and the governed, but as manifestos proclaiming values, aspirations and goals': 
Copper, note 20 above, 13. 
38 See UNHCHR [United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights], 'Membership of the 
Commission on Human Rights' (2006) 
<http: //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu2/2/chrmem. htm>, accessed 7 June 2006. 
39 See Foot R, Rights Beyond Borders. - The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in 
China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 96. 
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ratification of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 40 yet it was also a decade which culminated in the force 
used at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 4 June 1989 and severe repression in Tibet 
from 1987 to 1990, with the establishment of martial law in Tibet on 7 March 1989.41 
Nevertheless, the 1982 Constitution makes specific references to human rights. These 
are principally contained in Chapter 11 of the Constitution, 42 and by Article 33 all 
citizens of the People's Republic are equal before the law. 43 This article was amended 
by item 8 of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, 44 by an additional paragraph 
stating: 'The State respects and preserves human rights. ' Article 34 provides the right 
to vote and to stand for election 45 and by Article 35 citizens 'enjoy freedom of speech, 
of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration 9.46 
Article 36 provides freedom of religious belief , 
47 and freedom of the person is 
protected by Article 37.48 By Article 39 the home of a citizen is inviolable and 
unlawful search of the home is prohibited, and by Article 40 freedom and privacy of 
correspondence is protected. 49 
40 The People's Republic of China signed the Convention against Torture on 12 December 1986 and 
ratified the Convention on 4 October 1988; however, the People's Republic entered two reservations to 
the Convention, thus that the Chinese Government did not recognize the Committee against Torture as 
provided for in Article 20 of the Convention, and also that the Chinese Government did not consider 
itself bound by Article 30, paragraph I of the Convention: see in this context 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/countries/ratification/9. htm>, accessed 7 June 2006. See also Foot, note 
39 above, 256. Earlier in the decade China had ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (on 4 November 1980) and acceded to the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (on 29 December 198 1), both with 
reservation and declaration: respectively <http: //www. un. org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states. htm> and 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/countries/ratification/2. htm>, each accessed 7 June 2006. 
" See, for example, Foot, note 39 above, 97-10 1. 
42 Entitled 'The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens'. 
43 Reflecting Article 7 of the UDHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR. 
" Approved on 14 March 2004 by the I Oth National People's Congress at its 2nd Session. 
45 Note Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR. 
46 See Article 19 of the UDHR and Articles 19,21 and 22 of the ICCPR. 
47 See Article 18 of the UDHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
48 See Article 3 of the UDHR and Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
49 See Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR. 
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Article 42 grants citizens the right to work, 50 while Article 43 grants citizens a right to 
rest. 51 By Article 45 the old, ill or disabled have the right to material assistance from 
the state, 52 and Article 46 provides a right to receive education. 53 Article 47 grants the 
right, inter alia, to engage in cultural pursuits, 54 and Article 48 grants equal rights to 
women. 55 
Article 51 is of importance: 'The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of 
China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the 
state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other 
citizens'. 56 In the context of Tibet, also of importance are Articles 52 and 54 
respectively, whereby it is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic 'to safeguard 
the unity of the country and the unity of all its nationalities' and 'to safeguard the 
security, honour and interests of the motherland; they must not commit acts 
detrimental to the security, honour and interests of the motherland'. 57 
There are other provisions of the Constitution that are of interest so far as human 
rights are concerned. Article 4 provides that all nationalities within the People's 
Republic are equal, and that 'The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use 
'0 As amended by item 10 of the Second Amendment to the Constitution, approved on 29 March 1993 
by the 8th National People's Congress at its I st Session. See Article 6 of the ICESCR. 
51 See Article 24 of the UDHR and Article 7(d) of the ICESCR. 
52 Compare Article 22 of the UDHR and Article 9 of the ICESCR, whereby everyone should have 
rights, for example, of social security. 
53 See Article 26 of the UDHR and Article 13 of the ICESCR. 
54 See Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the ICESCR. Note also Article 119 of the Constitution 
regarding organs of self-government in national autonomous areas administering, among other things, 
cultural affairs in their areas: see section 3.5.2 above. Further, by Article 22 of the Constitution, 'the 
State protects ... valuable cultural monuments and relics and other important items of China's historical and cultural heritage'. 
15 See the UDHR, which reflects throughout the equality of all persons, Article 3 of the ICESCR, 
Articles 3 and also 26 of the ICCPR. 
56 Emboldened text in original. Though note the limitation imposed by Article 29 of the UDHR: 
'Everyone has duties to the community ... (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society'. 
57 Emboldened text in original. 
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and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or refonn their 
own ways and CUStOMS., 
58 By Article 5, 'no organization or individual may enjoy the 
privilege of being above the Constitution and the law', and further that no law shall 
contravene the Constitution. Article 2 provides that 'All power in the People's 
Republic of China belongs to the people', 59 and by Article 3 the National People's 
Congress and the local people's congresses are subject to their supervision. 60 Private 
property is protected by Article 13 of the Constitution. 61 As final points, by Article 24 
the state 'combats the decadent ideas of capitalism and feudalism', 62 and by Article 25 
it promotes family planning. 
No mention is made of human rights in the Preamble to the Constitution, yet certain 
rights were specifically granted, particularly in Chapter 11. Such rights have the 
protection of the law. 63 Although in terms 'human' rights were not provided for in the 
1982 Constitution as originally drafted, they are now emphasised following the 
specific reference in the Fourth Amendment of 14 March 2004 to the state respecting 
and preserving human rights. 64 It is pertinent to ask whether this relevance of human 
rights is reflected in other legislation applicable in the People's Republic, and this is 
the subject of the next part of the chapter. 
58 Equality of nationalities is safeguarded by Article 89(11) through the functions of the State Council. 
Provisions regarding self-government and national autonomous areas (Articles 112ff) are considered 
above at section 3.5.2. 
59Emboldened text in original. 
60 It is noteworthy that the state finds its definition in Article 9 as 'the whole people'. 
6' As amended by item 6 of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, approved on 14 March 2004. 
62 One reason for the 1950 invasion of Tibet was to liberate the people from feudalism: see sections 
3.2.3 and 3.4 above. 
63 See for example Article 4 (which prohibits discrimination against and oppression of any nationality) 
and Article 89. 
64 Impliedly including, for instance, the individual's right to life, and freedom from torture and slavery: 
note also Articles 3-5 of the UDHR and Articles 6-8 of the ICCPR. 
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5.3.2 Legislation and White Papers 
Individuals are able to take action against the state under administrative law. In China, 
Article 41 of the 1982 Constitution is of relevance by virtue of the rights it grants, 65 
but not until 1990 was a general law enacted enabling individuals to take legal action 
against the administration. The Administrative Litigation Law was promulgated in 
1989 and became effective on I October 1990.66 Also in 1990 two further pieces of 
legislation relating to safeguards and remedies against the administration were 
promulgated: the Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration 67 and the 
Regulations on Administrative Supervision in the People's Republic of China, 68 the 
latter being replaced in 1997 by the Law on Administrative Supervision 69 and the 
former in 1999 by the Law on Administrative Reconsideration. 70 In addition the State 
Compensation Law took effect in 1995 71 and the Law on Administrative Penalties in 
6' Article 41 states, inter alia: 'Citizens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and 
charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or 
functionary'; further, 'Citizens who have suffered losses through infringement of their civil rights by 
any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the law'. 
66 Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress on 4 April 1989. Accessed at 
<http: //www. cecc. gov/pages/newLaws/adminLitigationENG. php>, 9 June 2006. 
67 Adopted at the 71 st Meeting of the State Council on 9 November 1990, effective on I January 199 1. 
The Regulations were amended on 9 October 1994. Accessed at 
<http: //www. humanrights. cn/zt/lawsandregulations/2005120051229152224. htm>, 12 September 2007. 
68 Adopted at the 72nd Meeting of the State Council on 23 November 1990. See Buhmann K, 
Implementing human rights through administrative law reforms. - The potential in China and Vietnam 
(Copenhagen: Jurist- og Okonomforbundets Forlag, 2001) 339. 
69 Adopted on 9 May 1997 at the 25th Session of the Eighth National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, promulgated by President Jiang Zemin on the same date. Accessed through 
<http: //lehmanlaw. com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/administration. htm>, 12 September 2007. 
70 Adopted on 29 April 1999 at the 9th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People's Congress. It became effective as of I October 1999. Accessed at 
<http: //www. zhb. gov. cn/english/law - 
detail. php3? id=53>, 9 June 2006. 
7' Adopted on 12 May 1994 at the 7th Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People's Congress. It became effective from I January 1995. Accessed at 
<http: //www. humanrights. cn/zt/lawsandregulations/20051200629160715. htm>, 12 September 2007. 
See in this regard Shelton D, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 65, and regarding both the Administrative Litigation Law of 1990 and the State 
Compensation Act, especially re the scope of compensation etc, 'Right to restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms', Report of the 
Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/34, E/CN. 4, '1996/29,27 
November 1995 (UNHCR): Report accessed on 12 September 2007 at 
<http: /, /daccessdds. un. org/doc/UNDOC/GEN'G95/146/22, 'PDFý'G9514622. pdf>. 
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72 It is ollow immediately on the i 1996 of particular note that such legislation did not f 
1982 Constitution but that it did follow in the aftermath of the events of Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989. The role of the criminal law is also of relevance and, for 
instance, by Article 251 of the Criminal Law, infringements of the right to freedom of 
religious belief are penalised. 73 
In 1991 the Chinese Government issued a White Paper on 'Human Rights in China'. 74 
The 1991 White Paper, containing statements of a political stance, essentially 
provides a historical resume of China's basic position and practice on human rights; it 
does not in and of itself grant human rights de novo to the populace. The Preface, for 
instance, states that 'The issue of human rights has become one of great significance 
and common concern in the world community' but goes on to state that 'the evolution 
of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by the historical, social, 
economic and cultural conditions of various nations, and involves a process of 
historical development'. A relativist stance is taken, and the document itself takes on 
the appearance of a defensive justification of the People's Republic to the outside 
world. The Preface further specifies that 'The various civic rights prescribed in the 
Constitution and other state laws are in accord with what people enjoy in real life. 
China's human rights legislation and policies are endorsed and supported by the 
people of all nationalities and social strata and by all the political parties, social 
organizations and all walks of life. ' The Preface finally refers to the long-tenn task of 
72 Adopted by the Eighth National People's Congress on 17 March 1996, effective from I October 
1996. Accessed at <http: //www. cecc. gov/pages/newLaws/adminPunishmentENG. php>, 9 June 2006. 
See generally, in this context, regarding the various laws and regulations aforementioned, Buhmann, 
note 68 above, 338-340. 
73 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 'White Paper: Freedom of 
Religious Belief in China' (2003) 36(3) Chinese Law and Government 7-20,12. Further, at 17: 'The 
Law of the People's Republic of China on National Regional Autonomy stipulates: "Organs of self- 
government in ethnic regional autonomous areas protect the right to freedom of religious belief of the 
citizens of all ethnic groups". ' 
" Published through the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China in 
November 1991, and available at <http: /ý'NN-NN, w. china. org. cn/e-white/ý7/index. htm>. 
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'the Chinese people and government to continue to promote human rights and strive 
for the noble goal of full implementation of human rights as required by China's 
socialism". Hence the aim of implementation of human rights in China is 
circumscribed by the requirements of the socialist state. 
The White Paper states that 'the most important of all human rights' is the 'right to 
subsistence', and 'to protect the people's right to subsistence and improve their living 
conditions remains an issue of paramount importance today'. 75 The White Paper 
moves on to illustrate that the Chinese people have gained extensive political rights, 76 
that they enjoy economic, cultural and social rights, 77 and freedom of religious 
belief. 78 There is guarantee of human rights in China's judicial work, showing that 
'China attaches great importance to human rights protection in the administration of 
7 80 justice" 9 and it is of interest that 'political prisoners do not exist in China'. Certain 
81 82 
guarantees are outlined: the right to work, the rights of the disabled, and the rights 
of the minority nationalities. 83 The last-mentioned is of relevance to Tibet, and the 
White Paper states: 'In New China the political rights of minority nationalities are 
ensured. ' 84 Further, 'Thanks to the democratic reform, the minority nationalities, 
oppressed for generations, obtained the freedom of person and human dignity, won 
basic human rights and for the first time became masters of their own destiny. ' 85 
Finally, the White Paper includes reference to Family Planning and Protection of 
75 199, White Paper on 'Human Rights in China', ibid: Part 1. 
76 Ibid: Part 11. 
77 Ibid: Part 111. 
78 Ibid: Part V1. 
79 Ibid: Part IV. 
80 Ibid: Part IV, section 4. See, however, in this context, section 5.4.1 below. 
81 Ibid: Part V. 
82 Ibid: Part IX 
83 Ibid: Part VII. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. While China has ethnic law to guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities, minorities must 
demonstrate political loyalty to the state: see Sautman B, 'Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: 
Progress and Constraints' ( 1999) 21(3) Law and Policy, 283-3 14,284. 
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Human Rights 86 and to Active participation 
Activities. 87 
in International Human Rights 
In September 1992 the Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China published a further White Paper entitled 'Tibet - Its Ownership 
88 
and Human Rights Situation'. Again, in the Preface, it is emphasised that the 
purpose of the document is to present 'the facts' to the world. It is a historical and 
political presentation -a document of social propaganda, not a document granting 
rights or signifying a change of policy. 89 The document was published subsequent to 
repression in Tibet in the late 1980s, and in Part One justifies China's historical 
claims to Tibet while at the same time commenting on the origins of 'so-called 
Tibetan independence' and the separatist activities of the Dalai Larna. 90 It emphasises 
that for 'more than 700 years the central government of China has continuously 
exercised sovereignty over Tibet' 91 and that Tibetan independence 'brooks no 
discussion'. 92 The integrity of the motherland and Chinese patriotism are stressed in 
the document: 'Historical facts over more than a century clearly demonstrate the so- 
called "Tibetan independence" was, in reality, cooked up by old and new imperialists 
out of their crave [sic] to wrest Tibet from China. ' 93 Part Two of the White Paper 
contains various sections, including those entitled 'The People Gain Personal 
86 199, White Paper on 'Human Rights in China', ibid: Part VIII. 87 lbid: Part X. See also section 5.3.3 below. 
88 Available at <http: //www. china. org. cn/e-white/tibet/index. htm>. 
89 The document is therefore of limited significance for this thesis, yet is indicative of the stance taken 
towards Tibet by the People's Republic. 
90 These activities include: publicly advocating that Tibet is an independent state; setting up the 
government in exile; reorganising the 'armed rebel forces'; and spreading 'rumors and calumnies and 
plotting riots': 'The Dalai's words and deeds have showed [sic] that he is no longer only a religious 
leader as he claims. On the contrary, he has become the political leader engaged in long-term divisive 
actions abroad' - 1992 White Paper, 'Tibet - Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation', Part One, 
section Ill. 
91 lbid: Part One, section 11. 
92 lbid: Part One, section III. 
93 1 bid: Part One, section 11. 
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Freedom' 1,94 'The People EnjoY Political Rights', 
95 'Economic Development and 
Improvement of Living Standards' '96 
'Freedom of Religious Belief, 97 and 
'Development of Education and Culture'. 98 
Apart from the significant White Papers mentioned, China issues annual White Papers 
delineating progress in China's human rights cause, for example in 2004 following 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 99 Again the purpose is 'To help the 
international community toward a better understanding of the human rights situation 
in China'. ' 00 If anything, all the White Papers referred to indicate a relativist stance to 
human rights from a political standpoint and it is thus of interest to note how the 
People's Republic interrelates with the international human rights regime. 
5.3.3 China and the International Human Rights Regime 
As the state has a distinct role as the controller and also the disseminator of power, 
and thus has the ability to extend rights, 101 and therefore to curtail and repress rights, 
it is instructive to consider how the People's Republic of China engages with the 
international human rights regime: how it perceives itself to be engaging and how 
others view its commitment. 
Both Confucianism and Chinese Marxism influence the Chinese doctrine of human 
rights. 102 Thus the collective interests of the family and society are placed above the 
94 lbid: Part Two, section V. 
95 lbid: Part Two, section VI. 
96 lbid: Part Two, section VII. 
97 lbid: Part Two, section VIII. 
98 lbid: Part Two, section IX 
99 See section 5.3.1 above in respect of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 
100 See China Daily, 'China publishes white paper on human rights progress' (2004) 
<http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/english/doc/2004-O' ) 130/content-319176. htm>, accessed 9 June 2006. 
101 Galbreath, note 3 above, 541. 
102 See sections 2.3.3 and 3.2.3 above. 
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interests of the individual. 103 Ultimately 'the stress of the interest of the state, society 
and nation over and above the rights of individuals has reflected the Marxist 
conviction that individual rights can only be fully realised within a strictly collective 
context'. 104 Yet, at the same time, it can be said that where the state is intolerant of 
opposition, i. e. where the state perceives that its own interest is paramount, that very 
factor may be 'inconsistent with traditional communal values'. 105 It is of import for 
individual and collective human rights within China that China engages with the 
international human rights regime, and indeed that there is reciprocal engagement. 
This need for reciprocity argues against a relativist approach to human rights, for 'the 
traditional culture advanced to justify cultural relativism far too often no longer 
exists'. 
106 
It should not be supposed that Confucianism is incompatible with human rights, 107 
and China has stated in the United Nations, in 2004, that 'Human rights norms ... 
must be the guiding principles for the establishment of a just international and social 
order'. 108 This comment was made by the Representative of China in the introduction 
to the draft resolution concerning the impacts of globalisation on human rights co- 
sponsored by China. 109 China also for instance stresses the importance of international 
co-operation in respect of the Rights of the Child and maintains that impediments to 
103 Weatherley RD, The Discourse of Human Rights in China: Historical and Ideological Perspectives 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997) 245. 
104 lbid 211. See also section 2.3.3 above. 
105 Yash Ghai, 'Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate' (1994) 15 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 1,5, quoted in Steiner and Alston, note I above, 550-552,552. 
106 Donnelly J, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1989) 119, quoted in Steiner and Alston, note I above, 552-553,553. 
107 Chan J, 'A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China' in JR Bauer and DA 
Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 212-237,237. 
108 Qiang Chen, 'Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2004(11)' (2005) 4(2) Chinese Journal 
of International Law 607-645,625, see also Summary Record of the 51st Meeting of the CHR, 
E/CN. 4/2004/SR. 51 (16 April 2004) 21, paras 114-115. 
109 E/CN. 4/2004/L. 35. 
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the full attainment of women's equality should be eliminated. 110 At the same time, 
China believes there is an imbalance between economic, social and cultural rights, on 
the one hand, and civil and political rights, on the other. The People's Republic takes 
the view that greater priority should be given to the former than currently is the 
case. 111 As to civil and political rights, these are said to be 'linked closely to 
economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, and that their 
realization would be a gradual process that required resources and capacity- 
building'. 112 
China thus engages with the international community in respect of human rights 
matters, yet has still to ratify the ICCPR. Paragraph 9 of the Joint Statement of the 7th 
China-EU Summit, held in The Hague on 8 December 2004, can be seen to have 
relevance in this regard: 
The Leaders believed that the China-EU human rights dialogue promoted 
mutual understanding and agreed to continue this dialogue, while making 
efforts to achieve more meaningful and positive results on the ground, as well 
as the related bilateral cooperation programme. They underlined their respect 
for international human rights standards provided for in relevant human rights 
instruments, including on the rights of minorities, and their commitment to co- 
operate with UN human rights mechanisms. In this respect, China is 
committed to the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) as soon as possible.... The Leaders underlined the 
importance of concrete steps in the field of human rights and reaffirmed their 
'10 Qiang Chen, note 108 above, 626-627. 
111 lbid 624; see also Summary Record of the 26th Meeting of the CHR, E/CN. 4/2005/SR. 26 (30 
March 2005) 17, paras 85-86. 
112 lbid 623. 
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commitment to further enhance co-operation and exchanges in this field on the 
basis of equality and mutual respect. 113 
China is not then a state on the periphery of the human rights debate, and it clearly 
plays its part in the work of international agencies, 114 engaging in an international 
dialogue. This though does not mean there is agreement that China complies within its 
borders with human rights norms. Criticism comes from numerous sources, for 
example from other states, such as the USA, and from NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. 1 15 The USA has designated China as 'a 
country of particular concern' under the International Religious Freedom Act, and has 
for example stated that Tibetans experience societal discrimination. ' 16 This is despite 
the fact that China's ethnic law emphasises the rights of minorities. 117 
Consequently, having reviewed the integration of human rights into Chinese policy 
and noted engagement of the People's Republic of China in the international human 
113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Joint Statement of the 7th China-EU 
Summit' (2004) 
<http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/wjdt/2649/tl74512. htm>, accessed 29 March 2006. The EU in the 8th 
EU-China Summit in September 2005 'welcomed China's commitment to ratifying the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as soon as possible': European Commission, 'Joint 
Statement of the 8thEU-China Summit' (2005) 
<http: //ec. europa. eu/comm/extemal - 
relations/news/barroso/sp05 - 
478. htm>, accessed 7 August 2006, 
at para. 10. One of the stated aims of the EU's China policy is 'to support China's transition to an open 
society based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights': European Commission, 'The EU's 
China Policy' (2007) 
<http: //ec. europa. eu/extemal - 
relations/china/intro/index. htm>, accessed 14 September 2007; concern 
about human rights has been a major theme in EU-China relations since the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown in June 1989. 
Qiang Chen, note 108 above, 628. 
See section 5.4 below. The reporting of the two NGOs mentioned can be accessed at, respectively, 
<www. amnesty. org> and <www. hrw. org>. 
116 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U. S. Department of State, 'International 
Religious Freedom Report on Mainland China' [7 October 2002 Report] (2003) 36(3) Chinese Law 
and Government 21-48,38-39. What may be termed 'civilising influences' may lead to injustice - 
'Benevolent domination may be quite as oppressive as self-interested exploitation': Freeman, note 30 
above, 5 1. 117 Sautman, note 85 above, 286. 
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rights regime, ' 18 it is appropriate to examine the human rights situation as it has 
pertained in Chinese Tibet. This will make visible whether mere lip-service is paid by 
the People's Republic to rights that it in turn has granted, and whether such rights are 
simply emphasised for political rather than practical, meritorious ends. The situation 
can most effectively be explained by reference to abuses that have been perpetrated 
by organs of the state over the Tibetan people. Although the concern of the thesis is 
centrally with collective rights, it is through the violation of individual human rights 
that concern may be manifested, and it is through violation of such individual rights 
that group rights may ultimately be asserted. ' 19 
5.4 Oppression in Tibet 
Chinese oppression over the Tibetan people has taken place in four vital spheres of 
Tibetan life: the political, the cultural-ideological, economic, and social. 120 In an 
attempt to illuminate a pattern of abuse in respect of individual rights these will now 
be considered in turn, in the context, first, of civil and political rights, and second in 
the context of economic, social and cultural rights. The litany is discernible from the 
time of the advance of the People's Liberation Army into Tibet in 1950, and perhaps 
reached a peak during the Cultural Revolution, 12 1 but nevertheless continues down to 
the present day. All these instances of human rights abuse should be seen against a 
118 Although it has been argued that the engagement of China in the international human rights regime 
has not been entirely beneficial and that, for example, moves by the People's Republic to question the 
impartiality of the UN Commission on Human Rights 'represent an attempt to undercut the legitimacy 
of the body and to cast it as a tool of the developed West': Foot, note 39 above, 270. 
119 Hannum H, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Seýf-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 117. 
120 Dawa Norbu, China's Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001) 386. 
12 1 The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 and continued until 1976. Abuses in China during this 
period were not confined to Tibet, and the Cultural Revolution 'constituted a strong attack on 
established institutions and patterns, including the legal system ... [it] has been described as a period 
of legal nihilism and led to a time of relative isolation of the PRC from international society': 
Buhmann, note 68 above, 193. It also led to considerable criticism of human rights in, and of arbitrary 
rule of the state in, the People's Republic: see ibid 243. 
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backdrop of the three United Nations General Assembly Resolutions expressing 
concern for fundamental rights and freedoms in Tibet and an end to practices 
depriving the Tibetan people of those rights and freedoms. 122 
5.4.1 Civil and Political Rights 
Human rights are inevitably interwoven with the political process. It has been said 
that 'Basic to a constitution are human rights, which define the relationship between 
government and society', and further that human rights in the form of civil and 
political rights 'define our rights against the government to protect us from abuse of 
123 
power% and at the same time 'ensuring the transparency of government'. Thus 
human rights operate as a control on the government, but equally government may 
operate as a control on and an abuse of the human rights of its people. As was seen in 
Chapter 3 above, the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951 provided that the existing 
political system of Tibet would not be altered and that the functions, status and power 
of the Dalai Lama were to remain the same. 124 However, within months of the 
Agreement there was evidence of interference when the two Tibetan co-prime 
ministers were ousted, and as the years progressed the authority of the Dalai Lama 
was undermined. 
125 
While political Tibet has the status of an autonomous region, the people enjoy no 
meaningful autonomy, and minority cultures within the People's Republic 'have been 
122 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV) in 1959,1723 (XVI) in 1961 and 2079 
(XX) in 1965. See section 3.4.3 above generally. It may be noted that these resolutions took place 
before the People's Republic was seated at the United Nations in October 197 1. 
123 Plunk RL, The Wandering Peacemaker (Charlottesville, VA: Hampton Roads Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2000) 43. See also note 37 above regarding interpretation of China's constitutions, 
12' Article 4 of the Agreement; see section 3.3.2 above. 
125 See section 3.4 above. 
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126 
caught up in the political upheavals in the country at large in recent decades' . These 
upheavals include, for example, the Cultural Revolution and the pro-democracy 
suppression of 1989. Throughout the period since 1950 the Chinese Government has, 
on a systematic basis, suppressed independent political activities within Tibet, initially 
through the use of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and later through effective direct 
authority under the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet, 
which erased the last residue of Tibet self-rule. 
127 
A lack of political freedom in Tibet is apparent; 87,000 were killed in the suppression 
of the 1959 rebellion,, and in 1989 there was again repression, including the 
imposition of martial law. 128 Dissenting views on the sovereignty of Tibet were 
suppressed. 129 Oppression continues and, for example, in its World Report of 2001, 
Human Rights Watch commented that 'Chinese authorities continued to suppress 
suspected "splittist" activities in Tibet and exert control over religious institutions. 
Officials embarked simultaneously on campaigns to vilify the Dalai Lama and to 
convince the international community that Chinese policies in Tibet had ensured 
economic well-being and respect for human rights. ' 130 
126 Hannum, note 119 above, 426. 
127 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 241. See also section 3.4.1 above in this regard. 
12' Cao Changching, 'Independence: The Tibetan People's Right' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour 
(eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination (An-nonk, New York, and 
London: ME Sharpe, 1998) 3-23,12. 
12913ing Zilin and Jiang Peikun, 'Tibetans' Rights and Chinese Intellectuals' Responsibility' in Cao 
Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self- 
Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1998) 31-35,33. 
130 Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2001: China and Tibet: Human Rights Developments' (2001) 
6 
<http: //www. hrw. org/wr2kl/asia/china. html>, accessed 14 June 2006. Suspected separatists - splittists 
- continue to be imprisoned: see Human Rights Watch, World Report 2006 (Human Rights Watch, 
2006) 25 1. Splittism 'flaunts the flag of religion and nationalism, dividing the country': Barnett R, 
'Beyond the Collaborator - Martyr Model: Strategies of Compliance, Opportunism, and Opposition 
Within Tibet' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and 
Societ. y in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 25-66,43, quoting from a leftist 
attack, in the Party newspaper in Tibet in August 1989, on proponents of liberalisation policies in the 
TAR. The oppression in Tibet has been referred to as 'something not far from genocide': Gray J, Black 
Mass. - 4pocaýi; ptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Allen Lane, 2007) 169. 
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In Tibet it is impossible to separate the political from the religious. Buddhism is the 
central force of both in Tibet. 131 Consequently when considering the political 
oppression in Tibet it is essential to note religious oppression, which has been the 
hallmark of Chinese dominance over Tibet. While the Dalai Lama remained in Tibet 
and a part of 'the establishment' the Chinese Govemment could claim some 
legitimacy for their policies in Tibet, and the presence of the Dalai Lama could be 
seen as a protection for the Buddhist religion in Tibet under Chinese rule. However, 
once the Dalai Lama left Tibet in 1959 that protection disappeared and religious 
oppression escalated. Monasteries were destroyed, both Buddhist and Bbn-Po, 132 the 
economic power base of the monasteries was eroded, and the long-term aim of the 
People's Republic is seen as the eradication of the monkhood as a social group. 1 33 
Monasteries were ransacked, taxes were imposed on monasteries, and monks were 
singled out for thamzing, abused and imprisoned. 134 
During the Cultural Revolution oppression of religion in Tibet reached its zenith and 
the practice of religion was outlawed. Monks suffered torture and destruction of the 
monasteries continued. 135 In addition there was widespread destruction of religious 
artefacts - not only in monasteries but also in the home. In 1959, Tibet had contained 
more than 600,000 monks, 4,000 incarnate lamas, and 6,524 monasteries, 136 but by 
131 In Tibet there is a 'duality of politics and religion': Ardley J, The Tibetan Independence Movement: 
Political, religious and Gandhian perspectives (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) 11. 
Also, for Tibetans, religious freedom equals political freedom: Ding Zilin and Jiang Peikun, note 129 
above, 34. Indeed it is arguable that in a pre-political era religion gives legitimacy to power: Dawa 
Norbu, note 120 above, 129. It is, in addition, worth noting that 'The exile political system integrates 
political institutions and Buddhism': He Baogang and Sautman B, 'The Politics of the Dalai Lama's 
New Initiative for Autonomy' (2005) 78(4) Pacific Affairs 601-629,622. 
132 The early religion of Tibet: see Ardley, note 131 above, 10. 
133 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 254,267. 
134 See, for instance, the vivid account in Avedon JF, In Exileftom the Land of Snows: The Dalai Lama 
and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994, reissued 1997) 230-232; 
also for example at 92 and 221-222. For an explanation of thamzing see section 3.4.3 above. 
1`5Avedon, ibid, 288-293; Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 317. 
136 Avedon, ibid, 92. 
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the end of the Cultural Revolution only thirteen monasteries in Tibet had escaped 
destruction. 137 
After the Cultural Revolution ended the more liberal policy of Deng Xiaoping was in 
ascendancy, and China sought a more conciliatory approach in Tibet. 138 There was an 
easing of restrictions, a certain tolerance of demands for greater religious freedom and 
reconstruction of monasteries. 139 Nevertheless religious institutions remain controlled. 
For example: 
In December 1999, one of the most senior religious figures in Tibetan 
Buddhism, the then fourteen-year-old Karmapa, fled Tibet for India. In the 
wake of his escape, authorities moved his parents out of Lhasa ... ; 
detained 
several people at Tsurphu, the Karmapa's monastery; and replaced some 
monks. The same week as the escape, Chinese authorities announced their 
recognition of another high-ranking figure, the two-year-old 7th Reting 
Rinpoche, thereby once again asserting a government role in the selection and 
installation of Tibetan religious figures. In May, authorities detained eight 
Reting monks who protested the choice. ' 40 
137 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 322 and 512 note 24. By 1965,80% of the monasteries had been 
destroyed, and 'By the beginning of 1970, all the monasteries and temples had been vandalised by the 
Red Guards and left to ruin': ibid 348. The destruction was effectively a destruction of 'Tibet's 
separate identity', obliterating 'Tibetan distinctive characteristics': at 322 and 349. 138 lbid 37 1. 
139 lbid 402-, noting the Monlem prayer ceremony was allowed in Lhasa in 1986 for the first time in two 
decades; also, Barnett, note 130 above, 37. Wang Lixiong refers to restoration of temples and the fact 
that by the early 1990s there was little interference in religious practice of the laity: Wang Lixiong, 
'Reflections on Tibet' (2002) 14 New Left Review, March-April, 78-111,105. 
140 Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2001', note 130 above, 6. The present Panchen Lama, second 
in hierarchical status only to the Dalai Lama, is a direct choice of the Chinese authorities, the 
incarnation proclaimed by the Dalai Lama on 14 May 1995 having been abducted by the Chinese 
authorities. There is still no information as to the whereabouts of the latter incarnation: Tibetan Centre 
for Human Rights and Democracy, 'I I years on! The II th Panchen Lama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, 
still remain disappeared [sic]', Press Statement 24 April 2006 (2006) 
<http: //wNvN%,. tchrd. org/press/2006/ps2OO6O424. html>, accessed 16 June 2006. 
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Further detention of monks and nuns 'for their peaceful pro-independence activities' 
continued into the present century. 
141 
While the Chinese Constitution provides for freedom of religious belief, 142 tight 
controls on religious practices remain. Many traditional religious practices are 
permitted, yet the authorities 'promptly and forcibly suppress those activities viewed 
as vehicles for political dissent'. 143 Consequently religious repression continues in 
Tibet. Monks and nuns are subjected to imprisonment and there are reports of deaths 
of religious prisoners and also abuse and torture of those who are accused of political 
activism. 
144 
Human rights in this context include those in respect of freedom of speech and 
assembly. Again there are instances of abuse of these in Tibet, and they are reported 
on an ongoing basis. 145 The Annual Report 2005 of the Tibetan Centre for Human 
14 1 Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2001', note 130 above, 7. 
142 Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution. 
143 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, note 116 above, 40. In its World Report 2006, 
Human Rights Watch referred to the Chinese Regulation on Religious Affairs, effective in March 2005, 
codifying religious policy in effect since 1982: 'particularly troublesome [is] ... a requirement that 
religious bodies "safeguard unification of the country, unity of all nationalities, and stability of 
society. " This last requirement is vague enough to give the state control of any and all religious 
teachings and is rigorously enforced in the Tibet Autonomous Region': Human Rights Watch, World 
Report 2006, note 130 above, 248. 
144 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, note 116 above, 40 and 45-47 for examples. 
The purpose of this thesis is not to delve into the minutiae of human rights abuses, rather in that 
connection to demonstrate their existence. Early findings of Chinese abuse of Tibetan human rights are 
outlined, for example, in International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet and Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization (ICLT and UNPO), The Case Concerning Tiber Tibet's Sovereignty and the 
Tibetan People's Right to Seýf-Determination (New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary & Policy Research 
Centre, 2000) 59ff. Recent instances of persecution by the state in Tibet in the religious and political 
context include those reported at Human Rights Watch, 'Trials of a Tibetan Monk: The Case of Tenzin 
Delek' (2004) 16(l)(C) (February) Human Rights Watch 1-106, regarding particularly the arrest, 
treatment and sentence to death of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, the violation of his rights, and the violation 
of rights and execution of Lobsang Dondrup on 26 January 2003; and those reported on the FreeTibet 
website, for example the detention and torture of Phuntsog Wangdu: Free Tibet Campaign, 'Phuntsok 
Wangdu: Urgent Campaign - 22 July 2005' (2005) 
<http: //www. freetibet. org/campaigns/phuntsokwangdu220705. html>, accessed 16 June 2006. 
"' See for instance the Free Tibet Campaign regarding the arrest of five monks and nuns 'for 
involvement in the distribution and pasting of a protest letter' calling, for example, for the 
independence of Tibet and for the Chinese authorities to enter into negotiations: Free Tibet Campaign, 
'Urgent Campaign - 30 January 2006: Five monks and nuns arrested for displaying Dalai Lama poster' 
(2006) 
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Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) focuses on five spheres of rights' violation in Tibet, 
including civil and political liberties and religion, 146 and at the end of 2005 TCHRD 
documented '20 known arrests of Tibetans during the year for simply calling for 
freedom in Tibet and for showing allegiance to the Dalai Lama', i. e. for their political 
belief . S. 147 There is a focus on 'striking hard against Tibetan freedom activists and 
intensification of "patriotic re-education" campaign in monastic institutions in 
Tibet'. 148 'The use of detention, arrest, and torture of large numbers of Tibetans 
continues to be an integral part of China's effort to suppress opposition to Chinese 
rule in Tibet', 149 and, at the 56th UN Commission on Human Rights in 2000, the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture's report referred to individual cases within Tibet, 
including instances of detentions, severe beatings and 'brutal' interrogations. ' 50 
Accordingly a pattern of human rights abuse is evident in Tibet in the sphere of civil 
and political rights. It is apparent and ongoing, as reported to the current date. While 
the ICCPR has yet to be ratified by the People's Republic of China, this is not the case 
with the ICESCR. 
<http: //www. freetibet. org/campaigns/Iabrang300106. htm1>, accessed 16 June 2006. Amnesty 
International 'has said that the Chinese authorities continued to severely restrict the freedom of 
religion, expression and association of the Tibetan people during 2005': International Campaign for 
Tibet, 'Amnesty International Says Arbitrary Arrests and Unfair Trials Continue in Tibet' (2006) 
<http: //savetibet. org/news/newsitem. php? id=980>, accessed 16 June 2006. 
146 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Human Rights in Tibet. - Annual Report 2005 
(Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 2005). 
"' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 'Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual 
Report 2005', Press Release 21 February 2006 (2006) 
<http: //www. tchrd. org/press/2006/pr2OO6O221. html>, accessed 16 June 2006. See also TCHRD, note 
146 above, 7. 
148 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 'People's Republic of China high on renewing 
campaigns against peaceful Tibetan dissidents', Press Release 17 May 2006 (2006) 
<http: //www. tchrd. org/press/2006/pr2OO6O5l7. html>, accessed 16 June 2006. 
149 International Campaign for Tibet, 'Tibetan Prisoners of Conscience' (2006) 
<http: //www. savetibet. org/news/positionpapers/prisonsersofconscience. php>, accessed 16 June 2006. 
"0 Government of Tibet in Exile (The), 'Sir Nigel Rodley, the Special Rapporteur on Torture's report' 
(2000) 
<http: //www. tibet. com/I-JNHRC/tb- I 4. html>, accessed 16 June 2006. 
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5.4.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
It is pertinent to commence this section with reference to the 2001 White Paper 
151 
entitled 'Tibet's March Toward Modernization'. Part I of the White Paper outlines 
the rapid social development in Tibet from its previous level since 1950, particularly 
since the democratic reform of the Tibetan social system in 1959, and sums up as 
follows: 'the development history of Tibet in the past five decades since its peaceful 
liberation has been one of proceeding from darkness to brightness, from 
backwardness to progress, from poverty to prosperity and from isolation to openness, 
and of the region marching toward modernization as a part of the big family of 
China'. 
Part 11 of the White Paper deals with Tibet's modemisation achievements and outlines 
the significant progress the economy is said to have made. It refers to the growth of 
modem industry, the thriving of basic industries, such as energy and transportation, 
and the flourishing of trade and commerce, in addition to the rapid progress in 
education, science and technology, and medical and health care. The traditional 
Tibetan culture is said to have been 'explored, protected and developed' and the 
freedom of religious belief and traditional customs of the Tibetan people 'have been 
152 
respected and protected' . In sum, the quality of 
life of Tibetans has greatly 
151 Issued by the Information Office of the State Council on 8 November 2001. Accessible at 
<http: //www. china. org. cn/e-white/20011108/index. htm>. The document forms political propaganda for 
a foreign audience and is not intended as a harbinger of new legislation. The tenor of the document is 
made clear in the concluding words of the Foreword to the White Paper: 'This year is the 50th 
anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet. Looking back on the course of modernization since its 
peaceful liberation, publicizing the achievements in modernization made by the people of all ethnic 
groups in Tibet through their hard work and with the support of the Central Government and the whole 
nation, and revealing the law of development of Tibet's modernization - these will contribute not only 
to accelerating the healthy development of Tibet's modernization but also to clearing up various 
misunderstandings on the "Tibet issue" in the international community and promoting overall 
understanding of the past and present situations in Tibet. ' 
152 This though is a protection and development not by the people whose culture is in point, the 
Tibetans, but by Han Chinese government elites. See, in this context, Freeman, note 30 above, 48, 
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improved: 'it is beyond doubt that the development of Tibet in the past half century 
has greatly changed its former poor and backward features, and laid a solid foundation 
for realizing a leapfrog development in its modernization drive'. 153 
Part III of the White Paper specifically raises the political and postulates that 'The 
modernization drive of Tibet has been forging ahead consistently during the 
protracted struggle against the Dalai Lama clique and international hostile forces'. 154 
Thus this section of the thesis aims to clarify whether the life of Tibetans has greatly 
improved in the last half-century - whether the 'forging ahead' has in fact benefited 
Tibetans. 
From an economic point of view, the influx of Han Chinese into Tibet during the 
period in question is of significance. Since 1984 Han Chinese have been free to enter 
Tibet for purposes of business and trade and there has been significant population 
transfer as a result, particularly resulting from a migration surge in the mid-1990s. 
There is now a flourishing Chinese community within Tibet, which dominates the 
Tibetan economy, although at the same time it must be said that a skilled workforce 
was needed as a result of a lack of skills among Tibetans themselves. ' 55 This has led 
to a dominance of Han Chinese in both the business and economic spheres. They have 
provided the entrepreneurship and have reaped the rewards within a developing 
economy. This raises various issues: the right to work, 156 and whether Tibetans suffer 
detriment in this regard bearing in mind the influx of Han Chinese; questions of 
where the author gives the example of Chinese Communist elites being culturally distinct from the 
Tibetans whom they govern, and also 53, where the point is made that the instrument of the state may 
be used 'for the oppression and destruction of cultures'. 153 'Tibet's March Toward Modernization', note 151 above, Part IL 
15' Emphasis added. 
155 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 94,395,404-405,438. See section 4.4.2.1 above regarding Han 
migration into both the TAR and ethnographic Tibet as a whole. 
1-56 See Article 42 of the 1982 Constitution (as amended), and also Article 6 of the ICESCR. 
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education, 157 for instance whether the education system has held back Tibetans within 
their own territory, thus making it more difficult for them to find well-paid work, or 
indeed work at all; and issues as to whether the migration influx has adversely 
impacted on Tibetans' standard of living or way of life. 
These issues are of significance because an objective of the People's Republic of 
China has been to promote social reforms and bring Tibet within the ambit of the 
social system of China, which in turn is associated with the stress given by the 
People's Republic to collective rights over and above individual rights. 158 Further, in 
recent years particularly China has sacrificed economic, social and cultural rights to 
market-driven growth, and thus the state's commitment to such rights is open to 
question. 
159 The economic disparity that has opened up in Tibet 
160 is on the face of 
matters detrimental to Tibetans when compared to Han Chinese, and this disparity is 
linked with the availability of work to individuals, and the type of work available to 
them. 
Without emphasis on education, the economic situation is not going to improve for 
Tibetans, many of whom live in more rural areas which suffer greater impoverishment 
than urban areas, and the majority of whom are in less well paid occupation than the 
Han migrants. 161 Prior to 1950 education was the responsibility principally of the 
"' See Article 46 of the 1982 Constitution; also Article 26 of the UDHR and Article 13 of the ICESCR. 
158 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 93 and 435, and in turn to the strengthening of the state: see, for 
example, Kent A, Between Freedom and Subsistence. - China and Human Rights (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 38. 
159 Bauer and Bell, note 16 above, 7. 
160 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 446-447. It is though perhaps of relevance that Tibet has been 
chronically dependent on Chinese subsidy - 95%, for instance, in 1983: ibid 392. 
16 1 Despite this, thouc" h, there is the emergence of a new social class of rich Tibetans: Yan Jiaqi, 
'Federalism and the Future of Tibet' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet Through 
Dissident Chinese Eyes. - Essays on Self-Determination (An-nonk, New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 
1998) 107-120,114. 
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monasteries,, 1 62 and by attacking and destroying the monasteries the People's Republic 
attacked and destroyed the educational base of the Tibetans. John Avedon reports that, 
from 1970 onwards, the children of Han settlers 'attended special schools, while 
Tibetan schools were virtually nonexistent'. 163 The Tibetan language was not studied 
in schools, and this created social and employment disadvantages: Chinese language 
thus dominated spheres of business and also governance. The failure to educate 
Tibetans left them at significant disadvantage accordingly. 164 
However, the 1997 Report, 'The Next Generation', found that it was 'undeniable that 
the People's Republic of China has improved the public school facilities in Tibet in 
recent years'. 165 Nevertheless the Report made the point that the school facilities were 
mainly constructed to benefit the children of the Han settlers, and the majority of 
schools had therefore been built in urban areas. The Conclusion further pointed out 
that approximately one-third of school age children in Tibet received no education 
whatsoever, and that even primary school education was not free. 166 There were 
violations of international conventions concerning access to education, fonn of 
162 See, for example, the 1997 Report of the Government of Tibet in Exile entitled 'The Next 
Generation - The state of education in Tibet today' (hereafter 'The Next Generation'), accessed at 
<http: //www. tibet. com/HumanrightsýEduToday/intro. htm1>, 23 June 2006, Chapter 2: 'In independent 
Tibet [i. e. prior to the 1950 invasion/liberation] over 6000 monasteries and nunneries served as Tibet's 
educational institutes in addition to lay schools. ' 
16' Avedon, note 134 above, 316. At the same place he also comments: 'Closed during spring and 
autumn so that the children could help with the field work, those few students who could attend - their 
parents not requiring the extra work points earned from their labor - were often marshaled during the 
rest of the year to undertake road repair, cut grass, collect manure and exten-ninate birds and insects. 
The only topics covered were the Chinese language, Marxist doctrine and mathematics. ' 
164 Note though that thousands of Tibetan children were sent (not in all cases with the willing 
agreement of their parents) to China to be educated. The intent was to train them for leadership within 
Tibet: Avedon, note 134 above, 73 and 269-27 1. It is arguably from these children that the 'new social 
class of rich Tibetans' has emerged: see note 161 above. 
165 Conclusion to 'The Next Generation', note 162 above, in Chapter 7 thereof. 
166 Completion of a full course of primary schooling is one of the eight Millennium Goals of the United 
Nations: <http: //www. un. org/millenniumgoals/>, accessed 23 June 2006. In the People's Republic as a 
whole, in 2004 it was said that 'the national net enrollment rate in elementary schools is 98.58 percent': 
People's Daily Online, 'Overview' (2004) 
<http: //engiish. people. com. cn/data/China_in_brief/Education/Overview. html>, accessed 7 August 
2006. 
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education, and content of education. 167 The main teaching language continued to be 
Chinese, and thus Tibetan children remained unfavourably circumstanced in relation 
to their Chinese counterparts from the outset, leading to a high failure rate. 168 This 
failure rate is then reflected in work and economic prospects, leading to a continued 
underclass of Tibetans within Tibet. 
Education in turn is linked to culture. In this context students have reported 'that the 
right to freedom of religion and thought in public schools in Tibet is repressed 
through a variety of methods'. 169 Chapter 5 of the 1997 Report refers to the fact that 
'Tibetan children attending Chinese schools received almost no education about their 
cultural heritage'. 170 Thus in Chapter 7 the Report concludes: 'this report indicates 
that Chinese- sponsored "education development" in Tibet not only fails to benefit the 
Tibetans themselves, it is also being used as a political tool to strip Tibetans of their 
cultural rights and dignity'. 17 1 Language is of itself a means of control, 172 and absolute 
167 See Chapters 3-5 of 'The Next Generation'. 
16' Article 27 of the ICCPR has relevance in this regard: 'In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language' (emphasis added). This is a right conferred upon 
individuals and not a collective right. 
169 See section Fii of Chapter 4 of the 1997 Report, where examples are shown. 
170 See section A. This despite Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution and also Article 29(l) of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, whereby the 'States Parties agree that the education of the child 
shall be directed to: ... (c) the 
development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural 
identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the 
country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own' 
(emphasis added). This convention was ratified by the People's Republic on 2 March 1992. See also 
UNGA Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted without a vote, Article I providing 
that 'States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, religious and linguistic identity of 
minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that 
identity. ' 
17 1 Attacks on Tibetan culture and identity are also reported in, for example, Tsering Shakya, note 35 
above, 333, although the People's Republic takes the view that minorities need Han Chinese for their 
cultural advancement: Sautman, note 85 above, 292. In any event, the Tibetan culture has proved to be 
resilient in the face of attack: Fang Lizhi, 'Tibetan, Chinese, and Human Rights' in Cao Changching 
and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eýves: Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, 
New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 1998) 37-40,37. 
172 Tsering Shakya, note 35 above, 407. 
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control of the media by the People's Republic of China in Tibet buttresses this control 
and disseminates the agenda of the Party. 173 
Albeit the economy of Tibet has developed over the last half-century it appears that 
the greatest beneficiaries of this improvement have been Han Chinese, rather than 
Tibetans themselves. Tibetans may have greater economic opportunities, but these are 
likely to be of a menial nature, and they are hampered by the educational system that 
has evolved. Their economic rights are limited and their social and cultural rights 
denigrated. Thus it can be said that 'human rights in socialist systems are seen as 
determined by the state and as having no autonomous existence'. 174 It is evident that 
in Tibet cultural pursuits are tied in with religion, and thus cultural rights with civil 
and political rights. While the ICESCR has been ratified by China, it is apparently not 
complied with, particularly in the case of minorities in the People's Republic and in 
the case of the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
5.5 Human Rights as a Challenge to Sovereignty 
It is clear from the above that there have been abuses of international conceptions of 
human rights within Tibet, and also that the People's Republic does not abide by what 
may be termed 'human rights norms'. These abuses, in respect of civil and political 
rights, include suppression of independent political activities and a lack of political 
freedom, religious oppression and abuse of freedom of speech and assembly. 175 
Abuses in the sphere of economic, social and cultural rights include those relating to 
173 Cao Changching, 'Brainwashing the Chinese' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet 
Through Dissident Chinese Eýves. - Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME 
Sharpe, 1998) 25-30,25. See also section 4.3 above re the question of China being able to exert control 
over the content of the Internet. 
"' Kent, note 158 above, 13. 
175 See section 5.4.1 above. 
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education, the Tibetan language and also economic disadvantage. 176 It should be 
emphasised that mandatory provisions in the rules of international law concerning the 
universal protection of human rights 4constitute intransgressible principles of 
international customary law'. 177 The protection of fundamental rights of the human 
person is presupposed in the Charter of the United Nations: 'it is apparent from 
Chapter I of the Charter ... that one of the purposes of the 
United Nations is to 
encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms'. 178 Thus these 
international rights and freedoms need to be respected by member countries of the 
United Nations in any event. 
Two issues then appear pertinent. The first is whether there is such a thing as 
universality of human rights or whether human rights are dependent on cultural 
context, thus having a relative character. This question of universality and relativism 
has already been considered, 179 and China's interpretation of rights can be gauged 
from the 1982 Constitution. 180 These constitutional rights will themselves prove to be 
subject to interpretation by the Chinese Government, by reference to the politics 
dominant in the People's Republic rather than by reference to international covenants, 
particularly to covenants not ratified by the People's Republic. ' 81 Relativism 
consequently becomes not so much cultural as political, as does any question of 
universality of human rights. 
176 See section 5.4.2 above. 
177 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, para. 23 1, 
referring in turn to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 1996,226, para. 79, accessible at 
<http: //www. icj-cij. org/docket/files/95/7495. pdf>. 
178 Kadi, ibid, para. 228. 179 See section 5.2 above. 
180 The rights therein have been referred to above in section 5.3.1. 
181 The ICCPR is of course one such international covenant. Ratification of the ICCPR would be an 
impediment to free interpretation by the People's Republic of its Constitution, and a fetter on the 
Government's freedom to act in the political context. 
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In this political context, the second pertinent issue is whether the human rights 
situation in Tibet is changing. White Papers issued by the Information Office of the 
State Council continue to defend China's position in Tibet, showing the sensitivity of 
the state to external criticism, and yet arguably China is merely 'playing a tactical 
game designed to deflect Western threats to its regime . 
182 China's position is that 
human rights in Tibet have improved, and that 'The Central Government and local 
governments at all levels in the Tibet Autonomous Region have made great efforts to 
safeguard and promote the progress of human rights in Tibet. ' 183 
Some evidence of an improving situation exists. For example: 'In 1987, a provisional 
law to make Tibetan an official language of the TAR was enacted, including a 
provision requiring officials there to learn Tibetan. Similar regulations have been 
promulgated in other PRC Tibetan areas, yet in the main, they have not been 
implemented. It is not yet clear whether the permanent TAR language law, passed in 
2002, will meet with the same disregard. ' 184 In addition there is a greater openness 
now to Tibet, enabling access to those of non-Chinese origin. ' 85 Invitations such as 
182 Dunne T and Wheeler NJ, 'Introduction: human rights and the fifty years' crisis' in T Dunne and NJ 
Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1-28, 
15. 
183 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 'New Progress in Human 
Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region' White Paper published in Beijing, February 1998, Concluding 
Remarks, accessible at <http: //www. china. org. cn/e-white/last/index. htm>. The White Paper considers 
particularly the ethnic regional autonomy system and the people's political rights, economic 
development and the people's rights to existence and development, rights to education, culture and 
health protection, and the right to freedom of religious belief. 
184 He Baogang and Sautman, note 131 above, 627-628, footnotes omitted. In addition some Han 
officials serving in Tibet are being trained in the Tibetan language. Progress in this respect is therefore 
evident, although apparently patchy. The 1987 law has to all intents and purposes been withdrawn: 
Barnett, note 130 above, 45. See, in the context of international obligations, UNGA Resolution 47/135 
of 18 December 1992, note 170 above. 
185 For example, in September 1998, Mary Robinson, then UN Human Rights Commissioner, visited 
China and Tibet at the invitation of the Chinese Government: Ming Wan, note 29 above, 125. 
However, the Commissioner met with no political prisoners or dissidents. Concerns regarding ongoing 
human rights abuses at that time were expressed, for instance, by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 
and Democracy, 'Human Rights Update and Archives, 15 September 1998' (1998) 
<http: //www. tchrd. org/publications/hr - updates/1998/hrl9980915. 
html>, accessed 27 June 2006, at 3-4. 
The same article reported the expulsion of more than 100 monks from Tashi Choeling Monastery in 
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those issued to the UN Human Rights commissioner may indicate that the Chinese 
Government believe there is an improving situation in Tibet. ' 86 Equally an increasing 
number of visits will expose Tibetans, and also Han Chinese, to the operation of 
international human rights organisations. 
The People's Republic has found in the recent past that its human rights record can 
have economic and political costs. For instance, following the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident, both the United States and France agreed to sell military equipment 
and weaponry to Taiwan, and the issue of Tibet was internationalised further as 
European Governments met with the Dalai Lama. 1 87 The return of Taiwan to the 
motherland is of particular importance to the People's Republic, and it is in such 
political contexts that pressure can be put on the Chinese Government if the 
international community has the Will. 
188 
Despite improvements that have taken place in Tibet, some of which may reflect 
general improvements in economic conditions due to the rapidly expanding Chinese 
economy, international organisations continue to express concern regarding human 
rights in Tibet. 189 It is clear that there have been abuses in Tibet, and that China does 
not fully abide by the rights nonns referred to in its own 1982 Constitution, let alone 
the norms of the international human rights regime. In spite of the supposed 
universality of human rights such rights are not universally applied. In this respect the 
Amdo (at 2). It was noted that the monastery was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and 
subsequently renovated in 1980. 186 For example with regard to rebuilding of monasteries. 187 Ming Wan, note 29 above, 69. 
188 This will generally has proved to be lacking, and other political interests and factors come into play. 
For instance, in 1990 the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities 'did not introduce a resolution on Tibet in exchange for Beijing's agreement not to oppose a 
resolution on Iraq' in the UN Security Council, where China has a veto: Ming Wan, ibid, 1] 3. 
189 For example, Human Rights Watch in its World Report of 200 1, see section 5.4.1 above, and recent 
instances mentioned in note 144 above. 
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international human rights regime has failed to offer protection to Tibetans, and in 
that sense the international legal regime fails Tibet. ' 90 
The economic face of the People's Republic is changing, and benefits accruing to the 
urban centres slowly filter through to the peripheries of the country. Such benefits 
along with a greater openness should produce human rights benefits. Yet Political 
realities dictate that when human rights issues conflict with state objectives, such as 
with regard to sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereignty will prevail. 
191 Politics 
plays a key role in determining which of competing international norms may prevail, 
which of two norms may be accommodating the other. Thus certain aspects of 
international law may be reinforced, in this case sovereignty. Politics has been pivotal 
in the international community's reaction to Chinese Tibet, where a human rights 
regime has been imposed by a dominant Chinese state utilising its own values, 
although since the end of the Cultural Revolution there has been a more liberal 
element to the Han Chinese dominance, exemplified by the rebuilding of 
monasteries. 
192 
'90 'Human rights is a legal device for the protection of smaller numbers of people (the minority or the 
individual) faced with the power of greater numbers': Pannikar R, 'Is the Notion of Human Rights a 
Western Concept? ' (1982) 120 Diogenes 75, quoted in Steiner and Alston, note I above, 387. The 
failure of the human rights regime to protect Tibetans evidences failure of the international legal 
regime itself, and underlines 'the moral weakness of official commitments to human rights': Santos B 
de S, Toward A New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, And Emancipation, Second Edition 
(London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) 266. 
'91 This is of course not only evident in China. This can be illustrated by two separate reports in The 
Times of 26 June 2006 where, first, Mikhail Gorbachev warned Western countries 'to stop interfering 
in Russia's domestic affairs', saying that '[p]utting pressure on President Putin over human rights ... 
would be counter-productive', and secondly, David Cameron, British Conservative Party leader, was to 
announce plans to replace the Human Fights Act by enshrining a constitutional Bill of Rights 'to 
rebalance the rights of British citizens after widespread criticism of Human Rights Act rulings': see 
respectively LeBor A, 'Don't meddle in our affairs, Gorbachev warns the West', 26 June 2006 The 
Times 29 and Charter D, 'We should have a Bill of Rights to stop MPs meddling, say Tories', 26 June 
2006 The Times 24. 
192 However, the monks and nuns remain subject to Chinese regulation and legal management: see, for 
example, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, note 116 above, 42-43, and Tibetan Centre 
for Human Rights and Democracy, note 146 above, 87ff. 
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Even though sovereignty as a concept of international law has been reinforced, there 
are certain limitations on it. A state cannot treat its nationals as it wishes, by virtue of, 
for example, Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter. Human rights are part of the 
mandatory principles of international law binding on member states of the United 
Nations. 193 Indeed, the group right of self-determination has been recognised as a part 
of customary international law with, at minimum, erga omnes character. ' 94 China,, 
however, while accepting the existence of norms of international law and engaging 
with the international community in respect of human rights matters, does not always 
comply with those norms, as has been made clear with respect to the human rights of 
Tibetans, despite its protestations. 
195 
Having examined in this chapter the links between human rights and self- 
determination, and examined how the Chinese state has oppressed the lives of 
Tibetans within the political ambit of the state's human rights regime, it is pertinent to 
assess whether an expansion of the collective right of self-determination may lead to a 
reconsideration of the status of Tibet. The political backdrop to this analysis will form 
a crucial part of the following discussion, as patterns of changing politics and political 
realism prevail. 
193 Kadi, note 177 above, paras 228,229. 
194 Western Sahara Case Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12, para. 56; East Timor (Portugal v 
. Australia) ICJ Reports 
1995,90,102; 'In the view of some writers, the principle of self-determination 
is also ius cogens': Harris, note 5 above, 117. See also section 2.4.1 above. 
195 Note, by way of example, the defensive justification of the People's Republic in the 1991 White 
Paper on 'Human Rights in China': see section 5.3.2 above. 
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6 Self-Determination and Beyond 
6.1 The Twenty-First Century Context 
Self-determination played an ever-increasing role during the twentieth century as a 
weapon in the armoury of those espousing human rights, in particular group human 
rights. The evolution of the concept has been outlined in Chapter 2 above, and in this 
chapter the focus will move to the present day and an examination of how the 
collective right of self-determination has been expanded but also circumscribed, 
where its dynamics have led it, and how it has been applied. Patterns of a changing 
political world will form a part of the analysis both as to the status of self- 
determination in the panoply of international law and the role the theory may perform 
with reference to the Tibet Question. ' 
6.2 A Tempered Idealism 
An underlying feature of the theory of self-determination is a determination of the 
conditions under which a right to external self-determination may be justified. 2 These 
conditions have changed over time, just as political theory and views may be 
perceived to change as contesting ideologies compete for dominance. The history of 
the theory has evolved during the twentieth century through three distinct phases: first 
in the aftermath of the First World War with attendant population transfer and 
' See section 1.2 above with regard to what may be termed 'the Tibet Question'. 
2 The volume on National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
edited by Margaret Moore, inter alia 'analyses the various normative theories of secession, which 
elaborate the conditions in which a right to self-determination, including a right to secession, may be 
justified': Moore M, 'Introduction: The Se If-Determi nation Principle and the Ethics of Secession' in M 
Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 1-13, 
1. 
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exchange; secondly following the Second World War, with the application of the 
theory to situations of colonial domination; and thirdly in the post-Cold War era. 3 
In each stage of the theory different conditions in which the right to self- 
determination may be justified can be elaborated. In the context of the present century 
the ongoing philosophical debate between the choice theorists and the remedial right 
theorists gives focus to the elaboration. 4 
62.1 Choice Theorists 
Choice theorists expound a wider concept, potentially including within the ambit of 
the theory a large number of peoples entitled to self-determination. The right is 
essentially conditioned upon choice, the choice expressed by a majority by 
referendum or plebiscite for self-determination. Daniel Philpott argues for this 
approach, which harmonises with the approach of 'John Stuart Mill and Woodrow 
Wilson, of the American Revolution and colonial independence movements: self- 
determination is a basic right, rooted in liberal democratic theory, available to any 
group the majority of whose members desire it'. 5 Philpott, while propounding this 
generally permissive approach, constricts the claims by providing that: 'Self- 
determining groups are required to be at least as liberal and democratic as the state 
from which they are separating, to demonstrate a majority preference for self- 
determination, to protect minority rights, and to meet distributive justice 
requirements. ' 6 
3 Section 2.2 above. 
' See also section 2.4.3 above. 
5 Philpott D, 'Self-Determi nation in Practice' in M Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and 
Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 79-102,80. 
6 Ibid. 
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The nature of the group, 'the peoples', is at the core of any theory of self- 
determination, both as to whether particular 'peoples' are perceived as being entitled 
to pursue self-determination, and as to 'who is the majority, who is the minority, and 
what is the relationship between thern'. 7 As to the first part of this issue, the nature of 
4peoples' has been the subject of debate and uncertainty. 8 David Miller shows that a 
principle of nationality supplies a perspective on the issue of secession, 9 and 
ultimately a theory of self-determination, as an issue of secession, that 'can avoid us 
having to condone a secessionist free-for-all without forcing us to defend existing 
state boundaries regardless', 10 and he defines a nation as 'a group of people who 
recognize one another as belonging to the same community, who acknowledge special 
obligations to one another, and who aspire to political autonomy'. " 
7 Moore, note 2 above, 11, emphasis in original. 
8 See section 2.3.1 above. See also Tomuschat C, 'Secession and self-determination' in MG Kohen 
(ed. ), Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 23- 
45,23-26 for a discussion of the concept of people and the attendant dilemma of legal construction. 
9 Secession is the ultimate potential result of self-determination, although not the only one. It may be 
defined as 'the separation of part of the territory of a State carried out by the resident population with 
the aim of creating a new independent State or acceding to another existing State': Haverland C, 
'Secession' in R Bernhardt (ed. ), Encyclopedia ofPublic International Law vol. IV (Amsterdam: North 
Holland, 2000) 354; see also Thio L-A, 'International law and secession in the Asia and Pacific 
regions' in MG Kohen (ed. ), Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 297-354,297. It is only one of the panoply of outcomes that may pertain under 
the concept of self-determination, but is the one with the most far-reaching consequences, although 
secession is not of itself a right of self-determination: Nolte G, 'Secession and external intervention' in 
MG Kohen (ed. ), Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 65-93,84. That said, the right of self-determination may be 'of fundamental importance for 
either the creation of ... entities and States or their 
(continued) survival as States': Dugard J and Raid 
D, 'The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession' in MG Kohen (ed. ), Secession: 
International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 94-137,120. 
Secession and external self-determination may be contrasted with internal self-determination: see 
sections 2.2 and 2.4.2.4 above. Especially in the Tibetan context, it may be noted that 'Ethnic and 
religious conflicts fuel contemporary secessionist struggles by groups possessing distinct identities ... [yet the fact of diverse populations within states] does not necessarily lead to secessionist claims; there 
are instances where groups restrict their claims to greater autonomy and political participation rights': 
Thio, ibid, 312. 
10 Miller D, 'Secession and the Principle of Nationality' in M Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination 
and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 62-78,75. The potential secessionist free-for- 
all in a world where the majority of states are heterogeneous is referred to by Tomuschat, note 8 above, 
24. 
'' Miller, ibid, 65. 
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It is instructive to apply these elements of a choice theory of self-determination to 
Tibet. First, as to the question of nationhood, there are arguments that prior to 1950 
China and Tibet were two separate sovereign independent states, 12 and indeed both 
Chinese Republican and Chinese Communist thinking was that China 'was composed 
of five nationalities: Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui (Chinese Muslim), and 
Tibetan'. 13 Whether recognised as a nation or as a nationality Tibetans can claim to be 
4a group of people who recognize one another as belonging to the same community', 
and this an ethnic community. Further, Tibetans are inextricably bound together by 
their religion and their culture, thus they 'acknowledge special obligations to one 
another'. The element of aspiration to political autonomy is more complex, and this 
links particularly to the conditioning of the right to self-determination upon choice. 
Two specific problems materialise in the Tibetan context: first, that of who is to 
exercise choice; and, second, how any such choice is to be evidenced, let alone acted 
upon. The difficulty regarding the 'who' is problematic, first because all Tibetans are 
not resident in Tibet. In addition, the point raises questions as to the extent of Tibet. 
Certainly any independent Tibet would include the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
but Tibetans would premise that it should also include the provinces of Kharn and 
Amdo, where a significant number of Tibetans reside - regions that historically have 
formed part of ethnographic Tibet. 14 Therefore, so far as the 'who' is concerned, the 
4who' may include Tibetans in Kharn and Amdo, but there are also Tibetans in exile - 
and a Tibetan government in exile. 15 Arguments by proponents of Tibetan self- 
determination would thus focus on all ethnic Tibetans being entitled to have their say, 
12 See, for example, sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.4 above. 
13 Wu H, 'My View on the Tibet Issue' in Cao Changchin, -,, and JD Seymour (eds), Tibet Through 
Dissident Chinese Eivs. - Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and London: ME Sharpe, 
1998) 91-96,92. 
14 See Chapter 3 above, note 99. 
" See especially section 4.4.2.3 above. 
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yet a proportion of these live outside the TAR, and indeed outside the greater area of 
ethnographic Tibet. This leads on to a second problem regarding the 'who': should 
those exercising choice include the Han population of Tibet? 16 Cao, Changching 
argues that on the issue of Tibet any reference to choice 'has to mean respecting the 
majority of the Tibetan people's Willq. 17 Yet if choice is exercised by Tibetans in and 
outside Tibet such a choice is one that would not be recognised in any sense by any 
government of China. This directly brings up the second difficulty referred to - as to 
how any such choice regarding Tibetan self-determination is to be evidenced. 
Philpott premises his arguments on the basis of exercise of choice through referendum 
or plebiscite. The political realities in the People's Republic of China are such that no 
such referendum or plebiscite would be permitted in the current climate. This then 
may lead us to reject the application of the choice theory of self-determination both 
generally and also specifically with regard to the Tibet Question. First, because there 
are problems with the theory itself. its inevitable and logical result is fragmentation of 
states, leading to, among other problems, an ever-increasing number of states. 18 
16 In a 1959 referendum by virtue of which Hawaii voted to become a state of the USA, 'no distinction 
was drawn between "native" Hawaiians from the majority "colonial" population and non-"native" 
Hawaiians' - this is one point by virtue of which indigenous people of Hawaii assert 'the violation of 
their right to self-determination through the US' invalid annexation of the Hawaiian Kingdom': Thio, 
note 9 above, 316-317. See also Palley C, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary- 
General's Afission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2005) 74, regarding the issue surrounding Turkish settlers participating in the referendum 
vote on a new settlement and Constitution for Cyprus on 30 April 2004: although the Turkish Cypriot 
community voted in favour of the referendum plan, the plan was rejected in any event by the Greek 
Cypriots. Cyprus as a whole acceded to the EU on I May 2004, but by Protocol 10 of the EU Treaty of 
Accession 2003 the acquis was suspended in the northern, Turkish part of the island, over the area of 
which the Government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control: 
<http: //ec. europa. eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot - 
community/index-en. htm>, accessed 14 September 
2007. See also Katsigeorgis J, 'Cyprus Post-referendum' (2004) 
<http: //www. un. org/'Pubs/chronicle/2004/webArticies/073004_Cyprus. asp>, accessed 23 April 2007. 
17 Cao Changching, 'Independence: The Tibetan People's Right' in Cao Changching and JD Seymour 
(eds), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination (Armonk, New York, and 
London: ME Sharpe, 1998) 3-23,18, emphasis in original. 
18 See section 2.4.33 above. The Bangkok Governmental Declaration of 1993 (see section 5.2.2 above), 
by virtue of stressing territorial integrity and a state's right to political independence, contemplates self- 
determination in a restrictive fashion, which 'pre-empts groups within sovereign independent States 
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Secondly, because, taking into account the dominant position of the People's 
Republic of China, it is difficult to see how choice theory could rationally assist any 
resolution of the question. A referendum to evidence choice would not be sanctioned 
by the People's Republic, neither on a question of secession nor on one of internal 
self-determination, a concept that is seen as being of particular relevance to choice 
theorists. 19 
62.2 Remedial Right Theorists 
Remedial right theorists emphasise that the right to self-determination is legitimated 
only if the right is necessary to remedy a prior injustice . 
20 Thus a people exercising a 
simple choice by referendum or plebiscite will not, should not, ground a collective 
right to self-determination: indeed Allen Buchanan argues that 'recognition of a 
plebiscitary right to secede would threaten democracy'. 21 Consequently the remedial 
right theorists impose a burden of proof on those seeking self-determination, a burden 
to prove they have a just cause: 
[A] group has the right to secede (in the absence of any negotiations or 
constitutional provisions that establish a right) only as a remedy of last resort 
to escape serious injustices. On my version of the remedial right only position, 
injustices capable of generating a right to secede consist of persistent 
violations of human rights, including the right to participate in democratic 
governance, and the unjust taking of the territory in question, if that territory 
from asserting self-determination as grounds for a legal claim to secession, allaying fears of State 
fragmentation': Thio, note 9 above, 3 10. 
19 Philpott, note 5 above, 86. See section 6.3.3 below on the future status of Kosovo as to the possibility 
of secession without the consent of the predecessor state. 20 See section 2.4.3 above. 
21 Buchanan A, 'Democracy and Secession' in M Moore (ed. ), National Self-Determination and 
Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 14-33,17. 
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previously was a legitimate state or a portion of one (in which case secession is 
22 
simply the taking back of what was un ustly taken) i 
This view of remedial rights and self-determination has considerable potential 
significance for the Tibetan situation. 23 Christian Tomuschat argues that remedial 
secession 'has broad support in the legal literature' and 'should be acknowledged as 
part and parcel of positive law'. 24 He acknowledges that the empirical basis is thin, 
but points out that it is not entirely lacking: 'the events leading up to the establishment 
of Bangladesh and the events giving rise to Kosovo as an autonomous entity under 
international administration can both be classified as coming within the purview of 
remedial secession'. 25 It should be noted, however, that Buchanan talks of secession 
as a last resort. This is right, for if issues can be dealt with in less conflictual ways the 
not inconsiderable disadvantages surrounding secession may be avoided: 
disadvantages that include attendant increases in new minorities; the potential 
increased movements of peoples seeking escape from or entry to a state; increased 
22 Ibid 25. Further, 'The international community is more likely to recognise the realities of secessionist 
attempts as a remedy where the government of the predecessor State committed gross human rights 
violations against the seceding unit': Thio, note 9 above, 300. Buchanan refers to a group having the 
right to secede, and the nature of a 'group' having the right to benefit from the principle of self- 
determination can be distilled into two particular questions: first, as to who the people are; and 
secondly, as to the relevant territorial unit over which they should exercise self-determination. These 
questions are interrelated: Moore, note 2 above, 2. See section 6.2.1 above, for example, as to the issue 
of 'people' in the Tibetan context, and especially section 6.5 below as to the question of 'territorial 
unit'. Issues of whether a seceding unit can meet the criteria for statehood laid down by Article I of the 
1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (165 LNTS 19) will also be of relevance. 
See section 4.2.1 above regarding criteria for statehood, and see section 4.5 above regarding the 
potential of Tibet to satisfy those criteria. It is also of note that states may arise before all elements of 
the criteria are in place: see, for example, sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.5.1 above. In the instance of 
Bangladesh, 'What brought about the recognition of the new entity by the international community was 
simply the principle of effectiveness': Tomuschat, note 8 above, 30. 
23 It is also a view of remedial rights and self-determination taken by Christian Tomuschat, who writes 
of 'the idea that exceptional circumstances are capable of sustaining a claim for secession - 
circumstances which may roughly be summarized as a grave and massive violation of the human rights 
of a specific group in a discriminatory fashion': Tomuschat, ibid, 35. A line, in addition, taken by Lee 
Buchheit, termed 'remedial secession': see Buchheit L, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self- 
Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978) 222. 
2' Tomuschat, ibid, 38,42. 
25 Ibid 42; see sections 6.3.2,6.3.3 and 7.2 below concerning ongoing developments with regard to 
Kosovo, also the latter with reference to relevant issues of customary international law. For a contrary 
view of Bangladesh, see note 54 below. 
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fluidity of political and legal identity; and of course potential anned conflict. 26 Thus 
when considering the application of the remedial right theory two specific issues 
arise: first, whether injustices capable of generating a right to secede exist; secondly, 
whether the injustices can be resolved without resorting to the ultimate sanction of 
secession. 
So far as the Tibet Question is concerned, therefore, it can be asked whether there 
have been injustices capable of generating a right on behalf of Tibetans to secede. 
These injustices may consist of persistent violations of human rights. In Chapter 5 '27 1 
examined the topic of oppression in Tibet, and found that an ongoing pattern of 
human rights abuse is evident in Tibet in the sphere of civil and political rights 28 and 
that, although the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has been ratified by China, it has apparently not been complied with. 29 Consequently 
a case can be mounted that there are persistent violations of Tibetan human rights 
such as to found injustices capable of generating a right for Tibet to secede from the 
People's Republic of China. Tibetans may further try to found such arguments on the 
4 unjust taking of territory'. 30 However, the issue of whether Tibetan territory has been 
26 See section 2.4.3 above; and also note armed conflict in respect of the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia: see section 2.4.2.2 above and section 6.3.2 below. The creation of new states 'disrupts the 
composition of international society and challenges the very foundations of its main actors': Kohen 
MG, 'Introduction' in MG Kohen (ed. ), Secession. - International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1-20,1. However, 'The violation of the fight to internal self- 
determination, including the violation of minority and political participation rights, is a precursor to 
claims to external self-determination through secession': Thio, note 9 above, 321. 27 At section 5.4 above. 28 Section 5.4.1 above. 
29The ICESCR was adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force 3 January 1976: 999 UNTS 
3. See section 5.2.1 above regarding ratification of the 1966 International Covenants by China, and 
section 5.4.2 above regarding oppression in Tibet and economic, social and cultural fights. 
30 The claims of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, the Baltic Republics, for independence in the early 
1990s were based on claims of forcible and illegal annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940; their claims 
'were not articulated as an exercise of the right to self-determination or as a secession, but rather as a 
reassertion of the independence and dejure continuity of these States which had been sovereign from 
1918 to 1940': Pazartzis P, 'Secession and international law: the European dimension' in MG Kohen 
(ed. ), Secession. - International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 355- 
373,363. It is nevertheless the case that 'No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of 
force shall be recognized as legal': UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) The Declaration on Principles of 
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taken by China is highly contentious. Moreover Tibetan arguments in this respect 
have not found favour with the international community. 31 Alternatively Tibetans may 
argue that their participation in democratic governance within the People's Republic 
is illusory due to Han dominance within the state; yet they do have rights to 
32 participate and have the protection of the Chinese Constitution. All in all, the 
overriding issue from the Tibetan perspective to establish a just cause, and to fall 
within the ambit of the remedial right theory, is that of persistent violation of human 
rights. 
Having established that this is the overriding issue for Tibetans so far as the remedial 
right theory is concemed, and as I have previously argued that the intemational legal 
order has failed Tibet, 33 in the light of what has been said in this section I will 
consider the dynamism of the theory of self-determination and whether this has the 
potential to unlock the Tibet Question, to assist ethnic Tibetans. 
6.3 The Dynamic Theory of Self-Determination: A New Progression 
According to traditional theory, 'the function or disappearance of a State is a pure 
fact, a political matter, remaining outside the realm of law (which does not create 
States but presupposes their existence as de facto sovereign entities)'. 34 However, this 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970, extract from 
the first principle therein, and this principle that belligerent occupation does not affect a state's 
continuity is well established: Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 688. See also Chapter 3, note 76 above. 
31 The response of the international community with regard to the predicament of Tibet has been 
limited: subsequent to the events of 1950, to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, and indeed 
thereafter. See sections 3.3 and 3.4.3 above. 
32 See section 5.3.1 above for a discussion of the current Chinese Constitution, adopted on 4 December 
1982, and various relevant provisions thereof. 33 Section 5.5 above. 
34 Tancredi A, 'A normative "due process" in the creation of States through secession' in MG Kohen 
(ed. ), Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 17 1- 
207,171-172. See also sections 6.3.3 and 7.2 regarding creation of states, state building from the 
outside, especially with reference to Kosovo. If, however, a state comes into existence or ceases to 
189 
norm has been abrogated within the framework of self-determination emanating from 
decolonisation, and the question now is how far this exception has expanded in the 
post-Cold War period, when few colonised territories remain under the control of the 
metropolitan state. An attempt to answer this question 'may be based on the practice 
of the last decade, a period which hosted a large number of processes of State 
creation'. 35 It is in this context that the remedial right theory is pertinent. As a 
preliminary to issues of dynamism, however, when considering the conditions in 
which a right to self-determination may be justified, it always has to be borne in mind 
that in international law there is no right to unilateral secession, thus secession, 
subject to exceptions referred to in section 6.3.1 below, is not a right of self- 
determination. 36 
6.3.1 Secession 
Secession as a concept is in opposition to ideas of territorial integrity and state 
sovereignty. It is these latter ideas that dominate the international political arena, and 
by extension international law. The Charter of the United Nations emphasises the 
inviolability of territorial integrity and the political independence of the state, 37 as for 
example do LTNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 196038 and UNGA 
exist, this de facto situation should be based on principles of international law: see, for example, para. 
I (a) of Opinion No. I of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia (1992) 
31 International Legal Materials 1494-1497 (the Badinter Commission). 
35 See Tancredi, ibid, 184. 
36 See note 9 above. As Antonelli Tancredi concludes, 'international law, as it now stands, recognises 
neither a general nor a remedial right to secede in oppressive contexts': Tancredi, ibid, 188; although a 
state formed in breach of 'due process ... is not inexistent from a factual or a legal point of view': ibid 205. Further, however, 'The right to self-determination of subaltern nations is really a right to secession 
from the control of dominant powers': Hardt M and Negri A, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 106, echoing back to the views of Lenin who affirmed a right to national self- 
determination, which was 'really the right to secession for all': ibid 432, note 7. 
37 Article 2(4) of the Charter, recalled in para. 87 of Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion, lCJ, 9 July 2004; (2004) 43 International 
Legal Materials 1009. 
38 The Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples: see Chapter 2, 
note 28 above. 
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Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 '39 and an entity 
is only able to separate 
itself from its parent state in limited circumstances. 40 
It is clear therefore that, subject to certain exceptions, unilateral secession is not 
recognised in international law, and 'Any attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations'. 41 State practice 
therefore resists any claim to a right to secession, 'leading to statehood against the 
will of the present sovereign'. 42 Thus the primacy of territorial integrity is 
acknowledged. There remain, however, exceptions to the inviolability of territorial 
integrity, and these become evident in the historical context of self-determination. 
A principal exception relates to the recovery of land lost to enemy action, and 
6existing states which have been invaded or which are otherwise clearly controlled by 
foreign powers have a right of self-determination, i. e., the right to overthrow the 
invaders and re-establish independence'. 43 This exception has particular application in 
the colonial context, but is said not to apply to a minority within a subsisting state, 
and indeed, so far as such minorities are concerned, 'constant state practice and the 
weight of authority require the conclusion that such a right does not exist'. 44 Ifthough 
39 See note 30 above. Also see Chapter 2, note 53 above. 
40 See exceptions mentioned below, and also Chapter 2, note 53 above. 
" UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, note 38 above, point 6. 
42 Warbrick C, 'States and Recognition in International Law' in MD Evans, International Law, Second 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 217-275,227; consequently there is no right in 
international law to unilateral secession 'where the central government represented "the people as a 
whole on the basis of equity and without discrimination"': ibid, referring to Reference re Secession of 
Quebec [ 1998125 SCR 217, para. 154, where the wording in fact is 'the whole of the people or peoples 
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination'. 
43 Hannum H, Autonom 
, v, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 48; see also section 
6.2.2 above. 
44 lbid 49. See also Crawford, note 30 above, 415. The application of the principle of uti possidetis 
applies. See Chapter 2, note 28 above. Also note thatý although republics were able to secede from the 
Soviet Union, federal units were not given the opportunity to establish statehood, for example 
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an independent state is unlawfully invaded and annexed, international law protects 
that state so that it may, 'even for a considerable time, continue to exist as a legal 
entity despite lack of effectiveness'. 45 Thus, so far as Tibet is concerned, this 
particular exception can only have any relevance if it can be established that Tibet 
was an existing state prior to 1950. Arguments can be put forward that Tibet was de 
46 facto independent at that time, but dejure sovereignty has not been established. As 
discussed, this essentially resulted in Tibet not being recognised as a state, and it is 
this lack of recognition that has proved critical and so far determinative as the 
international community has to all intents and purposes taken the side of China, 
recognising Tibet as a territory within that state. 47 
States in the post-World War 11 era have shown 'extreme reluctance ... to recognize 
or accept unilateral secession outside the colonial context'. 48 However, a second 
exception is apparent in that 'A government may become partially illegitimate if 
effective participation by minority or indigenous groups or their members has been 
rendered impossible by either deliberate discrimination or a political situation which 
permanently excludes such groups'. 49 Similarly a govenunent may lose legitimacy if 
it practises human rights abuses: and the 'common denominator is the violation of 
fundamental rights by the state'. 50 The United Nations Charter, in its Purposes and 
Principles, refers to promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, 51 and, due 
to the increasing profile and significance of human rights, if a state fails to respect the 
Chechnya: Warbrick, note 42 above, 227. However, by way of potential contrast, see the instance of 
Kosovo: section 6.3.3 below. 
45 Crawford, ibid, 63. See also section 4.2.1.4 above. 
46 See section 3.2.1 above, and also Chapter 3, notes 50 and 133 above. 
47 While of course strictly speaking recognition is not a criterion of statehood; see Chapter 4, note 17 
above. See Chapter 4 generally regarding issues of sovereignty and Tibet. 
48 Crawford, note 30 above, 415. 
49 Hannum, note 43 above, 470-47 1. 
50 1 bid 47 1. See also section 6.3.3 below. 
51 Article 1(3). 
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human rights of its peoples or minorities it may 'forfeit the protection it en oys by i 
virtue of international law'. 52 This may lead to intervention by the international 
community, and while such government practices may not legitimate a right to 
secession they may legitimate a basic right to resistance, to self-help, on the part of 
the community discriminated against, by oppressed peoples, and such right may lead 
to a recognised effective secession. 53 Other than the instance of Bangladesh it is 
arguable that, in the decades following 1945, of the newly emergent states outside the 
colonial context, none achieved independence through unilateral secession. 54 Yet, the 
dynamism of the theory of self-determination may be evidenced by more recent 
events where there has been intervention by the international community, particularly 
in Kosovo. 
6 3.2 Kosovo and Intervention by the International Community 
States within the international community, and bodies within the United Nations, have 
in recent years shown an increasing appetite for intervention against the territorial 
integrity of Member States. 55 Thus territorial integrity diminishes in importance for 
52 Tomuschat, note 8 above, 41. 
53 & In the end, one is left with the thought that remedial secession . merely affirms a basic right of 
revolution by oppressed peoples; and that has long been thought to be one of those "inalienable" rights 
which the international community could neither bestow nor revoke': Buchheit, note 23 above, 223. 
This contention receives strong support, by implication, from the penultimate paragraph, under the 
heading 'The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples', in UNGA Resolution 2625 
(XXV), note 30 above: 'Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour. ' 
5' Even in the case of Bangladesh, 'The indications are that the United Nations did not treat the 
emergence of Bangladesh as a case of self-determination despite good grounds for doing so, but rather 
as a fait accompli achieved as a result of foreign military assistance in special circumstances. The 
violence and repression engaged in by the Pakistan military made reunification unthinkable, and in 
effect legitimised the creation of the new State': Crawford, note 30 above, 415-416. Others, though, 
believe the establishment of Bangladesh does come within the principle of self-determination: see note 
25 above and related text. 
55 'What is "international, " and the concern of the international community, and what is "domestic, " 
and the sole concern of a nation, are evolving concepts': Plunk R-L, The Wandering Peacemaker 
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those looking on and then intervening. One area stands out as of special importance in 
this respect: the Balkans generally, Kosovo in particular. 
Reference has previously been made to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, 56 and 
especially to the intervention of the United Nations by reference to UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999). 57 Kosovo was a self-administering province of 
Serbia under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, 58 but self-rule 'was curtailed in 1989 
leading to local unrest', 59 and further curtailed the following year by a new republican 
constitution proclaimed by Serbia on 28 September 1990.60 The goal of the Kosovars 
was independence from Serbia 'under international (presumably UN) protection', 61 
and in response to the 1989 curtailment of autonomy the Kosovo provincial assembly 
on 2 July 1990 issued a Declaration of Independence, which made reference to the 
sovereign right, including the right to self-determination, of the Kosovar people. 62 
Kosovo attempted to secede from Serbia, if not from Yugoslavia, at that time, and a 
plebiscite was held in September 1991 on Kosovo's sovereignty and independence. 
Following secession from Yugoslavia by Croatia and Slovenia the next month, 
Kosovo declared independence and sought international recognition. Only one state, 
(Charlottesville, VA: Hampton Roads Publishing Company, Inc., 2000) 119. In addition, realpolitik 
itself turns the focus on the respective roles of international law and politics - 'Normative weakness of 
International Law and predominance of "real politic" in it, turn International Law into "embryonic law" 
in fact': Savaneli B, 'Necesity [sic] of Transformation of International Law Into Universal Human 
Rights Law in the Framework of Pure Theory of Law After September IV 
Accessible at <http: //www. iatp. org. ge/downloads/publications/savaneli-transform. pdf>. 
56 Section 2.4.2.2. 
57 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011 th meeting on 10 June 1999. 
5' The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, promulgated on 21 February 1974, 
and reprinted in part in Trifunovska S, Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its 
dissolution (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) 224-233. The Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a federal state comprising five Socialist Republics and also two 
'Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia: Article I of the 1974 Constitution; see also Article 2. 
59 Crawford, note 30 above, 557. See also Radan P, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002) 196-197. 
60 By Article 6 of that constitution, Kosovo, renamed 'the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and 
Metohi_la, was stated to have a "form of territorial autonomy"': Radan, note 59 above, 197. 
61G lenny M, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin Books, 1992) 18 1. 
62 Radan, note 59 above, 198. 
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Albania, recognised Kosovo's independence, and it is noteworthy that the European 
Community was not prepared to grant recognition of autonomous provinces, only of 
republics of the former Yugoslavia. 63 
The Kosovo Liberation Army fonned and started to attack federal security forces of 
the rump Yugoslavia in 1997, and following continued and spreading violence on 
both sides UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) expressed 'its support for an 
enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration'. 64 At subsequent talks in early 1999 at 
Rambouillet, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 'rejected provisions for 
NATO peacekeeping and eventually withdrew from the talks'. 65 There followed a 
NATO bombing campaign, commencing on 24 March 1999, days before the NATO- 
led KFOR (Kosovo Force) was deployed under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999) and FRY forces withdrew from Kosovo. Resolution 1244 (1999) confirmed 
the territorial integrity of the FRY, yet brought about what was effectively a 
partitioning of Kosovo from the FRY under the protection of the United Nations by 
66 
virtue of the deployment of KFOR . 
Thus both NATO and, as a mandating authority, the United Nations have shown 
willingness to intervene here in the affairs of a sovereign state, despite references in 
Security Council resolutions to commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
63 lbid 199-200, referring to the Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia 
(the Badinter Commission); and see also Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace in 
Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2 (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1497-1499, confirming the 
applicability of the principle of uti possidetis in the context of whether the Serbian population in 
Croatia and Bosnia- Herzogovina, as one of the constituent people of Yugoslavia, had a right to self- 
deten-nination. 
64 Paragraph 5 of UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998), adopted bythe Security Council at its 3868th meeting 
on 31 March 1998. 
65 Crawford, note 30 above, 557. See also note 74 below and related text. 
66 Radan, note 59 above, 201. Resolution 1244 (1999), at para. 3, had demanded that the FRY put an 
end to violence and repression in Kosovo and also that the FRY conduct a phased withdrawal of its 
military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. See section 2.4.2.2 above with regard to the 
development of KFOR. 
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or humanitarian of the states in the region, including the FRY Yet it was concern f 
matters that prevailed in the United Nations, and UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999), in its preamble, underlined a determination 'to resolve the grave 
humanitarian situation in Kosovo% referring also to a 'humanitarian tragedy', while 
UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), referred to in Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999), emphasised 'that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in 
Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a 
genuine political process'. 68 This concern chimes with the approach of the Badinter 
Commission which, in its Opinion No. 2, stated that 'Article I of the two 1966 
International Covenants on human rights establishes that the principle of the right to 
self-determination serves to safeguard human rights', and the Commission considered 
that 'international law as it currently stands does not spell out all the implications of 
the right to self-determination'. 69 
In consequence, in 2003 Michael Ignatieff felt able to comment that although 
'Kosovo's future is held in the balance so that appearances of the international state 
order can be maintained.... Kosovo does set a precedent. It establishes the principle 
that states can lose sovereignty over a portion of their territory if they so oppress the 
majority population that they rise in revolt and successfully enlist international 
67 See, for example, the preamble to UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999); also the preamble to UNSC 
Resolution 1239 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at its 4003rd meeting on 14 May 1999. 
68 Paragraph 3 of UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998). It is also of note that two international tribunals, the 
ICTY and the ICTR, have in recent years been established to deal with grave violations of human 
rights. The ICTY was set up in 1993: see section 2.4.2.2 above. The ICTR was established in 1994 'for 
the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between I January 1994 and 31 December 
1994': see website of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 'About the Tribunal - General 
Information', <http: //69.94.1 1.5 3 /default. htm>. These tribunals strengthen the force of human rights 
law, and evidence increased forces against national sovereignty, although the tribunals themselves do 
not put at risk the territorial integrity of the state. 
69 Opinion No. 2, note 63 above, paras I and 3. 
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support for their rebellion. 70 The legitimacy of the United Nation's action in Kosovo 
has been questioned, 71 yet the fact of the matter is that it shows a will on the part of 
the international community to proactively intervene in the internal affairs of a nation 
state, both in Security Council resolutions and on the ground. 72 It is also instructive 
that this intervention followed violence by an ethnic 'liberation army'. 
6.3.3 The Future Status ofKosovo 
The ultimate outcome for Kosovo is not yet certain, but the latest developments are of 
significance for the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination. On 2 February 
2007 Martti Ahtisaari, the UN mediator in Kosovo, revealed his draft proposals for 
the future status of Kosovo. 73 This process had been launched in accordance with 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which mandates the international presence 
to promote substantial autonomy in Kosovo, taking into account the Interim 
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (the so-called Rambouillet 
Accords). 74 Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, was appointed by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations as his Special Envoy for the future status of 
Kosovo in October 2005, an appointment supported by the UN Security Council the 
70 Ignatieff M, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 
2003) 69-70. 
71 See Crawford, note 30 above, 560. 
72 The partitioning of Kosovo from the FRY is also ipso facto in defiance of the principle of uti 
possidetis in that it partitions a state (Serbia) that has itself been formed through the self-determination 
of the constituent parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
73 UNOSEK Press Release, 2 February 2007, 'Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presents his proposal for 
the future status of Kosovo in Belgrade and Pristina', Press Release available at 
<http: www. unosek. org/unosek/en/press. html>. These draft proposals are superseded by the draft 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement: see below. UNOSEK is the United Nations 
Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo. 
74 Paragraph II (a) and (e) of UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). The Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-Goverriment in Kosovo, dated 23 February 1999 at Rambouillet, France, provided framework and 
detail for peace and self-government in Kosovo, including inter alia detailed provisions for a 
constitution, policing and security, elections, and humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and economic 
development. The agreement can be accessed at <http: //jurist. law. pitt. edu/ramb. htm>, for example, and 
the Accords are annexed to UN DOC S/1999/648. Yugoslavia refused to sign the Agreement: Radan, 
note 59 above, '200. See also note 65 above and related text. 
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following month. 75 In addition, ten Guiding Principles were issued by the Contact 
Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo, 76 which included provision, inter alia, 
that: 
9 'The settlement of the Kosovo issue should be fully compatible with international 
standards of human rights, democracy and international law'; 77 
9 'The settlement should ensure multi-ethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo'; 
0 'The settlement of Kosovo's status should include specific safeguards for the 
protection of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo'; and 
9 'For some time Kosovo will continue to need an international civilian and military 
presence to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance of the provisions of the 
Status settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection for minorities as 
well as to monitor and support the authorities in the continued implementation of 
standards'. 
78 
Subsequent to the presentation of the draft Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement of February 2007, a series of meetings on the proposal then took 
75 See Background on the Origins of UNOSEK, accessible through 
<http: //www. unosek. org/unosek/index. htm1>. 
76 The Contact Group, comprising France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and 
United States, is an advisory group - 'an important link between Kosovo and the UN Security 
Council': Dickinson M, 'The Contact Group and Kosovo's Way Forward' (2005) 
<http: //www. unmikonline. org/pub/focuskos/feb05/focusklead2. htm>, accessed 7 June 2007. It was 
created in 1998 and has been involved since inception in the resolution of the question of Kosovo's 
status: see, for example, Letter Dated 9 July 1998 from the Acting Permanent Representative of 
Germany to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN DOC S/1998/657,16 July 
1998, accessible at 
<http: //www. un. org/peace/kosovo/s98657. pdf>; also see Background on the Origins of UNOSEK, note 
75 above. The work of the Contact Group has the approval of the United Nations: see, for example, 
UNSC Resolutions 1160 (1998) and also 1199 (1998) adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th 
meeting on 23 September 1998. 
77 As to whether the proposed settlement does comply with international law, see section 7.2 below 
with regard to customary rules of international law. 
78 Guiding Principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo, accessible through 
<http: //%vNN-w. unosek. org/unosek/index. html>. 
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place involving the Special Envoy, representatives of both parties, and also 
representatives of the Contact Group, the European Union and NATO . 
79The Special 
Envoy was left 'with no doubt that the parties' respective positions on Kosovo's 
status did not contain any common ground to achieve an agreement' and thus he 
4 80 concluded that the potential of negotiations was exhausted'. On 14 March 2007 the 
Final Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement prepared by the 
Special Envoy was handed over to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
together with the Report of the Special Envoy on Kosovo's Future Status. 81 
The Report of Martti Ahtisaari on Kosovo's future status is unequivocal: 'I have come 
to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be 
supervised for an initial period by the international community. 582 The Special Envoy 
refers to the systematic discrimination against the Albanian majority in Kosovo, the 
response of the Kosovo Albanians in the form of armed resistance, and the subsequent 
'reinforced and brutal repression' by Belgrade during the 1990s. 83 Martti Ahtisaari 
therefore states: 'A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its 
79, The Status Process (updated I't August [2007])', accessible at 
<http: //www. unosek. org/docref/Theý/ý20Statusý/ý2OProcess-0 I 08doc>. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. See also Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, with Report of the Special Envoy of the S ecretary- General on Kosovo's future 
status annexed, S/2007/168; and Addendum comprising the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement, S/2007/168/Add. 1. In his letter, the Secretary-General stated that he fully supported 
both the recommendation of Martti Ahtisaari in his Report and the Comprehensive Proposal. The terms 
of reference acted upon by the Special Envoy were that the process 'should culminate in a political 
settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo', and his mandate explicitly provided that he 
'determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the 
Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground': 
paras I and 3 of the Report of the Special Envoy. It will be for the UN Security Council to consider the 
Report and Comprehensive Proposal. See section 7.2 below regarding legitimation of the proposals. 
82 Report of the Special Envoy, ibid, para. 5. In the same paragraph, Martti Ahtisaari comments that his 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement 'provides the foundations for a future 
independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their 
members can live a peaceful and dignified existence'. 83 Ibid, para. 6. 
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authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the 
borders of Serbia - however notional such autonomy may be - is simPly not 
tenable. ' 84 He also concludes the 'international administration of Kosovo cannot 
continue', 85 thus that 'Independence is the only option for a politically stable and 
economically viable Kosovo'. 86 
The Settlement provides that 'Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, which shall 
govem itself democratically, and with ftill respect for the rule of law'. 87 The exercise 
of public authority 'shall be based upon the equality of all citizens and respect the 
highest level of internationally recognized human rights and ftindamental freedoms'. 88 
A Constitution is to be adopted to enshrine such principles and to promote 'the 
peaceful and prosperous existence of all its [Kosovo's] inhabitants'. 89 The general 
principles stipulated in the Comprehensive Status Settlement include clear elements of 
sovereignty, for example: 
9 'Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements 
and the right to seek membership in international organizations'; 90 
9 'Kosovo shall have its own, distinct, national symbols, including flag, seal and 
ant em'; 
91 
84 lbid, para. 7. Such comments may also have resonance with regard to, for instance, Chechnya within 
the borders of Russia. 8' lbid, para. 8. 86 lbid, para. 10. 
87 Article 1.1 of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, S/2007/168/Add. 1: 
note 81 above. This reference to democracy is despite the fact that all states have the right to choose 
their own political system. The UN Charter imposes no duty so far as democracy is concerned: see 
Articles 2(7) and 4(l) of the Charter. See also Simpson G, Great Powers and Outlaw States. - Unequal 
Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 264-269, 
regarding the rejection of a proposed requirement of the UN that states should have democratic 
institutions; questions of democracy, therefore, are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
" Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, ibid, Article 1.2. 
89 lbid, Article 1.3; see also Annex 1, Article 1. 
90 lbid, Article 1.5. 
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0 'Kosovo shall take all necessary measures towards ratifying the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
its Protocols'; 92 
9 'The Constitution shall provide that the rights and freedoms set forth in [the main] 
international instruments and agreements [on fundamental human rights and 
- 
93 freedoms] shall be directly applicable in Kosovo', 
. 
94 'The President of Kosovo shall represent the unity of the people', 
9 The Government of Kosovo and the composition of the civil service are to reflect 
the diversity of the people of Kosovo; 95 
A constitutional court is to 'be composed of nine ... 
distinguished jurists of the 
highest moral character'. 96 
In essence the proposal will create a state of Kosovo, by virtue of supervised 
statehood: 'The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all 
necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this 
Settlement'. 97 The Comprehensive Proposal, if ultimately acted upon, is a significant 
development in the role of self-determination, to the detriment of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the state. If the proposal is followed through it would instance a 
situation whereby a state has been constructed by other states, but a state that was not 
91 lbid, Article 1.7. 
92 lbid, Article 2.1. 
93 lbid, Annex 1, Article 2.1. 
94 lbid, Annex 1, Article 4.1. 
95 lbid, Annex 1, Article 5. 
96 lbid, Annex 1, Article 6.1. 
97 Article 1.11 of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, S/2007/168/Add. 1: 
note 81 above. 
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in the past a republic but simply an autonomous unit within a state. 98 It would also 
suggest the legality of this procedure: the Guiding Principles issued by the Contact 
Group incorporated the reference to the fact that the Settlement of the Kosovo issue 
should be fully compatible with intemational law. 99 
There is no certainty that the proposals of Martti Ahtisaari will achieve the support of 
the United Nations and be acted upon. For instance, Serbia's foreign minister 
responded to the draft proposals by asserting that Belgrade should insist on its right to 
keep Kosovo. ' 00 Russia, an ally of the rump former Yugoslav state of Serbia, is likely 
to oppose any move leading to Kosovar independence, and a similar line from the 
People's Republic of China can be assumed. The principal point though is the very 
fact that this proposal has been made and a trend potentially emerges, although the 
Special Envoy indicates in his Report that the solution for Kosovo 'does not create a 
precedent for other unresolved conflicts'. 101 The proposal speaks of a dynamic to the 
legal theory of self-determination that is continuing, an extension of the conditions in 
which the right to self-determination may be justified and a considerable attack on the 
supposed illegality of unilateral secession. 
98 This moves beyond, for example, the recognition of Bosnia, a republic within the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, at a time when 'clearly it was not one' and further 'had never been a state at 
all, at least until modem times': Warbrick, note 42 above, 246 and 24. That recognition in itself was 
beyond what might have been expected: ibid 268. The present momentum regarding Kosovo 
demonstrates the potential construction of a juridical state out of a unit within a subsisting state. 
99 Guiding Principles, note 78 above; cf the scepticism expressed by Colin Warbrick with reference to 
this possibility: Warbrick, note 42 above, 246. See also note 77 above. The legitimacy of any 
settlement needs to be premised on customary rules of international law, as any treaty entered into 
regarding the settlement would not prevail over obligations of the UN Charter (Article 103 of the 
Charter), and such obligations include the right to respect for territorial integrity: see Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter; also Simpson, note 87 above, 87. 
100 People's Daily Online, 'Serbia insists on right to keep Kosovo' (2007) 
<http: //english. people. com. cn/200702/05/print2OO7O2O5 - 
347664. html>, accessed 5 February 2007. 
'01 Paragraph 15 of the Report of the Special Envoy, note 81 above. See section 7.2 below on questions 
of state practice and opiniojuris. 
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It may thus be that the norm of non-intervention in foreign states appears to be 
weakening, 102 and this recent instance of intervention by the international community 
demonstrates that the apparent illegality of unilateral secession is not the absolute 
prohibition on unilateral external self-determination that it appears to be. This is 
evident from the situation in Kosovo: the intervention of the United Nations in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), the NATO bombardment, 103 the 
deployment of KFOR under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), and the 
proposals of UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari - despite the fact that the ultimate outcome 
for Kosovo is as yet uncertain. These interventions are indicative of a willingness to 
tolerate or even encourage unilateral secession, 104 despite the Special Envoy writing 
in his Report that the solution for Kosovo does not create a precedent. 105 It will be 
recalled that the UN Security Council resolutions relating to Kosovo confinned the 
territorial integrity of the FRY, 106 and yet this appears to be no longer the case, at least 
so far as the Special Envoy is concerned, and also the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 107 
102 As Warbrick suggests in respect of electoral processes: Warbrick, note 42 above, 238. 
103 The NATO bombing campaign was launched without authorisation of the UN Security Council: see 
Radan, note 59 above, 201. It may thus be characterised as unlawful: UN Charter, Article 2(4). 
104 As to the value of the interventions in Kosovo as a potential new trend, see section 7.2 below. 
105 Paragraph 15 of the Report; see note 101 above and related text. See section 7.2 below regarding 
0... 
, 
rintojuris and state practice. 6 6 For example, Resolution 1244 (1999): note 57 above. 
107 The Secretary-General has given his full support to Martti Ahtisaari's proposals: note 81 above. The 
proposals also have state support. The British Government, for instance, has welcomed the final 
settlement proposals, which then Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said 'represent a status outcome 
which the UN Special Envoy has described as independence, supervised by the international 
community. These proposals would give Kosovo clarity over its future ... we look forward to working 
with our partners in the UN Security Council, on the basis of the UN Special Envoy's settlement 
proposals, to bring the status process through to completion': Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'UN 
Proposals for Kosovo's Final Status' (2007) 
Accessible at <http: //www. fco. gov. uk>. A draft resolution on Kosovo was presented to the UN 
Security Council on 17 July 2007, but agreement could not be secured and discussions on the 
resolution were put on hold: Statement issued on 20 July 2007, accessible through 
<http: //www. unosek. org/unosek/index. html>. 
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Nevertheless, against the background of a perceived general bar against unilateral 
secession, in 1996 Hurst Hannum wrote: 'the notion that there is an internationally 
recognized right of secession would seem to have advanced only marginally, if at all, 
in recent years'. 108 Subject to the Kosovo outcome this comment is still of relevance, 
despite suggestions of choice theorists and remedial right theorists to the contrary. 
Even so, the political will to intervene or not to intervene is of evident importance. 
The theory of self-determination is dynamic, evidenced particularly in Kosovo, but 
realpolitik is key. The theory, though, relates not only to external self-determination 
but also to internal self-determination, and in the context of the dynamic theory of 
self-determination it is pertinent to consider issues of autonomy further, and whether 
the injustices perpetrated in Tibet can be resolved without recourse to the ultimate 
resort of secession. 
6.4 Enhanced Autonomy and Autonomy Light 
Among the range of options on offer as part of the evolving concept of self- 
determination is autonomy, and indeed schemes of autonomy 'have been offered to 
placate secessionist sentiments and maintain State cohesion, although it is feared such 
schemes could be a prelude to independence claims, by weakening the central 
governmenf. 109 Generally, autonomy is seen as involving issues relating to: 
'language; education; access to governmental civil service, including police and 
security forces, and social services; land and natural resources; and representative 
local government structures'. 110 It is worthwhile to look at these elements in the 
Tibetan context, and with reference to the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic 
108 Hannum, note 43 above, 499. 
109 Thio, note 9 above, 331-332; see also Pazartzis, note 30 above, 373. Li-ann Thio cites examples of 
autonomy offered to Tamil insurrectionists in Sri Lanka, to West Papua and Aceh by Indonesia, and to 
Mindanao by the Philippines. 
110 Hannum, note 43 above, 45 8. 
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of China, for essentially autonomy may be considered 'as a realization of the principle 
of internal self-determination in the form of self- governance', ' 11 and it is of 
significance that the 1982 Constitution provides for regional autonomy for the 
minority nationalities, one of such regions being the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR). ' 12 
6.4.1 Elements ofAutonomy 
The 1982 Constitution circumscribes the right to autonomy in Article 115, and the 
limits of the authority of the organs of self-government to exercise the right of 
autonomy are prescribed as mentioned therein. ' 13 Against that background, however, 
by Article 3 of the Constitution 'The people of all nationalities have the freedom to 
use and develop their own spoken and written language, and to preserve their own 
ways or customs. ' We have already seen, nevertheless, 114 that the Tibetan language 
has not been studied in schools, the main teaching language has been Chinese, and 
that the Chinese language has dominated areas of business and also governance, even 
though Article 121 of the Constitution provides: 'In performing their functions, the 
organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas, in accordance with 
the autonomy regulations of the respective areas, employ the spoken and written 
language or languages in common use in the locality. ' 115 There is, however, some 
evidence of an improving situation, though the effect of the Tibetan Language Law 
2002 is as yet uncertain. 116 Language, in particular as a medium of education, is 
important, and pilot projects during the last decade of the twentieth century showed 
III Loukacheva N, 'On Autonomy and Law' (2004) Working Paper for Globalization and Autonomy 
Accessible at <http: //www. globalautonomy. ca>, via <http: //anscombe-mcmaster. ca/ loball/news. jsp>. t. 9 112 Article 4 of the Constitution. 113 See section 3.5.2 above. 114 Section 5.4.2 above. 
115 Emboldened text in original. 
"' See section 5.5 above. 
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that Tibetan students educated in the Tibetan language produced better examination 
results than those educated in the Chinese language. 117 
Thus language should not be seen simply as a cultural issue, a part of what it means to 
be a Tibetan. It has real value and relevance in the economic world. Nevertheless, 
culture, too, is significant here, and China regards it as so: 
Since the late 20th century the focus of much writing on China's minorities 
and national identification program has been on the 'civilizing mission' of 
China's policy toward its 'backward minorities' ... Minorities, generally less 
educated in the Chinese school system than the Han majority, are thought to be 
somewhere behind the Han culturally. Education plays a privileged role in 
executing China's national integration project. ' 18 
If education, business and administration in the TAR are not carried out in Tibetan, 
those with Tibetan as their mother tongue are disadvantaged. Yet it cannot be in the 
interests of the People's Republic to disadvantage the Tibetan minority in this way. 
The central government has spent huge sums in Tibet in a bid to raise the region 
economically: sustainable economic development requires Tibetans to improve 
individual economic standards and anything that disadvantages them in this regard is 
counter-productive - for example, where Han Chinese possess better linguistic and 
technical skills, they will take business away from the local Tibetans, 119 and where 
117 Dawa Norbu, 'Economic Policy and Practice in Contemporary Tibet' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer 
(eds), Contemporary Tiber Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New 
York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 152-165,163. 
118 Gladney DC, Dislocating China. - Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2004) 261. 
119 He Baogang, 'The Dalai Lama's Autonomy Proposal: A One-Sided WishT in B Sautman and JT 
Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet. - Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, 
New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 67-84,79. 
206 
local Tibetans are educated in Chinese and business is conducted in Chinese there is a 
high probability that Tibetans will be disadvantaged linguistically. 
By Article 119 of the Constitution, education is to be independently administered by 
the organs of self-government of the TAR. As is evident, however, education is very 
much linked with language, and the topic has been examined above. 120 Failure rate of 
Tibetan students has been high, due to the language-medium of education, and 
attendance has been patchy if not poor. For Tibetans, autonomy needs to incorporate 
compulsory education in the Tibetan language. Compulsory education at least at 
primary level should be feasible to attain, not only among Tibetans, in compliance 
with the Millennium Goals of the United Nations. 
121 
As to access to governmental civil service, including police and security forces, and 
social services, it is the case that the TAR has such access, but that the services and 
forces are under the control of the central government of the People's Republic. The 
establishment of martial law in Tibet on 7 March 1989 exemplifies this, and it is of 
course the security of the motherland, the unity of the country, that is emphasised in 
the 1982 Constitution. 122 Social services also, for instance the right of the old, ill or 
disabled to material assistance, are in the hands of the state. 123 This is a sphere where 
the People's Republic of China would clearly be intent on retaining its power, 
certainly so far as police and security forces are concerned. Yet in itself that need not 
defeat any drive towards an agreed autonomous Tibet. In 2003, the Dalai Lama 
120 Section 5.4.2. 
121 UN [United Nations], 'UN Millennium Goals' (2005) 
<http: //www. un. org/millenniumgoals/>, accessed 23 June 2006. 
122 See, for example, Articles 52 and 54. 123 Article 45. 
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indicated 'that the numbers of the People's Armed Police should be reduced in 
Tibetan cities, implying his acceptance of the stationing of Chinese troops'. 124 
Land and natural resources are areas of direct conflict in the Sino-Tibetan context. 
The issue for China of territorial integrity incorporates its sovereignty over the land 
comprising Tibet, 125 and its attendant right to extract natural resources from the land. 
Tibet has abundant natural resources that have been exploited over the decades by the 
People's Republic: 'The gold-bearing sands of cultural Tibet have been renowned for 
centuries. Less well known are the area's other rare metals, including lithium, lead, 
antimony, and, it is rumored, uranium. There are also coal deposits and an abundance 
of salt. ' 126 Such autonomy as the TAR has enjoyed under the People's Republic to 
date has clearly not incorporated autonomy over its land and natural resources. 
Indeed, by virtue of the 1982 Constitution, mineral resources are owned by the state, 
as is land. 
127 
Representative local govenunent structures are in place within the TAR and have 
been so in one form or another since the advent of the Seventeen-Point Agreement in 
128 1951 . The right of the Tibetan people to exercise regional autonomy was referred to 
in Article 3 thereof, and to a greater or lesser extent the People's Republic contends 
124 He Baogang, note 119 above, 71 This stance of the Dalai Lama could equally, however, imply an 
acceptance by the Dalai Lama that the PRC would not agree a situation whereby all Chinese troops 
were withdrawn from Tibet. 
12' Both areas of ethnographic Tibet outside the TAR and the TAR itself 
126 Dreyer JT, 'Economic Development in Tibet Under the People's Republic of China' in B Sautman 
and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region 
(Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 129-151,130. See also Avedon JF, In Exileftom the Land of 
Snows: The Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994, 
reissued 1997) 4 1. 
127 Articles 9 and 10 respectively. Further, nuclear sites and installations within ethnographic Tibet, and 
the strategic initiative given to China by its control over the Tibetan plateau, reinforced by the 1982 1 Constitution and China's emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity, will ensure that China is not 
prepared to willingly divest itself of land or mineral resources contained within Tibet: see section 
4.4.2.2 above. 
128 The Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet: see section 3.3 above. 
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that a system based on autonomy has been in place thereafter. 
' 29 However, Chinese 
officials have held leadership positions in Tibet and 'in September 2000 a class of 
some seventy ethnic Chinese was opened at Tibet University specifically to train 
ftiture Chinese officials so they could take up leadership positions in Tibetan counties 
and townships'. 130 Consequently, opportunities for ethnic Tibetans to take up official 
positions within Tibet are limited. Thus it is arguable that what are 'representative' 
local government structures in fact lack the element of representation in that 
committees and local government structures are heavily influenced by and may be 
dominated by Han Chinese. 
Despite this Robert Barnett argues that Tibetan politicians in Tibet are not wholly 
without power or influence, even though 'a politics of ethnic superiority' has been 
created in Tibet. 13 1 There is 'contempt of Chinese officialdom for their Tibetan 
colleagues'. 132 This contempt chimes in with the general superiority evinced by the 
Han Chinese toward the country's 'backward minorities', 133 and emphasises also the 
present limitations on local government structures being representative within the 
TAR. It equally has bearing on the meaning of autonomy itself in Tibet. 
6.4.2 The Meaning ofAutonomy in Tibet 
Autonomy in Tibet means different things for the People's Republic, on the one hand, 
and for Tibetans, on the other, and 'The debates over what kind of autonomy should 
be implemented in Tibet stem from different theoretical sources and positions. While 
129 See, for example, Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution. 
130 Barnett R, 'Beyond the Collaborator - Martyr Model: Strategies of Compliance, Opportunism, and 
Opposition Within Tibet' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, 
Development, and Societ), in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 25-66,45. 131 lbid 49. 
132 lbid 50. 
133 See, for example, note 118 above and related text; also Chapter 5, note 17 1. 
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the Dalai Lama's genuine autonomy proposal draws on liberal principles of 
autonomy, the official Chinese conception of regional autonomy derives from 
Marxist principles. ' 134 Autonomy as practised in the TAR is, of course, that 
understood by the People's Republic. 
In the previous section we have noted how, in practice, issues surrounding language 
and education have turned out. The freedom to practise religion is a further area of 
significance for autonomy in Tibet. Destruction of the monasteries and oppression of 
the monkhood took place in Tibet after the Dalai Lama's departure in 1959 and 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution, although subsequent thereto there has 
been an easing of policy by the central goverru-nent. 135 Even so, there remain limits on 
the numbers who may become monks and pilgrimage is controlled. 136 Both these 
restrictions are contrary to Tibetan cultural autonomy. 
Even where laws and directives are in place, these are not necessarily put into effect. 
For example, despite the adoption in 1987, by the TAR's People's Congress, of 
Regulations on the Study, Use, and Development of the Written Tibetan Language for 
trial implementation, plans for middle school texts to be written in Tibetan and for 
most school subjects to be taught in Tibetan have been abandoned. Almost all 
subjects, certainly after primary school, are still taught in Chinese and, although 
directives have been issued by the central government to Chinese residents in the 
TAR to learn Tibetan, these are largely ignored. All this leads to the disadvantage of 
Tibetans in the TAR, and this is compounded by the fact that, not unnaturally, 
134 He Baogang, note 1] 9 above, 73 (emphasis in original). 
135 See section 5.4.1 above. 136 He Baogang, note 119 above, 77. 
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officials and factory managers who speak only Chinese tend to prefer to employ 
people able to speak Chinese; this excludes many ethnic Tibetans. 137 
Turning to the question of political autonomy, the limited opportunity for Tibetans to 
take up official positions in the TAR has been noted, but although the majority of 
high-ranking Tibetan cadres hold only titular and nominal power, an ever-increasing 
number of Tibetan cadres hold posts at lower levels in government and also ever- 
larger numbers are admitted to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus the 
People's Republic can claim that there is an element of power sharing and also some 
form of limited autonomy. 138 However, as noted in section 3.5.2 above, local laws 
cannot override national law; in consequence central authority, central government, is 
dominant. Specific regulations of the TAR have to be submitted to the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress for approval before they go into 
effect, 139 and thus such regulations are subject to veto by the Standing Committee at 
national level. 
Consequently, the autonomy enjoyed by the TAR is limited in scope and does not 
accord with, for example, the Dalai Lama's proposals as presented at Strasbourg on 
15 June 1988 and addressed to the European Parliament. 140 The five-point plan called, 
inter alia, for negotiations between the Tibetans and the Chinese and, while the 
Government of the People's Republic would retain responsibility for Tibet's foreign 
137 lbid 78. See also section 5.5 above. 
138 lbid 76; cadres comprise members of groups of activists in a communist or other revolutionary 
party: The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Ninth Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995). Tibetans in 1980 comprised as many as 85% of the members of the Tibetan Political 
Consultation Committee, but only 22% of the Tibetan Party Committee and 54% of the Tibetan 
People's Congress; also in 1991 the CCP had more than 57,000 Tibetan and other minority members: 
He Baogang, ibid, 76-77. 
139Article 116 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution; see also Article 115. 
140 See section 4.4.2.4 above. 
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policy, the Dalai Lama's thinking was that a Tibetan government, founded on a 
constitution or basic law should: 
develop and maintain relations, through its own foreign affairs bureau, in the 
field of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and 
other non-political activities ... The basic law should provide for a democratic 
system of government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic equality, 
social justice, and the protection of the environment. This means that the 
Government of Tibet will have the rights to decide on all affairs relating to 
Tibet and the Tibetans. 
141 
The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal envisaged a genuine autonomy for Tibet 
'within the framework of the People's Republic of China ... with Tibetans 
fully 
responsible for their own domestic affairs, including the education of their children, 
religious affairs, cultural matters, the care of their delicate and precious environment, 
and the local economy. Beijing would continue to be responsible for the conduct of 
foreign and defense matters. ' 142 However, Beijing has not felt able to engage on the 
Dalai Lama's Proposals. 143 The Dalai Lama appealed in this respect in the 2001 
speech to the international community, and it is of relevance that the European Union 
engages at high level with the People's Republic of China. 144 
There are a number of reasons why the People's Republic rejects the Dalai Lama's 
proposals. He Baogang, for instance, cites fear that acceptance could lead ultimately 
141 Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (The), 'Strasbourg Proposal 1988: Address to the Members 
of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, France: June 15,1988' (1988) 
<http: //www. dala i lama. com/page. 96. htm>, accessed 30 January 2007. 
142 Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (The), 'Speech of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg: October 14,2001' (2001) 
<http: //www. dalailama. com/page. 99. htm>, accessed 30 January 2007. There is thus at least an implicit 
acknowledgement of China's present-day sovereignty over Tibet. 143 Ibid. 
"' See, for example, references at section 5.3.3 to China-EU summits. 
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to full independence for Tibet, a reluctance to agree to the idea of the chief executive 
in Tibet being elected, the unacceptability of demands that autonomy for Tibet should 
extend beyond the TAR into ethnographic Tibet, the unacceptability of the withdrawal 
of Chinese troops as a precondition for negotiation, the failure of the Dalai Lama to 
publicly make a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, the rejection 
of liberal principles of autonomy and rejection of the applicability of the right of self- 
determination to minorities in China, the fact that the Dalai Lama has brought the 
Tibet Question into international focus, and the fact that regional autonomy for 
minority nationalities already exists in China. 145 At the root of the matter Hu Jintao, 
the general secretary and president of the People's Republic, has stated that it is 
essential to fight unequivocally against the separatist activities by the Dalai clique and 
anti-China forces in the world, vigorously develop a good situation of stability and 
unity in Tibet and firmly safeguard national unity and state security'. 146 
Despite this failure to negotiate, benefits in resolving the Tibet Question are apparent 
for the People's Republic, for example in the potential to enhance the state's 
international image and also indeed in respect of increased stability and unity. 147 Tibet 
continues to enjoy the benefit of autonomous status within the People's Republic, at 
least so far as the area of the TAR is concerned. It is clear, however, that the 
autonomy, the internal self-determination, Tibet has is viewed with cynicism by 
Tibetans and by those taking their part in the Sino-Tibetan discourse. The Dalai 
Lama's moves towards an enhanced autonomy have not come to fruition, and 
essentially an impasse has been reached. 
145 He Baogang, note 119, above 80. 
146 Quoted at He Baogang, ibid. The People's Republic thus also implicitly brings into the equation the 
current agenda of the 'War against Terror', although the 2001 remarks by Hu Jintao pre-date the terror 
attacks of 9/11. 
117 Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (The) (200 1), note 142 above. 
213 
The need is for Tibet to gain a greater control over its own affairs. It has been 
suggested that it is in the interests of the Tibetan elites to decouple religion and 
politics - 'an adoption of democracy by the Tibetan government in exile'. 148 The 
argument is based, for example, on a greater legitimisation, formulation of clearly 
defined Tibetan goals, the potential for violent resistance, 149 and uniting Tibetans 
behind political figures subject to election rather than a reincamating religious 
leader. 1 50 All these arguments are pertinent. There are though two particular factors to 
highlight here. The first is that Tibetans cannot afford to have the equivalent of a 
regency on the death of the present Dalai Lama. The weakness of effectively an 
interregnum before a successor attains his majority, and a successor chosen by whom, 
can only be damaging to Tibetan goals. 151 Secondly, 'The Han elite has a strong 
tendency to regard religion as antithetical to modernization. ' 152 The views of the 
People's Republic on religion are well documented, as are the country's views on the 
splittist activities of the Dalai Lama. A greater emphasis on politics rather than 
religion in Tibetan circles should enable Tibetans to strengthen the political argument 
for their own self-determination and, at the same time, is likely to be welcomed in the 
People's Republic. 
6.5 The Tibet Question and Supervised Statehood 
Resolution of the Tibet Question is in both the Tibetan and Chinese interests as with 
the ageing of the Dalai Lama a natural watershed approaches. Both sides have much 
148 Ardley J, The Tibetan Independence Movement. - Political, religious and Gandhian perspectives 
(London and New York: Rout ledgeC urzo n, 2002) 171. 149 Violence is antithetical to Buddhist teachings and creeds. 
150 Ardley, note 148 above, 172ff. 
151 In addition, the interregnum would be of indeterminate length: the immediate successor, or 
successors, may fail to attain the age of majority as happened during the nineteenth century. 
152 yU Changj1an-, 'Life in Lara Village, Tibet' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary 
Tiber Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 
2006) 258-282,281. 
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to risk if the impasse continues; for instance, a violent outcome, potentially involving 
revolution and repression, could destroy Tibet and its culture, but could also leave the 
People's Republic as a pariah in the international community. It is clear from this 
thesis that the concepts of self-determination and also sovereignty evolve; but Tibet 
has as yet been unable to find advantage in either concept. In the absence of a 
conclusion based on satisfactory autonomy, the doctrine of external self-determination 
merits further examination in seeking a solution to the Tibetan problem. 
It has proved difficult to fit notions of sovereignty and self-determination into the 
context of the Sino-Tibetan relationship, and it has been argued persuasively that the 
West has framed the debate on the Tibet Question: 
There is no neutral historical 'truth'that can resolve whether Tibet was always 
an independent nation or an integral part of China. What is more important is 
to recognize historical develoPments that have contributed to the framing of 
the question in absolutist terms of sovereignty or independence, something that 
was alien to both the Chinese and the Tibetans before the twentieth century. 153 
As a result, Dibyesh Anand suggests that sovereignty and self-determination provide 
the wrong framing for the Tibet Question, and believes that the debate should move 
beyond conventional international politics, where realpolitik is emphasised, in order 
to solve the Tibet issue. 154 1 believe that is unnecessary. It is indeed undesirable that 
this be the case: the issue needs to be resolved within the present international system 
153 Dibyesh Anand, 'The Tibet Question and the West: Issues of Sovereignty, Identity, and 
Representation' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet. - Politics, Development, and 
Societi, in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 285-304,287, emphasis in 
original. See also Dibyesh Anand, 'Western Colonial Representations of the Other: The Case of 
Exotica Tibet' (2007) 29(l) Neit, Political Science 23-42,41. 
154 Dibyesh Anand (2006), ibid, 287 and 297. 
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and can be. It is in this respect that the concept of supervised statehood emanating 
from the UN mediator in Kosovo comes to the fore. 
Supervised statehood as a concept brings an added dimension into international law, 
having the potential to expand the ambit of the principle of external self- 
determination. It emphasises the global reach of the international community, and 
adds to the growing pressures of international human rights on sovereignty. Thus the 
mapping of international law itself evolves, commensurate with the idea that 'The 
globalisation of the principle of sovereignty and the aggressive legitimation of state 
power by reference to morality and human rights leaves no-one and nothing 
untouched. ' 155 Indeed, Costas Douzinas is moved to comment that 'Human rights 
have become the raison dWre of the state system as its main constituents are 
challenged by economic, social and cultural trends'. 
156 
The proposals of Martti Ahtisaari indicate that the international order has taken on a 
new dimension, and as a result that nation states are not necessarily defined by their 
physical territorial boundaries. Other factors may be relevant, and one of these may be 
ethnicity, or ethnographic boundaries. Kosovars did not think of themselves as 
Yugoslavs, and particularly not as Serbs. 157 A sense of community becomes 
significant, a shared language, a shared culture. 
Michael van Walt van Praag has previously promulgated a solution to the Tibet 
Question in the form of a free association between Tibet and the People's Republic of 
China, suggesting that this is an arrangement that could be satisfactory to Tibetans, at 
155 Douzinas C, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2000) 374. 
156 lbid; hence the People's Republic's intent to justify its human rights policies in the publication of 
annual White Papers: see section 5.3.2 above. As to oppression and abuses of human rights in Tibet, 
see section 5.4 above, particularly section 5.4.1 with regard to violations characterised by abuse and 
torture; also section 3.4 above. 
157 Thus the attempt to secede from Serbia, if not from Yugoslavia, in 1990: section 6.3.2 above. 
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the same time safeguarding the primary interests of the People's Republic. 158 The 
initial problem here though is evident in the first of the features of free association 
listed by van Walt van Praag: 'the relationship must be a consensual one between two 
sovereign States .. . 
'. 159 Again the issue of statehood and territorial integrity arises - 
the centrepiece of the Tibet Question. 
Nevertheless, the concept of free association now finds an echo in the supervised 
statehood mooted with reference to Kosovo. It is in the Comprehensive Proposal for 
the Kosovo Status Settlement that the solution to the Tibet Question may be sought, 
for, although the ultimate outcome of this proposal is by no means certain, what can 
be said is that the very proposal and its mandate for supervised statehood open the 
door potentially for independence - thus focusing on the central issue of the Tibet 
Question. 160 
The Kosovo Status Settlement is a new and important development in the doctrine of 
self-determination, prospectively a new interpretation of the international order. 
Kosovo can be distinguished from states created following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and also from the states created from the other constituent parts of Yugoslavia 
in that it has enjoyed the status of an autonomous province, not a republic. Under the 
158 Van Wait van Praag MC, The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law 
(London: Wisdom Publications, 1987) 201; referring also to Principle VII of UNGA Resolution 1541 
(XV) of 1960, Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation 
exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter. It should be borne in 
mind that van Walt van Praag is a proponent of the argument that Tibet was an independent state at the 
time of the 1950 Chinese invasion (ibid 141), yet his proposal is not one directly and immediately 
pursuing a claim for historical sovereignty, rather it is the solution of a free association, with Tibet as 
the associate state, having the right, for example, to be a member of international organisations, 
including the UN, and thus 'Tibet would thereby resume the exercise of its sovereignty, but China 
would assume the desired degree of responsibility for Tibet's foreign relations and defense ... the 
more satisfactory solution of the Sino-Tibetan question in the long run, however, would be ... the 
reemergence of Tibet as a sovereign State in law and fact' (ibid 202). 159 lbid 201. 
160 See Lazar E, 'Afterword' in E Lazar (ed. ), Tibet: The Issue is Independence (Berkeley, CA: Parallax 
Press, 1994) 84, as to 'the central issue of Tibetan independence'. State opposition to Ahtisaari's 
proposals is inevitable, for example from Serbia, Russia and also the PRC: see section 6.3.3 above. 
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1974 Constitution, Kosovo was a constituent part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia 
and was recognised as such. In that, it bears similarities to the Tibet Autonomous 
Region under the Chinese Constitution. 
While the People's Republic of China is 'a unitary multi-national state', 161 and 
therefore distinguishable from the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, 
for example, this distinction loses potency by virtue of the fact that both Kosovo and 
Tibet are in essence autonomous regions. The Constitution of Serbia, of 28 September 
1990, in its Preamble states that 'Contrary to constitutional definition of multi- 
national states - independent or federal units - both in the world and in our country, 
the Constitution of Serbia does not define the State by applying the ethnic criterion' 
and in addition that 'According to the new Constitution of Serbia, only one State does 
exist, as everywhere in the world, in the territory of the single State of Serbia. ' 162 
Thus the Republic of Serbia, at the time when it was a part of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, stressed its territorial integrity, as indeed does the People's 
Republic of China. The Preamble goes on to refer to the units of territorial autonomy, 
formerly known as autonomous provinces, which are without state ftinctions. By 
Article 6, the Republic of Serbia included the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and 
Metohija, which is expressed to have a form of territorial autonomy. 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 163 comprising Serbia and 
Montenegro, promulgated on 27 April 1992, in turn refers to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 'as a sovereign federal state', 164 and in Article 3 refers to the territory of 
161 Preamble to the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China. 
162 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 28 September 1990. 
163 Translation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is reprinted in Trifunovska, 
note 58 above, 5-334-565. 
16' Article 1. Montenegro declared independence from Serbia and seceded consensually following a 
referendum on 21 May 2006, and was admitted to the United Nations on 28 June 2006: see, for 
example, BBC News, 'Montenegro declares independence' (2006) 
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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a single entity. No specific mention is made of 
Kosovo, which is an integral part of Serbia and therefore a unit within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The People's Republic of China operates under a system of 
democratic centralism, 165 practising regional autonomy on the basis that 'All the 
166 national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China' . 
Thus here one state exists, the People's Republic, and an autonomous area within that 
state is the TAR. Both Kosovo and Tibet therefore had autonomous status within the 
parent state; neither had the status of a republic. 
If Martti Ahtisaari's proposals comply with international law, and it was a 
prerequisite of the Settlement that they should, 167 then it would appear that secession 
by an autonomous region is potentially legitimated. This then would provide a basis 
for legitimising secession from the People's Republic by Tibet, and is potentially of 
profound significance in the context of the Tibet Question. The particular 
significance, though, is for the TAR, and the people of the TAR, rather than for 
ethnographic Tibet as a whole. It is secession for an autonomous region that is 
potentially legitimised, rather than for a people, an ethnic group, as a whole. This 
effectively builds on the views of the Badinter Commission: 'Although the definition 
of a people as the total population of a state was rejected by the EC and the Badinter 
Commission, the meaning of people based upon the nation was not accepted in its 
entirety. Instead the population of a sub-state territorial unit was deemed to be a 
people. ' 168 Thus Ahtisaari extends the meaning of people to those based in an 
autonomous region, in the case of Tibet the TAR. Consequently the Kosovo 
<http: Hnews. bbc. co. uk/ I /h i/world/europe/5 043 462. stm>, accessed 14 September 2007, and also 
<http: //www. un. org/members/list-shtml>. 
165Article 3 of the 1982 Constitution. 166 Article 4. 
167 See Guiding Principles of the Contact Group, notes 77 and 78 above. See also section 7.2 below. 
168 Radan, note 59 above; by reference to Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 2, note 63 above. 
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Settlement has implications for 'people' in the Tibetan context: it is the people within 
the specific unit of the TAR to which the Settlement has relevance. 
In addition, human rights are emphasised by the Contact Group. Thus credence 
appears to be given to the remedial right theory of self-determination. There is now a 
clear case for Tibet to seek to build on the trend emanating from the draft 
Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, within the confines of 
international law, and seek to claim external self-determination through supervised 
statehood based on the remedial right theory. This trend and the potential 
developments form the basis for the discussion in the concluding chapter that follows, 
as implications for both Tibet and for public international law and its norms are 
considered. 
1-)o 
7 Conclusions 
7.1 Opening Remarks 
Against the backdrop of Tibet this thesis has conducted an examination of the legal 
theory of self-determination and its limitations, demonstrating that to date norms of 
public international law have failed to resolve the Tibet Question. Principles not only 
of self-determination but also of sovereignty and territorial integrity and human rights 
have been analysed, and it is evident that these concepts are not static; rather, they are 
dynamic. Concepts such as sovereignty are overriding principles of international law, 
forming a body ofjus cogens, from which no derogation is permitted, ' and this thesis 
contends that self-determination, which is certainly of erga omnes character, has 
achieved the status ofjus cogens. 2 
Norms of international law have to accommodate each other in a rapidly changing 
world, and exceptions to them arise, either reaffirming the existence of the relevant 
norm or leading to the creation of new norms. Changing ideas of sovereignty and self- 
determination have been focused upon in the thesis and I have sought to explain how 
the international legal system and legal theory have impacted on the relationship 
between China and Tibet and why Tibet has been unsuccessful in promulgating 
claims to statehood and to self-determination. In this concluding chapter the validity 
of the proposed Kosovo Status Settlement will be examined, while emphasis will be 
given to the effect that the proposed settlement in Kosovo may have on the Tibet 
Question and the importance evolving concepts of self-determination may have for 
1 See Chapter 4, notes 6 and 60, also Case Concerning Militarý, and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States ofAmerica) ICJ Reports 1986,14. 
2 See section 2.4.1 above. 
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Tibetans. The perspective will provide a new focus for the issue, and in the final 
section of the chapter the pressures on and implications for public international law 
and its norms, emanating from the long-standing failure to bring about a resolution of 
the issues surrounding Tibet, will be discussed, in a context where the important legal 
principle of self-determination shows dynamic potential to extend its reach and what 
has been perceived as a general prohibition on unilateral secession has been called 
into question. 
7.2 The Kosovo Status Settlement: A New Development 
The evolution of the legal theory of self-determination has come at the expense of 
legal norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and, before turning to consider the 
prospective effect on Tibet of the Kosovo Status Settlement, it is necessary to 
consider if the Final Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement 
complies with international law, would realise a further extension of the theory of 
self-determination, or would have the potential to further extend the theory. 
It will be recalled that the Contact Group in its Guiding Principles provided that the 
settlement in Kosovo should be compatible with international law. 3 Compatibility is 
required, therefore, to international norms of human rights, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and also self-determination. The question is one of how such compatibility 
is to be determined, and that determination will fall to the international community in 
the forum of the United Nations. 
If the proposals of Martti Ahtisaari are approved and come to fruition they will 
represent an extension of the theory of self-determination. They clearly represent a 
Section 6.3.3 above. 
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new development, a development that comprises state building from the outside and 
one that challenges references in UN Security Council Resolutions, inter alia, to the 
commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). 4 Two factors then come into the equation: the first, as to how such 
a conclusion of an independent Kosovo is to be legitimated; the second, as to whether 
it will create a precedent despite the statement in the Special Envoy's Report that the 
solution for Kosovo 'does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts'. 5 
The UN Security Council is seised of the Kosovo conflict, as evidenced by the 
various resolutions it has passed in this respect and by the S ecretary- General's Letter 
of 26 March 2007,6 but the operation of peremptory norms does impose legal limits 
on the Security Council. The Security Council is required to act 'in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations', 7 and 'the UN Charter cannot be 
8 
construed as authorizing any organ to act in violation of jus cogens'. For a valid and 
binding Security Council action to exist, therefore, Principles havingjus cogens effect 
must be complied with, yet it is apparent that the Security Council is able to breach 
such principles in a variety of ways. 9 However, that breach does not prejudice the 
applicability of that norm and the encroachment on a norm having the effect of jus 
cogens is outside the Council's competence: the resolution may be void if it offends 
' See Chapter 6, note 67 above, and related text. 
5 Paragraph 15 of the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status, 
annexed to a Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, S/2007/168. This statement may have been inserted in the Special Envoy's Report 
because to date there has been no state practice backed up by opiniojuris to warrant the solution being 
a precedent. However, as argued below in this section, this is not to say the potential for a precedent 
does not exist. 6 Ibid. 
7 UN Charter, Article 24(2). 
8 Orakhelashvili A, 'The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions' (2005) 16(l) European Journal of International Law 59-88,69. 
9 Orakhelashvili, ibid, 77, and his analysis preceding; also 67. 
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jus cogens, 10 and thus the Security Council is not unconstrained by international 
norms. Nevertheless, although jus cogens may limit the action of the Security 
Council, it is feasible for a Security Council resolution to continue in force although 
6 repugnant in the eyes of the international community'. II 
The norm of sovereignty is a jus cogens norm, and will be violated if Kosovo 
achieves independence without the agreement of the FRY. The reaction to this 
situation by the UN General Assembly would be instructive, and issues of customary 
international law and opiniojuris become relevant: 'international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law' is one of the formal sources from which the rule 
of law derives validity. 12 The principles within the Kosovo Status Settlement have the 
potential to constitute development of state practice, and therefore customary 
international law. The substance of customary rules is located 'primarily in the actual 
practice and opiniojuris of States'. 13 Self-determination itself is a general principle of 
international law, a norm certainly erga omnes and, as argued, ofjus cogens, and may 
be expanded by customary international law. 
Opiniojuris should be ascertained 'from the fact of the external evidence of a certain 
custom and its necessity felt in the international community', although 'for it to 
become binding, a rule or principle of international law need not pass the test of 
universal acceptance'. 14 The Kosovo Status Settlement does result from work under 
the auspices of the United Nations, and it is of relevance that 'the passage of only a 
10 lbid 79,84-88. 
" lbid 88. 
12 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(l), annexed to the Charter of the United 
Nations; see also Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2004) 19. 
13 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab JamahiriyalMalta) Judgment of 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985,13, 
para. 27. See also Legality of the Threat or Use o Nuclear Weapons 1CJ Reports 1996,226, para. 64, ýf 
accessible at <http: //www. icj-cij. org/docket/files/95/7495. pdf>. 
14 Harris, note 12 above, 31 and 32 respectively. 
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short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule 
. 
15 ore the possibility of the UN General of customary international law' There is theref 
Assembly recognising the rapid emergence of a new rule of customary law based on 
the Kosovo Status Settlement- on the recent practice of states. ' 6 While by itself and 
in its initiation the Kosovo Status Settlement, if approved, does not necessarily 
constitute a definitive development in the principle of self-determination, it sets a 
trend, which has the potential to realise a further extension of the theory, an extension 
from which Tibet may be able to benefit. General Assembly resolutions may found 
proof of opinioJuris, 17 and 'must be considered a part of state practice', 18 from which 
customary law can be inferred. 19 Blaine Sloan suggests that: 
In indicating an opinio juris on the part of the States Members, Assembly 
resolutions may supply the missing element in a line of existing State practice 
and thus consummate usage into custom ... or they may 
inspire practice which 
will develop into law ... Resolutions adopted 
in a particular case might also be 
practice accompanied by opinio juris ... It 
is possible, however, that an opinio 
juris expressed in a resolution of the General Assembly will be itself sufficient, 
or may stimulate a practice which will eventually be consolidated into 
customary intemationa aw. 20 
The views of states of course remain crucial despite the views of writers, 21 yet there is 
clear potential for a rule of customary international law to emerge in validation of the 
supervised statehood proposals put forward under the Kosovo Status Settlement, thus 
15 lbid 27. 
16 Ibid 3 1. 
17 Ibid 39. 
18 Sloan B, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Our Changing World (1991) 71-75, 
poted in Harris, note 12 above, 55. 
See aI so Nicaragua v United States ofA merica, note I above, para. 18 8. 
20 Sloan quoted in Harris, note 12 above, 57. 
21 Harris, note 12 above, 59. 
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expanding the principle of self-determination even though the Special Envoy has 
specified that the Kosovo solution does not create a precedent. 22 This expansion has 
the capacity to be of significance for the Tibet Question. 
7.3 A Kosovan Focus for Tibet 
The thesis has demonstrated the primacy in international law of the concepts of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the importance of an entity being able to establish 
statehood. Sovereignty as a construct has been developed from its Western roots in 
the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648,23 and it is in this Western construct that the Tibet 
Question has been formulated. The international community as a whole has not 
recognised that Tibet meets the criteria for statehood, the criteria being those specified 
in Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 24 The 
importance of recognition to statehood, although not a criterion for statehood, has 
been emphasised. 
25 
Tibetans, by virtue of their lack of participation in the larger community during the 
first half of the twentieth century, by their failure to participate in international 
organisations such as the League of Nations and by their failure to modernise, have 
been unable to mount a convincing case to establish that Tibet was an independent 
22 The principle of self-determination is itself a part of customary international law: Western Sahara 
Case, ICJ Reports 1975,12, para. 56; see also section 2.2 above. 
23 4 The effect of the Peace of Westphalia was to consolidate the existing States and principalities 
(including those whose existence or autonomy it recognized or established) at the expense of the 
Empire, and ultimately at the expense of the notion of the civitas gentium maxima - the universal 
community of mankind transcending the authority of States': Crawford J, The Creation of States in 
International Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 10. 
24 165 LNTS 19. The Convention was signed at Montevideo on 26 December 1933 and entered into 
force on 26 December 1934. 
25See Chapter 4, note 17 and section 4.2.2 above. It is also exemplified by the Arbitration Commission 
of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 8 (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 
1521-1523, point 2: 'while recognition of a state by other states has only declarative value, such 
recognition, along with membership of international organizations, bears witness to these states' 
conviction that the political entity so recognized is a reality and confers on it certain fights and 
obligations under international law'. 
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state at the time of the Chinese occupation of 1950.26 T us other states do not 
recognise Tibet as a state and, in international law, itself largely a construct of and 
dominated by Western states who engage in and are in turn in thrall to the realpolitik 
of international relations, Tibet has fallen outside the scheme of things. 27 As a result 
China has been able to maintain its occupation and assert that Tibet was historically 
part of its territory, relying on other states not to interfere in its domestic affairs on a 
basis of territorial integrity. 28 This is buttressed by the political power of the People's 
Republic of China, a dominant force and Permanent Member of the United Nations 
Security Council. Thus, for example, the United States recognises the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) as an integral part of the People's Republic. 29 
The issue of sovereignty is at the heart of the Tibet Question, but the primacy of the 
concept of sovereignty is itself under pressure. Neil Walker refers to a 'new multi- 
dimensional configuration ... 
in which state and non-state polities relate'; 30 in effect 
a constitutional pluralism, 'multiple levels of constitutional discourse and authority'. 31 
Walker argues that sovereignty is a centralised and orderly framework through which 
other 'values and virtues may flourish'. 32 Thus, while sovereignty may be subject to 
various pressures, it remains a core concept that cannot be sidelined, to the extent that 
'the entire U. N. conceptual structure is predicated on the recognition and legitimation 
26 Tibetan sovereignty dejure has not been recognised: see sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.2. 
27 See section 4.2.3 regarding international law as a Western construct. See also Dibyesh Anand, 'The 
Tibet Question and the West: Issues of Sovereignty, Identity, and Representation' in B Sautman and JT 
Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet. - Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, 
New York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 285-304,285-288. 
28 See, for example, Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, with reference to the territorial 
integrity and political independence of states. 
29 CRS, 'China-U. S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U. S. Policy', Report for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, updated 20 January 2006, 
<http: //fpc. state. gov/documents/organization/61492. pdf>, accessed 14 September 2007, p. 21; see also 
Sloane RD, 'The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet' (2002) 
16 Emory International Law Review 107-186,107. 
30 Walker N, 'Late Sovereignty in the European Union' in N Walker (ed. ) Sovereignty in Transition 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 3-32,5. 
31 lbid 4. 
32 lbid 3 1. 
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of the sovereignty of individual states'. 33 The pressures, though, come from a variety 
of sources: for instance, an expanding principle of self-determination which, since its 
inception, has undergone profound changes, the evolution of human rights covenants 
and conventions, a combination of sub-state nationalism and supranationalism, and 
potentially from the communicative power of the Internet. The Government of the 
People's Republic sees the latter as a threat, and the state seeks to exert control over 
the content of the Web available to its citizens. 34 The threat to sovereignty from a 
rising tide of sub-state nationalism and supranationalism is evident in Europe in the 
guise of the European Union and developments towards subsidiarity. It takes form as 
a potential alternative concept to sovereignty, a contrasting principle, 35 but as yet is in 
its infancy and restricted to a European dimension. There is, nevertheless, a 
weakening of exclusive territoriality. 36 
All these pressures provide checks and controls to external sovereignty. Human rights 
were considered in some detail in Chapter 5 above, where the focus was placed on 
abuses of the human rights of Tibetans. These abuses, from a practical point of view, 
have had little impact in the wider world, despite UN resolutions referring to the 
fundamental rights of the Tibetan people. 37 The human rights factor does though 
supply a platform for debate: 'the expanding human rights agenda, with its growing 
visibility at the global level, has opened up the social and political space that enables 
33 Hardt M and Negri A, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) 4-5. 
34 See section 4.3 above. 
35 See Carozza, note 76, Chapter 4 above. 
36 This in turn may lead to a new order having the potential to transcend sovereignty. For the 
weakening of the sovereign state in the EU, see MacCormick N, Questioning Sovereignty Law, State, 
and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), especially 
Chapter 8. 
37 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV) in 1959,1723 (XVI) in 1961 and 2079 
(XX) in 1965. Also see Resolution 199 1 /L. 19 of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and, generally, section 3.4.3 above. 
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people to challenge the domestic status quo and to challenge the state'. 38 The idea of 
human rights thus gives Tibetans a public presence and leverage within international 
39 debate, yet in and of itself it has the potential to cloud the Tibetan debate, 
particularly the potential to antagonise representatives of the People's Republic. 
As to the doctrine of self-detennination, to date it has proved a false friend to Tibet. 40 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of principles of external self-determination into 
international law has had the effect of impinging on the law relating to sovereignty, 
contesting with that norm and effectively state building from the outside. 41 In Chapter 
2 the developments of the doctrine during the twentieth century were traced, from the 
effect of the theory at the time of the Peace Settlement in Europe following the First 
World War, through its application to peoples in the colonial context subsequent to 
the Second World War, to its interpretation in the Post-Cold War era; developments 
marked by momentum from a series of major events rather than a smooth progress. Its 
acceptance as a legal principle was entrenched, a principle of erga omnes character 
and arguably forming part of the body of jus cogens, with both legal and political 
implications. Issues inherent in the theory were examined, and the theory was 
analysed. Following an appraisal of Tibet's status and its changing identity in Chapter 
3, and chapters specifically dedicated to sovereignty and human rights, Chapter 6 
38 Mountcastle A, 'The Question of Tibet and the Politics of the "Real"' in B Sautman and JT Dreyer 
(eds), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New 
York: ME Sharpe, 2006) 85-106,93. See also in this context notes 16-18, Chapter 2 above and related 
text, together with reference to points of entry for non-state actors to argue their case for self- 
determination. 
39 Mountcastle, ibid, 92 and 87. 
40 Richard Falk refers to Tibet having experienced 'the demoralizing burdens of thwarted self- 
determination and the criminal cruelties of persisting Chinese occupation', in contrast to Yugoslavia, 
'experiencing the full nihilistic brunt of self-determination', both instances comprising *opposed 
tragedies': Falk R, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995)30. 
41 See section 2.4.1 above with reference to self-determination as a principle of international law; also 
note 45 below and related text regarding state building from the outside. 
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analysed the principle of self-detennination as it has evolved in the twenty-first 
century. 
The two aspects to self-determination, external and internal, were examined in the 
context of Tibet. Internal self-determination in the form of autonomy is less 
threatening to the integrity of the state than is external self-determination, with its 
deducible extreme of secession from an existing state. However, a distinction is 
evident between the regional autonomy deriving from Marxist principles that the TAR 
enjoys and liberal principles of autonomy on which the Dalai Lama bases his proposal 
for genuine autonomy. 42 The distinction also highlights the fact that in debating the 
Tibet Question two different Tibets emerge: the TAR, viz political Tibet, and 
ethnographic Tibet - which includes Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo, now 
incorporated within Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. The TAR has been treated 
differently by the People's Republic of China: the 1951 Agreement on Measures for 
the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, for instance, related specifically to political rather 
than ethnographic Tibet, and it is political Tibet that has the status of an autonomous 
region. While prior to 1950 there is a strong argument that the Dalai Lama's writ ran 
in political Tibet, it is less clear that Tibetan government, or indeed any government, 
held sway and dominated in that part of Tibet that may be termed Inner Tibet. 43 
While the Dalai Lama has moved towards a position seeking enhanced autonomy, not 
only for the TAR but also for the remainder of ethnographic Tibet, such moves have 
so far failed to produce a result. Indeed, the People's Republic has shown extreme 
reluctance to engage in any negotiation on the Tibet Question, and will not negotiate 
unless and until the Dalai Lama publicly makes a commitment that Tibet is an 
42 See section 6.4.2 above. 43 See section 4.4.2.3 above. 
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inalienable part of China. The Tibet Question has not been resolved through 
autonomy, and thus the question of sovereignty and therefore external self- 
determination returns to the fore. Secession has been analysed in Chapter 6, as it is in 
opposition to concepts of territorial integrity and sovereignty. As a result of the 
apparent inviolability of such concepts it may be seen that, subject to exceptions, 
unilateral secession is not recognised in international law. 44 However, recent 
developments in the Kosovan context indicate a momentum to the contrary, a 
momentum that has the potential to establish an exception to the bar prohibiting 
unilateral secession, and new support for secessionist entities, in short a new 
dimension to the right of self-determination. 
The exception of supervised statehood has itself to reach fruition in Kosovo, yet it is 
the fact that Martti Ahtisaari, UN mediator in Kosovo, has felt able to make the 
proposal in compliance with the norms of international law that is important and 
demonstrates the evolving boundaries of the legal theory of self-determination and 
also the dynamism and momentum of the theory. It represents state building from the 
outside, 45 and consequently an attack on the supposed illegality of unilateral secession 
and on concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity even though it is stated that the 
settlement should not create a precedent in relation to other unresolved conflicts. " It 
also represents an opportunity for Tibetans to ensure that the international community 
becomes fully seised of the Tibet Question. Just as the People's Republic of China has 
taken advantage of the Western doctrine of sovereignty, potentially the way is now 
open for Tibet to take advantage of self-determination through a legitimated claim for 
" Certainly outside the context of self-determination: Abi-Saab G, 'Conclusion' in MG Kohen (ed. ), 
Secession: International Law Perspectii, es (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 470-476, 
474. 
45 See Chapter 6, note 98 above and related text; also section 6.5 above. 
46 Paragraph 15 of the Report: see note 5 above and related text. 
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supervised statehood . 
47 'The right of self-determination is indivisible', 
48 
and thus, if 
the Kosovan example is applicable to Tibet, then Tibet should find support in the 
international community for a claim to similar independence. It is also of relevance 
that 'Laws not only represent reality, but also create it'. 49 For instance, law has the 
potential to create the reality of an independent Kosovo. 
A weakening of the nonn of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is 
apparent and the autonomous region of Tibet should be positioned prospectively to 
benefit from the proposal of supervised statehood for the autonomous province of 
Kosovo, which has been administered by the United Nations since Resolution 1244 
(1999). 50 There are further factors though which are relevant. First, the potential 
importance of the remedial right theory promulgated in respect of self-determination 
should not be overlooked, particularly in conjunction with the advent of the apparent 
exception to the bar against unilateral secession. The Contact Group, in its ten 
Guiding Principles, emphasised the importance of human rights. 51 Chapter 5 of the 
thesis has demonstrated an ongoing pattern of human rights abuse in Tibet, and that 
abuse founds a basis on which Tibetans can argue for self-determination - the self- 
determination to take the form of supervised statehood. 52 It will be for Tibetans to 
47 The lack of clear-cut boundaries to the principle of self-determination and the fact that Tibet has not 
been seen as a right-holder have been referred to at section 2.2 above. Kosovo, too, as a province rather 
than a republic, has not previously been seen as a right-holder. The PRC rigidly interprets the doctrine 
of sovereignty, emphasising territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state, 
which are perceived as purely internal matters for the state: see section 4.2.3 above. 
48 Seidel G, 'A New Dimension of the Right of Self-Determination in Kosovo? ' in C Tomuschat (ed. ), 
Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002) 203-215,213. 
49Twining W, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000) 23 8. 
'0 Background on the Origins of UNOSEK, note 75, Chapter 6 above. 
51 See notes 76 and 78, Chapter 6 above and related text. 
52 It equally founds a basis for Tibetans to argue a case for meaningful autonomy based on the remedial 
right theory: section 3.5.3 above. 
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show a systematic discrimination and grave violations of human rights, thus bringing 
about equivalence of their situation with that of the Kosovars. 53 
A second pertinent factor relates to the people entitled to self-determination. 
Generally, resolution of the issue of 'peoples' entitled to the benefit of the principle of 
self-determination is in a state of flux, the nature of 'peoples' being undefined. 54 Like 
the Kosovars, Tibetans are 'a group of people living in a cohesive territory and they 
are closely connected by a common history, language, religion, culture and mentality. 
These are characteristics that distinguish one people from another. ' 55 As a result, as a 
people, Tibetans have the right to self-determination, certainly so far as internal self- 
determination is concerned. However, if the analogy with Kosovo is to be taken up by 
Tibet and secession pursued, it is the autonomous unit that is of clear relevance, and 
thus the claim for supervised statehood should reside in the TAR rather than in 
ethnographic Tibet. The Kosovan example consequently gives the focus and 
definition to 'peoples' that is required in the Tibetan context. 56 
A third factor of significance is that unilateral secession where it has arguably 
succeeded may be seen to be largely a product of violent revolution - Bangladesh, 
Kosovo - and such violence, and also terrorism, play a part in a changing world order. 
Consequently, if all political weapons, including those relating to revolution, are to be 
53 Seidel, note 48 above, 209; also 210: 'The right of an oppressed people or minority to demand 
secession ... is the sanction against a 
State's policy of ignorance and permanent and serious violations 
of human rights imposed on [a] people or minority. ' 54 See section 2.3.1 above. 55 Seidel, note 48 above, 205. 
56 The status of the right to self-determination is dependent upon the recognition of the collective in 
question, and the recognition given to an expanded definition of 'peoples' to include the Kosovar 
Albanians should help to confer similar status on Tibetans. This focus given by the Kosovo example, 
though, entails Tibetans limiting in this respect what they have sought to date, and in a claim for 
supervised statehood excluding areas falling outside the TAR. The collective in question having the 
right to self-determination through supervised statehood would be the population in the autonomous 
region: see section 4.4.2.1 above regarding the population of the TAR. See section 2.3.1 above 
generally regarding 'peoples'. This is a problem Tibetans need to concentrate on as much support for 
the independence movement comes from Khampas and Amdowas, who regard themselves as Tibetans 
and committed to the independence struggle: see section 4.4.2.3 above. 
233 
available to Tibetans, it is necessary to decouple politics from religion, 57 while at the 
same time it is important not to distance religion too far from politics in the Tibetan 
context, because such support as Tibet has found over recent decades is based largely 
on support for the person of the Dalai Lama and for the Buddhist religion. Yet in 
Buddhism violence is antithetical, and if Tibetans are to pursue a claim for external 
self-determination then civil disobedience in the form of violent resistance may even 
now prove to be an essential precursor; state opposition to the concept of supervised 
statehood as expounded by Martti Ahtisaari is only to be expected, both in respect of 
Kosovo and otherwise when propounded. 58 
Nevertheless there are compelling reasons why the People's Republic of China should 
consider a political solution to the Tibet Question and a reappraisal of the Sino- 
Tibetan relationship. First, there are external pressures in respect of human rights, and 
the People's Republic produces White Papers defending the state's position to the 
outside world - therefore the state is conscious of the potential impact of expanding 
human rights covenants, conventions, laws and custom; secondly, political realities 
regarding easing/improving relations with Taiwan, and whether Taiwan may be 
persuaded to return to the motherland; thirdly, increasing democratisation in China 
(and globally); fourthly, the advantages to the People's Republic, economically and 
politically, in ftill participation in the international community, and in particular in an 
improved and constructive relationship with America; and fifthly, the peaceful 
resolution of the Tibet Question, a resolution that may not only pay political dividends 
57 See Ardley J, The Tibetan Independence Movement. - Political, religious and Gandhian perspectives 
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) 178-18 1. Gerd Seidel argues in the circumstances of 
Kosovo, in the context of the maintenance of international peace, that 'Only a change in the status quo 
- the secession of Kosovo desired by the Kosovo Albanians - could ensure peace': Seidel, note 48 
above, 213. 
58 Parent state opposition to such self-determination is inevitable, and has been evidenced in respect of 
the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and East Timor from Indonesia. The role of violence in 
independence movements generally, and the attendant implications for international law, is an 
interesting and increasingly important topic, but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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but also achieve security of the state and provide economic dividends, 59 combining 
with the fact that violent repression of a Tibetan revolution, realistically an alternative 
to a peaceful resolution, is likely to lead to the People's Republic becoming a pariah 
of the intemational community. 60 
In this sense, realpolitik has obvious relevance, impacting on legal doctrines in the 
context of a Kosovan solution for Tibet based on supervised statehood and providing 
a window of oPportunity for a peaceftil resolution of the Tibet Question. Equally it 
impacts from the Tibetan perspective, for no state to date has supported or recognised 
Tibetan independence. As the present Dalai Lama has entered his eighth decade, an 
urgency to resolve the Tibet Question is required, and thus it is now for further 
research to ensure that new impetus is given to the resolution of the Tibet Question by 
a refocus of the question into the ongoing discourse on self-determination, to take 
advantage of its widening momentum into the concept of supervised statehood 
broadened within the remedial right theory. 61 Such a refocus will provide an 
opportunity for the doctrine of self-determination to stem the physical movement of 
peoples from Tibet, 62 and also to establish finally the political and legal identity of 
Tibetans. It will create pressure on the international community to achieve a 
consistency in its approach to the principle of self-determination, and to achieve this 
before the Tibetans resort to violence. 
59 Economic dividends may be obtained as a result of reduction in the subsidies paid in regard to the 
TAR: see note 160, Chapter 5 above and section 6.4.1 above. 
60 Violent repression is more likely subsequent to the death of the present Dalai Lama, who exerts a 
moderating influence and whose 'stated goal of autonomy does not seem to correspond with the wishes 
of the majority of the Tibetan people': Ardley, note 57 above, 180. With regard to the issue of 
revolution, see note 53, Chapter 6 above. 
61 It is in this concept of supervised statehood that an interstice opens up in the norm of sovereignty, 
which allows additional space for wider interpretation of self-determination. 
62 Economist, 'Hu's afraid of the Dalai Lama' (2006) 
<http: //www. economist. com/opiniorL, /displaystory. cftn? story_id=8172922>, accessed 14 September 
2007: 'Disaffection with Chinese rule remains , videspread. Up to 3,000 Tibetans still sneak across the 
border to Nepal and India every year. ' 
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7.4 Implications for Public International Law 
While the primacy of sovereignty and territorial integrity has been recognised in this 
thesis, it has also been shown that sovereignty is coming under increasing attack as 
other norms having the status, too, of jus cogens compete. Evidence of this has been 
elaborated in the particular instance of Kosovo. 
There is as yet no final outcome so far as Kosovo is concerned, but the implications to 
date for international law and the international community are stark. The dynamism of 
the theory of self-determination has become clear over the last century as it has 
evolved as a legal principle and into its present form in the post-Cold War era. The 
concept of supervised statehood for Kosovo is a new departure, emphasising self- 
determination and human rights of a people in an autonomous region to the detriment 
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an existing nation state that has infringed 
principles of human rights and self-determination, 63 and if pursued supplies a new 
exception to the norm of sovereignty. While this in itself can reaffirm the existing 
norm of sovereignty, it also potentially opens the door for peoples seeking external 
self-determination as a new trend develops. Further, it instances a situation whereby 
states as the principal actors on the international stage are under pressure. For China, 
international law is seen as an instrument of a state's foreign policy, and in 
consequence it is only states that participate in international law and have legal 
personality. 64 However, if Martti Ahtisaari's proposals, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, come to fruition,, the outcome will be a new state, having seceded 
against the will of its parent state, participating in international law. The Kosovo 
Status Settlement is particularly significant because Kosovo has had the status of an 
63 In this regard, see Seidel 2 10 at note 53 above. 
64 See section 4.2.3 above. 
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autonomous unit within a state. It was not and had not been a state, nor even a 
republic. 
65 
The new dimension opening up within international law as a result of the Kosovo 
proposals, which according to the Guiding Principles issued by the Contact Group 
should be fully compatible with international law, 66 is congruent with the 
International Court of Justice's interpretation of self-determination in cases such as 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia), 67 which brought about a space for minorities to 
argue a case for self-determination. 68 Further, beyond the instance of Kosovo in 
regard to self-determination, there is increasing intervention by the international 
community in the affairs of sovereign states. 69 Thus there is a growing force in 
opposition to norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the shape of 
international law changes, as the concept of exclusive territoriality weakens. 70 An 
increasing globalisation, an intensification of ever more complex worldwide social 
relations, disputes the primacy of norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
65 See section 6.3.3 above. Hence the Status Settlement represents state building from the outside: see 
section 7.3 above. 66 See sections 6.3.3 and 7.2 above. 67 ICJ Reports 1995,90. 
68 See section 2.2 above. 
69 Instances are numerous. For example, in Iraq, in respect of 'the intervention and overthrow of its 
government in 2003' (Crawford, note 23 above, 74), the legality of which intervention has been the 
subject of considerable and fractious debate, and by virtue of which 'some of the most fundamental 
rules and principles of international law are now in a state of flux': Lowe V, 'The Iraq Crisis: What 
NowT (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 859-871,859. In Sudan, the 
international community supplies financial, logistical and political support to African Mission in the 
Sudan Peacekeepers, but the UN has shown a reluctance to intervene directly 'in a situation in which 
there has been no semblance of consent among the parties to begin serious negotiations or to accept the 
presence of "peacekeepers"': Hannum H, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The 
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996) 493. In Somalia, in contrast, action has been taken by individual states who see such 
action as being in their national interest, rather than by the UN; Ethiopian forces have intervened, as 
have the USA: for example, Crilly R, 'Analysis: a military victory but Somalia vacuum looms' (2006) 
<http: //www. ti meson I ine. co. uk/tol/news/world/article 12646 89. ece>, accessed 14 September 2007; 
Clayton J, 'US strikes at al-Qaeda in Somalia' (2007) 
<http: //www. ti meson Ii ne. co. uk/to I/news/world/artic le 1290 852. ec e>, accessed 14 September 2007. 
70 See, for example, MacCormick note 36 above and Walker, note 30 above, together with related text. 
Conversely, the principle of self-determination, which itself has limitations, as shown by its inability as 
yet to assist Tibet, strengthens and broadens. 
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thus the consolidation of states at the expense of empire emanating from the Peace of 
Westphalia. 71 
A reconfiguration of international law emerges under various pressures. First, from an 
expanding doctrine of human rights, not only rights of individuals but also group 
rights, and the concept of supervised statehood imports an added dimension into 
international law. 72 Secondly, from an extended list of participants in international 
law, noting the instance of Kosovo, the judgment in cases such as East Timor 
(Portugal v Australia), 73 and work such as the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 1994, whereby indigenous peoples took part in the 
74 Working Group that formulated the draft. The September II World Trade Center 
attack in New York in 2001 also demonstrates an instance of non-state actors shaking 
'the basic conceptual framework of international law as a primarily inter-State 
matter'. 
75 
A third pressure comprises the increasing reach of actors in an increasingly integrated 
world,, impacting on norms of international law as those actors, state or non-state, 
show themselves prepared to intervene in the affairs of third party states, in the form, 
for example, of the use of force and military occupation. 76 In this respect also, 
supranational organisations impinge on the established power of states, organisations 
71 See note 23 above and related text; Michael Ignatieff refers to 'a new exercise of imperial rule': 
Ignatieff M, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003) 
109. 
72 See, for example, section 6.5 above; also Douzinas C, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal 
Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 374. 73 Note 67 above. 
74 (1995) 34 International Legal Materials 546; see section 2.4.2.4 above. 
75 Lowe, note 69 above, 859. 
76 Ibid. Bill Bowring refers to the 'degradation' of international law following the response of both the 
USA and the UK to 9/11, whereby certain states do not accept that international law is a legitimate curb 
on the use of force: Bowring B, 'The degradation of international law' in J Strawson (ed. ), Law after 
Ground Zero (London: Glasshouse Press, 2002) 3-19,3; also at 15: 'The Security Council, and, in 
effect, the whole of the [UNJ Charter and customary law on the use of force and self-defence, have 
been jettisoned in the name of the war against terrorism. ' 
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such as the European Union and the World Trade Organisation. Non-governmental 
organisations are prevalent and the Internet has the power to exacerbate tensions. 
The new dimension to the international order prospectively emanating from the 
Kosovo proposals, the capacity for re-mapping and reconfiguration of norms of 
international law resulting, have the potential for violence and fragmentation of states, 
and it is this potential that will now exercise the international community. Public 
international law needs to adapt to a changing world order in which existing norms 
are threatened by the effects of globalisation and the emergent norms of human rights, 
including the evolving principle of self-determination, a utilisation of the remedial 
right theory and a momentum from the Kosovo Status Settlement that has the 
potential to bring about a further exception to the restrictions on unilateral secession. 
It has been made clear in this thesis that unilateral secession is not recognised at 
international law, and that state practice has resisted any claim thereto. 77 Modem 
history reveals that, for a people to have the prospect of unilateral secession, violent 
civil disobedience is a genuine and credible strategy. This is the evidence of 
Bangladesh and also apparently of Kosovo. The concept of the state as the principal 
actor indeed dictates this, and thus it seems that where a state is unilaterally to 
separate along national or ethnic lines, outside the context of decolonisation, violence 
is generally a prerequisite. 78 This reflects the 'philosophy of violence' referred to by 
77 Section 6.3.1 above. 
78 An example of a mutual rather than a unilateral separation is the Velvet Divorce of the Czech and 
Slovak Republics on I January 1993, which did not entail violent rebellion: see section 2.4.2.2 above. 
Violence is not a route that necessarily leads to secession, although it has been the precursor to 
secession in Bangladesh, and will have been the precursor to secession in Kosovo if ultimately 
secession there is the end result: as to Bangladesh, see, for example, Choudhury GW, The Last Days of 
United Pakistan (London: C Hurst & Co, 1974) 186-187; also Bose S, 'Anatomy of Violence: Analysis 
of Civil War in East Pakistan in 197 F (2005) 40(4 1) Economic and Political Weekly 4463-4471,4464- 
4467; and Crawford, note 23 above, 141. Chechnya, however, is no nearer to self-determination as a 
result of violence against the Russian state, and violence can be equated with terrorism against which 
nation states are united, particularly in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. Yet, even in recent years, 
terrorist violence can be construed as successful, and gains by organisations such as the Republicans in 
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71 
rom Alain Finkielkraut Indeed, the failure of Tibet to achieve its independence f 
China, its self-determination, is itself an indication that violence is a necessary 
precursor to unilateral self-determination. 
Fragmentation of states, an ever-increasing number of states, is the ultimate result of 
an expanding doctrine of self-determination, potentially leading to a greater fluidity of 
legal and political identity and increased movement of peoples; all these points 
evidenced by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia into its constituent parts. A 
greater tolerance within states coupled with the granting of greater autonomy to 
regions has the power to counteract the break-up of states, yet ultimately secession 
may be justified within the remedial right theory of self-determination. 
A particular problem for the international community is that international law is 
interpreted in a broad fashion at the whim of powerful states, as evidenced for 
example in the divergent attitudes of states regarding both Iraq and also situations 
pertaining on the African continent . 
80 It is in this notion of realpolitik exercised by the 
powerful that the kernel of one problem for Tibet lies, and indeed a problem is 
presented for the international community to solve .81 Tibet needs to establish, 
in the 
Northern Ireland and the Basque Separatists in Spain have been achieved through, or despite, terrorist 
action. See also note 58 above re violence in independence movements. 
79 Finkielkraut A, In the Name of Humanity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 
2001) 24. Such philosophy was endemic in the 20th century and is subject to criticism by Finkielkraut, 
who refers to the turnaround of philosophical tradition in a chapter entitled 'The Irony of History', 
whereby 'Evil is now good and violence useful': ibid 63. There is no sign of an end to this philosophy, 
and John Gray concludes his thought-provoking Black Mass with the words, 'the violence of faith 
looks set to shape the coming century': Gray J, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of 
Utopia (London: Allen Lane, 2007) 2 10. 
'0 See note 69 above. International law, and the international political system generally, protect 
incumbent states, but at the whim of dominant powers: compare the situations that have pertained in 
Iraq, Sudan and Somalia, and also note the failure of the Kurds as well as the Tibetans and Chechens to 
establish their own state. It is noteworthy that states 'rank what they take to be their vital interests over 
more universal considerations': Gray, note 79 above, 197. 
81 The divergent attitudes of major powers to Tibet and to Outer Mongolia, which achieved 
independence recognised by China in 1946, is evidence of the part played by realpolitik in self- 
deten-nination. See note 93, Chapter 4 above, and reference to the argument that at the start of the 20th 
century the status of Outer Mongolia and Tibet with respect to China was similar. Power as a key 
concept in political realist theory has been referred to in section 1.33.1 above; see also the five 
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first place, entitlement to the same form of supervised statehood as proposed for 
Kosovo, utilising in this instance the remedial right theory. Having done so, however, 
Tibetans need to then consider the impact of a resort to violent civil disobedience, and 
in this regard I have emphasised the necessity of Tibetans divorcing politics from 
religion, while at the same time not alienating their present supporters in so doing. 82 
Principally, though, Tibet needs to persuade powerful allies to take its side, and the 
most powerful of these is the United States. It was unable to do so in the 1950s and, in 
consideration of this particular problem, it must be borne in mind that America will 
not perceive it to be in its interest to risk direct military confrontation with the 
People's Republic of China. 83 In turn, however, the international community needs to 
find a route whereby entities such as Kosovo and Tibet can achieve self-determination 
without first having to resort to violence. 
The Kosovo Status Settlement and the reaction to it of the international community 
are important for the future of international law. The failure to date of the 
international community and public international law to resolve the issues 
surrounding Tibet, combined with the failure to resolve other self-determination 
issues such as Kosovo and Bangladesh, also East Timor and Chechnya, peacefully 
and without recourse to violence, leads to the conclusion that the time is ripe for a 
new accommodation between the jus cogens norms of sovereignty and self- 
determination, at a time when violence and international terrorism are increasingly 
central to the thoughts of the international community. A remodelling is necessary to 
minimise friction between states and other actors, to avoid a perceived necessity of 
propositions of realism referred to in Grieco JM, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism' in DA Baldwin (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism. - 
The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 )) 116-140,118-119. 
82 Sections 6.4.2 and 7.3 above; Chapter 6, note 70 and related text also. 
83 See Chapter 3, note 120 above. 
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recourse to violence and the potentially destructive forces of self-determination, and 
to achieve resolution to long-standing areas of discord within the international 
community such as Kosovo and Tibet. For Tibet, the moment has come to refocus its 
claims with reference to self-determination and take advantage of a reconfiguration of 
international law potentially brought about through the machinations of the Kosovo 
Status Settlement. 
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Appendix of Primary Sources 
International Instruments 
821-822 Sino-Tibetan Treaty 
1648 Peace of Westphalia 
1842 Letters of Agreement between Tibet and Ladakh 
1856 Treaty between Nepal and Tibet 
1904 Convention between Great Britain and Tibet 
1912 Urga Treaty 
1914 Simla Convention 
1922 Treaty of Versailles/Covenant of the League of Nations 
1929 Lateran Treaty 
1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 
1945 Charter of the United Nations 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War 
1954 Sino-Indian. Trade Agreement over Tibetan Border 
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1955 Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
1956 Agreement on Economic Aid between China and Nepal 
1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity 
1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol 1) 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights 
2003 EU Treaty of Accession 
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Security Council Resolutions 
SC Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998 
SC Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998 
SC Resolution 1239 of 14 May 1999 
SC Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 
SC Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999 
General Assembly Resolutions 
GA Resolution 1353 (XIV) of 21 October 1959 
GA Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 
GA Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 
GA Resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960 
GA Resolution 1723 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 
GA Resolution 2079 (XX) of 18 December 1965 
GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 
GA Resolution 2758 (YXVI) of 25 October 1971 
GA Resolution 3458 (XXX) of 10 December 1975 
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GA Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992 
GA Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 
Miscellaneous UN/League of Nations Resolutions, Declarations and 
Documents 
The Aaland Islands Question; Report Submitted to the Council of the League of 
Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League Doc B. 7.21/68/106 (1921) 
Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, 5 September 1991 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1995) 34 International Legal 
Materials 546 
Letter Dated 9 July 1998 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Germany to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary- General, UN DOC S/1998/657,16 
July 1998 
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, dated 23 February 
1999 at Rambouillet, France (annexed to UN DOC S/1999/648) 
Draft Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, February 2007 
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, with Report of the Special Envoy of the S ecretary- General on 
Kosovo's future status annexed, S/2007/168; and Addendum comprising the 
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Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, S/2007/168/Add. I 
Documents Relating to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution of the Economic and Social Council of 16 February 1946 (document E/20 
of 15 February 1946) 
Resolution E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1991/L. 19 of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 23 August 1991 
Summary Record of the 51st Meeting of the CHR, E/CN. 4/2004/SR. 51 (16 April 
2004) 
Draft resolution concerning the impacts of globalisation on human rights, 
E/CN. 4/2004/L. 35 
Summary Record of the 26th Meeting of the CHR, E/CN. 4/2005/SR. 26 (30 March 
2005) 
Resolution 2006/2 of the Human Rights Council, 29 June 2006 
National and Other Constitutions 
1931 [Chinese] Soviet Republic Constitution 
1954 Chinese Constitution 
1974 Yugoslav Constitution 
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1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union 
1982 Chinese Constitution 
1990 Constitution of Serbia 
1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Chinese Legislation, White Papers and Policy Paper 
Legislation 
1979 Criminal Law 
1990 Administrative Litigation Law 
1990 Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration 
1990 Regulations on Administrative Supervision 
1995 State Compensation Law 
1996 Law on Administrative Penalties 
1997 Law on Administrative Supervision 
1999 Law on Administrative Reconsideration 
2002 Tibetan Language Law 
2005 Anti-Secession Law 
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White Papers and Policy Paper 
1991 Human Rights in China 
1992 Tibet - Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation 
1998 New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
2001 Tibet's March Toward Modemization 
2003 Freedom of Religious Belief in China 
2004 Tibet: China's Policy Paper on Tibet 
Miscellaneous Documentation 
1776 American Declaration of Independence 
1833 Slavery Abolition Act 
1914 Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations 
1951 Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 
1991 Charter of the Tibetans in-Exile 
1992 Opinion No. I of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace 
in Yugoslavia (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1494-1497 
1992 Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace 
in Yugoslavia (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1497-1499 
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1992 Opinion No. 8 of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace 
in Yugoslavia (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1521-1523 
1993 Bangkok Governmental Declaration 
Cases 
ici 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States ofAmerica) ICJ Reports 1986,14 
Continental Sheýf (Libyan Arab JamahiriyalMalta) Judgment of 3 June 1985, ICJ 
Reports 1985,13 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ Reports 1995,90 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971,13 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory Advisory Opinion, lCJ, 9 July 2004; (2004) 43 International Legal 
Materials 1009 
Legality of the Threat or Use offuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 1996,226 
Rcparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949,174 
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Western Sahara Case Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975,12 
CFI 
Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and 
Commission o the European Communities Judgment of the Court of First Instance of !f 
21 September 2005 
ICTY 
Indictment of 4 March 2004 against Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan Praljak, 
Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Covic, and Berislav Pusic (IT-04-74-PT) 
Canadian Domestic Cases 
Calder vA ttorney- General of British Columbia (1973) 34DLR(3d) 145 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia [ 1997] 3 SCR 10 10 
Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (1994) 96 International Law 
Reports 667 
Rv Sparrow [ 1990] 1 SCR 1075 
Reference re Secession of Quebec [ 1998] 25 SCR 217 
'51 
St Catherine'S Milling Co vR (18 8 8) 14 APP Cas 46 
Australian Domestic Case 
Mabo and others v Queensland (2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 
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